

**THE LIE THAT
‘BUSH LIED’**

"The road to tyranny, we must remember, begins with the
destruction of the truth."

--Bill Clinton, from a speech at the University of Connecticut, Oct
15, 1997.

Inter-war/Operation Rhetoric

“We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, -- a new world order -- can emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”

-President George Bush Sr. September 11, 1990

"We will chase [Americans] to every corner at all times. No high tower of steel will protect them against the fire of truth."

Saddam Hussein, Baghdad Radio, February 8, 1991

(Author's note: While Osama Bin Laden often declared war or issued Fatwehs against the U.S., he never threatened the US specifically and even denied ties to the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein often threatened to attack American towers-specifically the World Trade Center, and specifically threatened to attack New York City and Washington D.C..)

"[America] will not be excluded from the operations and explosions of the Arab and Muslim mujahidin and all the honest strugglers in the world."

Iraq News Agency, January 30, 1991 (State-controlled)

"What remains for Bush and his accomplices in crime is to understand that they are personally responsible for their crime. The Iraqi people will pursue them for this crime, even if they leave office and disappear into oblivion. There is no doubt they will understand what we mean if they know what revenge means to the Arabs."
Baghdad Radio, February 6, 1991 (State-controlled)

"Every Iraqi child, woman, and old man knows how to take revenge...They will avenge the pure blood that has been shed no matter how long it takes.
Baghdad Domestic Service, February 15, 1991 (State-controlled)
Iraq Masses Troops Against Kuwait, October 1994

"Does [America] realize the meaning of every Iraqi becoming a missile that can cross to countries and cities?"
Saddam Hussein, September 29, 1994

"[W]hen peoples reach the verge of collective death, they will be able to spread death to all..."
Al-Jumhuriyah, October 4, 1994 (State-controlled newspaper)

"[O]ur striking arm will reach [America, Britain and Saudi Arabia] before they know what hit them."
Al-Qadisiyah, October 6, 1994 (State-controlled newspaper)

"One chemical weapon fired in a moment of despair could cause the deaths of hundreds of thousands." Al-Quds al-Arabi, October 12, 1994 (State-controlled newspaper)

"Although Iraq's options are limited, they exist...Iraq's present state is that of a wounded tiger. Its blow could be painful, even if it is the last blow..."
Al-Quds Al-'Arabi, June 9, 1995 (State-controlled newspaper)

"[The U.S.] should send more coffins to Saudi Arabia, because no one can guess what the future has in store."
Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Radio, June 27, 1996

"One way or the other, we are determined to deny Iraq the capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. That is our bottom line."

- President Clinton, Feb. 4, 1998

"If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program."

- President Clinton, Feb. 17, 1998

"Iraq is a long way from [here], but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risks that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face."

- Madeline Albright, Feb 18, 1998

"He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has ten times since 1983."

- Sandy Berger, Clinton National Security Adviser,
Feb, 18, 1998

"[W]e urge you, after consulting with Congress, and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws, to take necessary actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile strikes on suspect Iraqi sites) to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs."

- Letter to President Clinton, signed by Sens. Carl Levin, Tom Daschle, John Kerry, and others, Oct. 9, 1998

"Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction technology which is a threat to countries in the region and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process."

- Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D, CA), Dec. 16, 1998

"Hussein has ... chosen to spend his money on building weapons of mass destruction and palaces for his cronies."

- Madeline Albright, Clinton Secretary of State, Nov. 10, 1999

"[Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti] blood will light torches, grow aromatic plants, and water the tree of freedom, resistance and victory."

Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Radio, January 26, 1999

"Whoever continues to be involved in a despicable aggressive war against the people of Iraq as a subservient party must realize that this aggressive act has a dear price."

Saddam Hussein, February 16, 1999

"What is required now is to deal strong blows to U.S. and British interests. These blows should be strong enough to make them feel that their interests are indeed threatened not only by words but also in deeds."

Al-Qadisiyah, February 27, 1999 (State-controlled newspaper)

U.S.S. Cole Bombing, October 12, 2000

"[Iraqis] should intensify struggle and jihad in all fields and by all means..."

Iraq TV, October 22, 2000 (State-controlled)

The Attacks of September 11

"The United States reaps the thorns its rulers have planted in the world."

Saddam Hussein, September 12, 2001

"There is no doubt that . Saddam Hussein has reinvigorated his weapons programs. Reports indicate that biological, chemical and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to pre-Gulf War status. In addition, Saddam continues to redefine delivery systems and is doubtless using the cover of a licit missile program to develop longer-range missiles that will threaten the United States and our allies."

-Letter to President Bush, signed by Sen. Bob Graham (D, FL) and others, Dec, 5, 2001

"[I]t is possible to turn to biological attack, where a small can, not bigger than the size of a hand, can be used to release viruses that affect everything..."

Babil, September 20, 2001 (State-controlled newspaper)

"The United States must get a taste of its own poison..."

Babil, October 8, 2001

"The real perpetrators [of September 11] are within the collapsed buildings."

Alif-Ba, September 11, 2002 (State-controlled newspaper)

"[September 11 was] God's punishment."

Al-Iktisadi, September 11, 2002 (State-controlled newspaper)

"If the attacks of September 11 cost the lives of 3,000 civilians, how much will the size of losses in 50 states within 100 cities if it were attacked in the same way in which New York and Washington were? What would happen if hundreds of planes attacked American cities?"

Al-Rafidayn, September 11, 2002 (State-controlled newspaper)

"The simple truth [about September 11] is that America burned itself and now tries to burn the world."

Alif-Ba, September 11, 2002 (State-controlled magazine)

Americans must be "...strong and tough and mature enough to recognize that even the best-prepared, best-equipped force will suffer losses in action. Our military men and women are prepared to face the risks. The American people will have to be as well."

-President Bill Clinton 1998

"The best way to end the threat now is a new government in Iraq."

-1998 (D) President Bill Clinton after Operation Desert Fox airstrikes on Iraq

"The hard fact is that so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for

all, is with a new Iraqi government ready to live in peace..."
-(D) President Bill Clinton 12/16/1998

Media Bias (the idea that war was popular until 11/02)

“Mr. Gorbachev earned worldwide admiration for ushering in the era of glasnost and perestroika in Russia. He worked relentlessly to force the U.S. and others to join his campaign to cut weapons of mass destruction and improve world security. But yesterday he was despairing of the aggressive agenda coming from the White House....”

– Oonagh Blackman, deputy political editor of London’s Daily Mirror, in a July 11 news story.

“Reinstating United Nations weapons inspectors – not the removal of Saddam Hussein – is the centerpiece of Britain’s policy toward Iraq, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said today. The statement, made on the BBC radio program Today, underscored the differences between the United States, which has made the removal of Mr. Hussein a priority, and Britain, its closest ally in fighting terrorism.”
– First two paragraphs of an August 23 New York Times story by Suzanne Kapner, headlined “British Aide Says Toppling Hussein Is Not a Goal for London.”

vs.

“An article on Friday about remarks by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on the British government’s Iraq policy misattributed a statement about that policy. The assessment that removing Saddam Hussein is ‘not an object of British foreign policy’ was made by the BBC interviewer, not by Mr. Straw.”

– New York Times correction published August 27.

Peter Jennings: “Some people are asking today whether or not the White House is losing control of the debate about war with Iraq.”

Terry Moran: "Well, Peter, White House officials are concerned that events are moving too fast and not in their direction. In the past couple of weeks, you've had top Republican leaders defecting from the pro-war camp, key allies opposing any action against Saddam Hussein....Mr. Bush's drive to topple Saddam Hussein received another sharp rebuke today from a close ally: Canada."

– World News Tonight, August 20.

"President Bush said today that he was listening carefully to a group of Republicans who were warning him against going to war with Iraq, but that he would still make up his own mind based on information that is very tightly held within his administration. It was the first time Mr. Bush had so directly addressed the growing chorus of concern from Republicans, which now includes former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger...."

– Front-page New York Times story by Elisabeth Bumiller, August 17.

vs.

"The administration should be prepared to undertake a national debate because the case for removing Iraq's capacity of mass destruction is extremely strong....The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, the demonstrated hostility of Saddam combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action."

– Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a Washington Post op-ed published August 12.

"The President disclosed that he has been reading Supreme Command, a new book by Eliot A. Cohen, a neoconservative hardliner on Iraq...."

"In his reading choice, Bush seems to be following the advice of Bill Kristol, the arch-neoconservative who has been using his Weekly Standard magazine to chide Bush for being too soft on Saddam Hussein....Kristol, suspected of playing puppeteer to a number of hawkish officials in the Bush Pentagon and National Security Council, appears to have added the marionette-in-chief to his act."

– Washington Post White House reporter Dana Milbank in his "White House Notebook" column, August 20.

“I think we’re going to see some interesting revisitations of journalistic history. For example, as the Iraq debate plays out of a war, I’m hearing a lot of echoes of the early ‘60s, when people were saying it was unpatriotic to report the debate over Vietnam....When you look at what the conservative columnists are saying, they’re expressing a perception of opinion, and they’re the best witness on it.”

– New York Times Executive Editor Howell Raines denying his newspaper’s coverage of Iraq has been biased, on the September 3 NewsHour on PBS.

“It’s no secret, now, that a great many American allies are very opposed to attacking Iraq unless the President makes a better case for it....With this many allies arrayed against an American invasion of Iraq, the question becomes, what would it mean for the United States to go it alone?”

– ABC’s Peter Jennings, World News Tonight, August 21.

“Even the optimists say if it were to go on for months, if Saddam Hussein eludes capture, then the cost to the American economy is likely to be heavy.”

– ABC’s John Cochran, World News Tonight, August 22.

“There are legal scholars who....say it would be unprecedented, a violation of the United Nations charter, and a reversal of nearly 200 years of U.S. policy to act only in response to an attack or the immediate threat of one.”

– ABC’s John Yang, World News Tonight, August 29.

“Now to the increasingly angry U.S. rhetoric against Iraq. The former South African President Nelson Mandela said today he is appalled by the U.S. threats. He said an attack would cause international chaos.”

– ABC’s Elizabeth Vargas, World News Tonight, Sept. 2.

“This business of attacking Iraq has been promoted so vigorously by some members of his administration, and running into such opposition, the President is now obliged to work harder at convincing people that what he wants is the right thing.”

– Jennings on World News Tonight, September 4.

“The prospect of war with Iraq caused anxiety on Wall Street today. The Dow Jones Industrial Average was down more than 355 points to close at 8308. On the Nasdaq, stocks were down 51 points. Investors expressing concern about the United States and about the state of the world in general.”

– Peter Jennings on ABC’s World News Tonight, Sept. 3.

vs.

“A report today that the manufacturing sector of the economy is still struggling helped to send stock prices sharply lower.”

– CBS’s Dan Rather on the same night’s Evening News.

And vs.

“The stock market sent a giant pessimistic signal after America’s factory business reported new orders were not what they had hoped in August. That triggered giant sell orders.”

– NBC Nightly News anchor Tom Brokaw, same night.

“My mother....was pretty anti-American. And so I was, in some respects, raised with anti-Americanism in my blood, or in my mother’s milk at least.”

– Peter Jennings, who was raised in Canada, on the September 6 Late Show on CBS.

"We ought not to politicize this war. We ought not to politicize the rhetoric about life and death,"

-Tom Daschle 9/25/02

The Rush to War?

There is a case to be made that further delay only works to Saddam Hussein's advantage, and that the clock should be seen to have been running on the issue of compliance for a decade: therefore not needing to be reset again to the starting point.”

-Former Vice President Al Gore 9/23/02

“Saddam Hussein’s track record is too compelling to ignore. We know that he continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices. And he may soon have the ability to use a nuclear weapon against other nations. I believe we have an obligation to protect the United States by preventing him from getting these weapons, and either using them himself or passing them or their components on to terrorists who share his destructive intent. As I stated in a speech I delivered in June, I believe we must confront the threat posed by the current Iraqi regime directly. But given the stakes involved and the potential risks to our security and the region, we must proceed carefully and deliberately. That’s why I felt it was essential to engage in negotiations in order to craft an effective and responsible authorization for the use of force if necessary -- so we can defend our nation and enforce U.N. resolutions pertaining to Iraq.

-Congressman Richard A. Gephardt (D) 10/10/02

Although I disagree with many other aspects of President Bush's foreign and domestic policy, I believe deeply that he is right about Iraq, and that our national security will be strengthened if members of both parties come together now to support the commander-in-chief and our military. That's why I have cosponsored the Senate resolution that was negotiated with the White House. It is time to

authorize the use of our military might to enforce U.N. resolutions, disarm Iraq, and eliminate the ongoing threat to our security, and the world's, posed by Saddam Hussein's rabid regime.

-Sen Joe Lieberman (D)

Iraq's Ties to the War on Terror

Now let me say to my colleagues, and my constituents in Missouri, why I have decided to vote for this Resolution. First, September 11th has made all the difference. The events of that tragic day jolted us to the enduring reality that terrorists not only seek to attack our interests abroad, but also to strike us here at home. We have clear evidence now that they even desire to use weapons of mass destruction against us.

-Congressman Richard A. Gephardt (D) 10/10/02

The events of September 11 created a new understanding of the terrorist threat and the degree to which every nation is vulnerable. That understanding enabled the Administration to forge a broad and impressive coalition against terrorism. Had the Administration tried then to capitalize on this unity of spirit to build a coalition to disarm Iraq, we would not be debating this question now, just a few weeks before Congressional elections.

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

"Before 9/11 we experienced the terrorist attacks on Khobar Towers, on the USS Cole, on two U.S. embassies in Africa. But we didn't believe it would happen here. On 9/11, it did happen here. And it can happen again. September 11th was the ultimate wake up call.

"We must now do everything in our power to prevent further terrorist attacks and ensure that an attack with a weapon of mass destruction cannot happen. The consequences of such an attack are unimaginable. We spent 50 years in a cold war and trillions of dollars deterring a weapon of mass destruction attack by another country. Now we must prevent such an attack by terrorists -- who, unlike our previous adversaries, are willing to die. In these new circumstances, deterrence may not work. With these new dangers, prevention must work.

-Congressman Richard A. Gephardt (D) 10/10/02

If you are worried about terrorists getting weapons of mass destruction or their components from countries - the first candidate you must worry about is Iraq. The 12-year history of the U.N. effort to disarm Iraq convinces me that Iraq is a problem that must be dealt with - diplomatically if we can - militarily if we must. I did not come to this view overnight. It has instead evolved over time as we have learned the facts about the Iraqi regime with increasing clarity. As you know, I opposed the use of force against Iraq in January 1991 in favor of giving sanctions more time to work. Others supported force, but thought that by dislodging Iraq from Kuwait, we would neutralize the threat. In hindsight, both of these assessments were wrong. In 1991, no one knew the extent to which Saddam Hussein would sacrifice the needs of his people in order to sustain his hold on power; deceive the international community in order to preserve his weapons of mass destructions programs; or take hostile actions against U.S interests in the region.

-Congressman Richard A. Gephardt (D) 10/10/02

Accidental Alliance-My Enemy's Enemy is my Friend

“We declared jihad against the US government, because the US government is unjust, criminal and tyrannical. It has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous and criminal whether directly or through its support of the Israeli occupation of the Prophet's Night Travel Land (Palestine). And we believe the US is directly responsible for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq.”

-Osama Bin Laden Interview with Peter Arnett Late March 1997

“A reaction might take place as a result of US government's hitting Muslim civilians and executing more than 600 thousand Muslim children in Iraq by preventing food and medicine from reaching them. So, the US is responsible for any reaction, because it extended its war against troops to civilians. This is what we say. As for what you asked regarding the American people, they are not exonerated from responsibility, because they chose this government and voted for it despite their knowledge of its crimes in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and in other places and its support of its agent regimes who filled our prisons with our best children and scholars.”

-Osama Bin Laden Interview with Peter Arnett Late March 1997

“The US does not consider it terrorism when hundreds of thousands of our sons and brothers in Iraq died for lack of food or medicine.”
-Osama Bin Laden Interview with Peter Arnett Late March 1997

“But I say if the American government is serious about avoiding the explosions inside the U.S., then let it stop provoking the feelings of 1,250 million Muslims. Those hundreds of thousands who have been killed or displaced in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, do have brothers and relatives. They would make of Ramzi Yousef a symbol and a teacher. The U.S. will drive them to transfer the battle into the United States.”

-Osama Bin Laden Interview with Peter Arnett Late March 1997

“There is a design aimed at redividing the Muslim world, similar to what happened in Afghanistan when it was divided into five mini-states. These days, there is also a plan to divide Iraq into three—one in the north for Muslim kurds, a state in the middle, and a third in the south. The same applies to the land of the two mosques (Saudi Arabia) where there is a plan to divide it into a state for the two mosques, another state for oil in the eastern region, and a state in the middle. This would make the people of the two mosques always busy trying to earn a living, and would leave a few people in the oil region who can be easily controlled.”

-Osama Bin Laden interview with Peter Arnett 12/22/98

“There is no doubt that the treacherous attack perpetrated a few days ago against the Muslim people of Iraq by the United States and Britain has confirmed several things, the most important of which is that Britain and America are acting on behalf of Israel and the Jews, to strike at any power in the Islamic world, with a view to paving the way for the Jews to divide the Muslim world once again and enslave it and boost the rest of its wealth.”

-Osama Bin Laden interview with Peter Arnett 12/22/98

“Suppose that the Americans have attacked an Islamic country and kidnapped my children, the children of Osama bin Laden, to use as a

shield, and then started to kill Muslims as is the case in Lebanon, Palestine, and these days in Iraq, and also when they supported the Serbs in massacring the Muslims in Bosnia. According to Islamic jurisprudence if we abstain from firing on the Americans lest we should kill these Muslims (used by Americans as shields), the harm that could befall Muslims at large, who are being attacked, outweighs the good of saving the lives of these Muslims used as shields.”

-Osama Bin Laden interview with Peter Arnett 12/22/98

“To seek to possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then this is an obligation I carried out and I thank God for enabling us to do that. And if I seek to acquire these weapons I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims. But how we could use these weapons if we possess them is up to us.”

-Osama Bin Laden interview with Peter Arnett 12/22/98

“Look at Iraq. At one point it was given support to attack Iran when it got away from American hegemony. But when Iraq managed to acquire some strength, it is now being heavily bombarded. The people of Iraq are being crushed, while the media tries to draw attention to some aspects of the conduct of Saddam Hussein, although a few thousand Iraqi Muslims die everyday.”

-Osama Bin Laden interview with Peter Arnett 12/22/98

“In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.
A message to our Muslim brothers in Iraq, may God's peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

O you who believe fear Allah, by doing all that He has ordered and by abstaining from all that He has forbidden as He should be feared. Obey Him, be thankful to Him, and remember Him always, and die not except in a state of Islam [as Muslims] with complete submission to Allah.

“We are following up with great interest and extreme concern the crusaders' preparations for war to occupy a former capital of Islam, loot Muslims' wealth, and install an agent government, which would be a satellite for its masters in Washington and Tel Aviv, just like all the other treasonous and agent Arab governments. This would be in preparation for establishing the Greater Israel. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“Amid this unjust war, the war of infidels and debauchees led by America along with its allies and agents, we would like to stress a number of important values: First, showing good intentions. This means fighting should be for the sake of the one God. It should not be for championing ethnic groups, or for championing the non-Islamic regimes in all Arab countries, including Iraq. God Almighty says: "Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who reject faith fight in the cause of evil." So fight ye against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan. Second, we remind that victory comes only from God and all we have to do is prepare and motivate for jihad. God Almighty says: "Oh ye who believe! If ye will help the cause of Allah, He will help you and plant your feet firmly." “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“Third, we realized from our defence and fighting against the American enemy that, in combat, they mainly depend on psychological warfare. This is in light of the huge media machine they have. They also depend on massive air strikes so as to conceal their most prominent point of weakness, which is the fear, cowardliness, and the absence of combat spirit among US soldiers. Those soldiers are completely convinced of the injustice and lying of their government. They also lack a fair cause to defend. They only fight for capitalists, usury takers, and the merchants of arms and oil, including the gang of crime at the White House. This is in addition to crusader and personal grudges by Bush the father. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“We also realized that one of the most effective and available methods of rendering the air force of the crusader enemy ineffective

is by setting up roofed and disguised trenches in large numbers. I had referred to that in a previous statement during the Tora Bora battle last year. In that great battle, faith triumphed over all the materialistic forces of the people of evil, for principles were adhered to, thanks to God Almighty. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“We were about 300 mujahideen [Islamic militants]. We dug 100 trenches that were spread in an area that does not exceed one square mile, one trench for every three brothers, so as to avoid the huge human losses resulting from the bombardment. Since the first hour of the US campaign on 20 Rajab 1422, corresponding to 7 October 2001, our centres were exposed to a concentrated bombardment. And this bombardment continued until mid-Ramadan. On 17 Ramadan, a very fierce bombardment began, particularly after the US command was certain that some of al-Qaeda leaders were still in Tora Bora, including the humble servant to God [referring to himself] and the brother mujahid Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri. The bombardment was round-the-clock and the warplanes continued to fly over us day and night. The US Pentagon, together with its allies, worked full time on blowing up and destroying this small spot, as well as on removing it entirely. Planes poured their lava on us, particularly after accomplishing their main missions in Afghanistan. The US forces attacked us with smart bombs, bombs that weigh thousands of pounds, cluster bombs, and bunker busters. Bombers, like the B-52, used to fly over head for more than two hours and drop between 20 to 30 bombs at a time. The modified C-130 aircraft kept carpet-bombing us at night, using modern types of bombs. The US forces dared not break into our positions, despite the unprecedented massive bombing and terrible propaganda targeting this completely besieged small area. This is in addition to the forces of hypocrites, whom they prodded to fight us for 15 days non-stop. Every time the latter attacked us, we forced them out of our area carrying their dead and wounded. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“Is there any clearer evidence of their cowardice, fear, and lies regarding their legends about their alleged power. To sum it up, the battle resulted in the complete failure of the international alliance of

evil, with all its forces, [to overcome] a small number of mujahideen - 300 mujahideen hunkered down in trenches spread over an area of one square mile under a temperature of -10 degrees Celsius. The battle resulted in the injury of 6% of personnel - we hope God will accept them as martyrs - and the damage of two percent of the trenches, praise be to God. If all the world forces of evil could not achieve their goals on a one square mile of area against a small number of mujahideen with very limited capabilities, how can these evil forces triumph over the Muslim world? This is impossible, God willing, if people adhere to their religion and insist on jihad for its sake. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“O mujahideen brothers in Iraq, do not be afraid of what the United States is propagating in terms of their lies about their power and their smart, laser-guided missiles. The smart bombs will have no effect worth mentioning in the hills and in the trenches, on plains, and in forests. They must have apparent targets. The well-camouflaged trenches and targets will not be reached by either the smart or the stupid missiles. There will only be haphazard strikes that dissipate the enemy ammunition and waste its money. Dig many trenches. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“We also recommend luring the enemy forces into a protracted, close, and exhausting fight, using the camouflaged defensive positions in plains, farms, mountains, and cities. The enemy fears city and street wars most, a war in which the enemy expects grave human losses. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“We stress the importance of the martyrdom operations against the enemy - operations that inflicted harm on the United States and Israel that have been unprecedented in their history, thanks to Almighty God. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“We also point out that whoever supported the United States, including the hypocrites of Iraq or the rulers of Arab countries, those

who approved their actions and followed them in this crusade war by fighting with them or providing bases and administrative support, or any form of support, even by words, to kill the Muslims in Iraq, should know that they are apostates and outside the community of Muslims. It is permissible to spill their blood and take their property.”

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“Regardless of the removal or the survival of the socialist party or Saddam, Muslims in general and the Iraqis in particular must brace themselves for jihad against this unjust campaign and acquire ammunition and weapons. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“Under these circumstances, there will be no harm if the interests of Muslims converge with the interests of the socialists in the fight against the crusaders, despite our belief in the infidelity of socialists. The jurisdiction of the socialists and those rulers has fallen a long time ago. Socialists are infidels wherever they are, whether they are in Baghdad or Aden. “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

“During the Al-Yarmuk Battle, a man told Khalid bin-al-Walid [an Islamic commander]: "The Byzantine soldiers are too many and the Muslims are few." So, Khalid told him: "Shame on you. Armies do not triumph with large numbers but are defeated if the spirit of defeatism prevails." “

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

Keep this saying before your eyes: "It is not fitting for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war until he hath thoroughly subdued the land." "Therefore, when ye meet the unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks."

-Osama Bin Laden tape 2/11/03

National Public Radio MORNING EDITION (10:00 a.m.ET) Feb. 18, 1999 THOUGH AFGHANISTAN HAS PROVIDED OSAMA BIN LADEN WITH SANCTUARY, IT IS UNCLEAR WHERE HE IS NOW. ANCHORS: BOB EDWARDS REPORTERS: MIKE

SHUSTER ... There have also been reports in recent months that bin Laden might have been considering moving his operations to Iraq. Intelligence agencies in several nations are looking into that. According to Vincent Cannistraro, a former chief of CIA counterterrorism operations, a senior Iraqi intelligence official, Farouk Hijazi(ph), sought out bin Laden in December and invited him to come to Iraq.

Mr. VINCENT CANNISTRARO (Former Chief of CIA Counterterrorism Operations): Farouk Hijazi, who was the Iraqi ambassador in Turkey ... known through sources in Afghanistan, members of Osama's entourage let it be known that the meeting had taken place.

-“ Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties”

In 1999 the Guardian, a British newspaper, reported that Farouk Hijazi, a senior officer in Iraq's mukhabarat, had journeyed deep into the icy mountains near Kandahar, Afghanistan, in December 1998 to meet with al Qaeda men. Mr. Hijazi is "thought to have offered bin Laden asylum in Iraq,"

-“The Iraq Al Qaeda Connections ”

FEBRUARY 19, 1998. Iraqi intelligence plans the trip of a senior al Qaeda operative and trusted bin Laden aide to visit Baghdad.

MARCH 1998. The al Qaeda operative visits Baghdad for two weeks. The visit sets the stage for Farouk Hijazi to travel to bin Laden's Afghanistan hideouts in December 1998.

-“ The Clinton Intel Record Deeper failures revealed”

On February 19, 1998, about six months prior to the attacks in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi, Iraqi intelligence officials set in motion a plan to bring a senior and trusted bin Laden aide to Baghdad from Khartoum. One of the key Mukhabarat intelligence documents shows that a recommendation was made for "...the deputy director general to bring the [bin Laden] envoy to Iraq because we may find in this envoy a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden." The meetings took place in March 1998.

The initial program to have the terror talks last for one week was extended to two because of the success in whatever nefarious plans were being hatched. The meetings also laid the groundwork for Iraq's former intelligence chief, Farouk Hijazi, arrested last Friday in Iraq, to meet with bin Laden in December 1998 in Afghanistan. Press reports also chronicled an earlier meeting between Hijazi and bin Laden in Sudan in 1994.

-“ The Clinton Intel Record Deeper failures revealed”

Oct. 31, 1999 BIN LADEN SPOTTED AFTER OFFER TO LEAVE
DATELINE: JALALABAD, AFGHANISTAN: ... The Taliban has since made it known through official channels that the likely destination is Iraq. A Clinton administration official said bin Laden's request "falls far short" of the UN resolution that the Taliban deliver him for trial. ...

-“ Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties”

United Press International Nov. 3, 1999, Wednesday, BC cycle.
WASHINGTON – The U.S. government has tried to prevent accused terror suspect Osama bin Laden from fleeing Afghanistan to either Iraq or Chechnya, Michael Sheehan, head of counter-terrorism at the State Department, told a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee. ...

-“ Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties”

U.S. Newswire Dec. 23, 1999 Terrorism Expert Reveals Why Osama bin Laden has Declared War On America; Available for Comment in Light of Predicted Attacks. ... Aauthor Yossef] Bodansky also reveals the relationship between bin Laden and Saddam Hussein and how the U.S. bombing of Iraq is "strengthening the hands of militant Islamists eager to translate their rage into violence and terrorism."

-“ Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties”

We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service.

-Sec. State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council

Top Iraqi intelligence officials and other trusted representatives of Saddam Hussein met repeatedly with bin Laden and his subordinates. Since Saddam personally insisted that the relationship between the two be kept secret, the contents of their conversations have apparently not yet been discovered. It is a safe bet, though, that operational cooperation was among the topics discussed.
-"Terror tied by memo"

In late 1998, Iraq sent an intelligence official to Afghanistan to seek close ties with bin Laden and the ruling Taliban. "The source reported that the Iraqi regime was trying to broaden its cooperation with al Qaeda." A senior Iraqi intelligence official met with the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Thereafter, bin Laden hosted a series of meetings with Iraqi officials in Pakistan.
-"Iraq al Qaeda link comes in focus"

Feb. 14, 1999 U.S. WORRIED ABOUT IRAQI, BIN LADEN TIES
TERRORIST COULD GAIN EVEN DEADLIER WEAPONS U.S.
intelligence officials are worried that a burgeoning alliance between terrorist leader Osama bin Laden and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could make the fugitive Saudi's loose-knit organization much more dangerous ... In addition, the officials said, Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal is now in Iraq, as is a renowned Palestinian bomb designer, and both could make their expertise available to bin Laden. "It's clear the Iraqis would like to have bin Laden in Iraq," said Vincent Cannistraro, a former head of counterterrorism operations at the Central Intelligence Agency ... Saddam has even offered asylum to bin Laden, who has expressed support for Iraq.
-" Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties"

... [in] late December, when bin Laden met a senior Iraqi intelligence official near Qandahar, Afghanistan, there has been increasing evidence that bin Laden and Iraq may have begun cooperating in planning attacks against American and British targets around the world. Bin Laden, who strikes in the name of Islam, and

Saddam, one of the most secular rulers in the Arab world, have little in common except their hatred of the United States ...
-“ Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties”

Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam's former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery.

-Sec. State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council

Between 1992 and 1995, Sudanese strongman Hassan al-Turabi set up a number of meetings between former Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) Deputy Director Faruq Hijazi and Ayman al-Zawahri, bin Laden's closest adviser. Other IIS-al Qaeda meetings occurred in Pakistan. Sometimes, al Qaeda members would visit Baghdad.
-"Iraq al Qaeda link comes in focus"

Hijazi, formerly a high-ranking Iraqi intelligence official, has confirmed to U.S. officials that he met Osama bin Laden in Sudan in 1994. He denies meeting with al Qaeda officials in 1998, but U.S. officials don't believe him. At that time, a leading newspaper in Rome reported that Hijazi traveled to Afghanistan on December 21, 1998, to offer asylum to bin Laden. The Corriere della Sera described Hijazi as "the person who has been responsible for nurturing Iraq's ties with the fundamentalist warriors since 1994."
-"Saddam's links to Osama were no secret"

SHUSTER: Iraq's contacts with bin Laden go back some years, to at least 1994, when, according to one U.S. government source, Hijazi met him when bin Laden lived in Sudan. According to Cannistraro, Iraq invited bin Laden to live in Baghdad to be nearer to potential targets of terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. There is a wide gap between bin Laden's fundamentalism and Saddam Hussein's secular dictatorship. But some experts believe bin Laden might be tempted to live in Iraq because of his reported desire to obtain chemical or biological weapons. CIA director George Tenet

referred to that in recent testimony. ... Foreign news services also carried news of the now-suppressed Saddam-bin Laden connection: Agence France-Presse Feb. 17, 1999 Saddam plans to use bin Laden against Kuwait, Saudi: opposition Iraq's President Saddam Hussein plans to use alleged terrorist Osama bin Laden's network to carry out his threats against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, an Iraqi opposition figure charged on Wednesday. "If the ... Jaber, a member of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), said Iraq had "offered to shelter bin Laden under the precondition that he carry out strikes on targets in neighbouring countries."
-“ Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties”

Newsweek magazine, in its January 11, 1999, issue, ran the headline "Saddam + Bin Laden." The subhead declared, "America's two enemies are courting." The article was written by Christopher Dickey, Gregory Vistica, Russell Watson, and Joseph Contreras. The authors cited reports from an "Arab intelligence source" about the alliance.
-"Saddam's links to Osama were no secret"

The Hijazi meeting wasn't the only Iraq-al Qaeda around that time. Eleven months before bin Laden spoke to Time, then-President Bill Clinton traveled to the Pentagon, where he gave a speech preparing the nation for war with Iraq. Clinton told the world that Saddam Hussein would work with an "unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized international criminals." His warning was stern.

We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century. . . . They will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen. There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein.

The timing, once again, is critical. Clinton's speech came on February 18, 1998. The next day, according to documents uncovered earlier this week in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein reached out to bin Laden. A document dated February 19, 1998, and labeled "Top Secret and Urgent" tells of a plan for an al Qaeda operative to travel

from Sudan to Iraq for talks with Iraqi intelligence. The memo focused on Saudi Arabia, another common bin Laden and Hussein foe, and declared that the Mukhabarat would pick up "all the travel and hotel costs inside Iraq to gain the knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy an oral message from us to bin Laden." The document further explained that the message "would relate to the future of our relationship with him, bin Laden, and to achieve a direct meeting with him." The document also held open the possibility that the al Qaeda representative could be "a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden."

There is certainly much more to learn about the "contacts with bin Laden" after this meeting. What is clear, though, is that it is no longer defensible to claim there were no contacts. The skeptics, including many at the CIA, who argued that previous evidence of such links was not compelling, ought to be convinced now. They may well argue that, given the timing of the contacts, Saddam reached out to al Qaeda only when he felt threatened. The facts as we know them today are consistent with such a conclusion. But as journalists continue to pore over documents, and military analysts begin to do the same, it would be hasty to imagine that we've already uncovered everything there is to find on the bin Laden-Saddam tie.

- "Saddam's links to Osama were no secret"

DATELINE: Kuwait City An Iraqi opposition group claimed in a published report Wednesday that Islamic militant Osama bin Laden is in Iraq from where he plans to launch a campaign of terrorism against Baghdad's Gulf neighbours. The claim was made by Bayan Jabor, spokesman for the Teheran-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Bin Laden "recently settled in Iraq at the invitation of Saddam Hussein in exchange for directing strikes against targets in neighbouring countries," Jabor told the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai al-Aam ... Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, where he had been living, said they lost track of him. Media reports have speculated he sought refuge in Chechnya, Somalia, Iraq, or with a non-Taliban group in Afghanistan. Jabor, who was interviewed in Damascus, Syria, said Iraq began

extending invitations to bin Laden six months ago, shortly after the United States bombed his suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan after linking him with the August 7 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and in Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania. The United States indicted Bin Laden for the embassy bombings and has offered a five million dollar reward for information leading to his capture. Bin Laden's disappearance has coincided with stepped up threats by Iraq against neighbours Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey for allowing the United States and Britain to use their air bases to carry out air patrols over two "no-fly" zones over northern and southern Iraq.

-“ Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties”

In its November 16, 2002, edition, Babil identified one Abd-al-Karim Muhammad Aswad as an "intelligence officer," describing him as the "official in charge of regime's contacts with Osama bin Laden's group and currently the regime's representative in Pakistan." A man of this name was indeed the Iraqi ambassador to Pakistan from the fall of 1999 until the fall of the regime.

-“Saddam's links to Osama were no secret”

Whatever the differences between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime, the two shared a hatred of America. One Iraqi official, some weeks after the September 11 attacks, publicly criticized the United States for rooting out al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The official was quoted in a report in broken English carried on The Pakistan Newswire of October 29, 2001, which said: "He stressed the US to stop bombardment on Afghanistan resulting in death of innocent children, women and elderly people." The official, who had been in his job since 1999, also expressed doubt that bin Laden was even a terrorist and responsible for 9/11. He "said the US President Bush should knock the door of international court of justice to address the situation because only court had authority to declare Prime suspect of September 11 tragedy 'Osama Bin Laden' terrorist or not."

You might recognize the official's name. It was published in Babil last fall: Abd-al-Karim Muhammad Aswad, "intelligence officer, official in charge of regime's contacts with Osama bin Laden's group and currently the regime's representative in Pakistan."

- "Saddam's links to Osama were no secret"

From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan played the role of liaison to the al-Qaeda organization.

- Sec. State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council

"Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi [a senior al Qaeda operative] said he was told by an al Qaeda associate that he was tasked to travel to Iraq (1998) to establish a relationship with Iraqi intelligence to obtain poisons and gases training. After the USS Cole bombing in 2000, two al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq for [Chemical and Biological Weapons] CBW-related training beginning in December 2000. Iraqi intelligence was 'encouraged' after the embassy and USS Cole bombings to provide this training."

(I really like this one since he was allegedly involved (per 1999 reports) in getting Yousef into the Philippines prior to Operation Bjoinka)

- "Terror tied by memo"

More worrisome, the American officials said, are indications that there may be contacts between bin Laden's organization and Iraq's Special Security Organization (SSO), run by Saddam's son Qusay. Both the SSO and the Mukhabarat were involved in a failed 1993 plot to assassinate former President George Bush ...

"The idea that the same people who are hiding Saddam's biological weapons may be meeting with Osama bin Laden is not a happy one," said one American official.... Beacon Journal wire services

- "Clinton-Era Reports Cited Saddam-bin Laden Ties"

- Brig. Salim al-Ahmed, an IIS bomb maker, traveled to bin Laden's farm in Sudan and gave instructions on how to build sophisticated explosives. He was observed at the farm in the fall of 1995 and again in July 1996, the year bin Laden left Sudan and established a new base in Afghanistan.

- "Iraq al Qaeda link comes in focus"

Mani abd-al-Rashid, IIS director, went to the farm to meet bin Laden during the same time period. "The Iraqi intelligence chief and two other IIS officers met at bin Laden's farm and discussed bin Laden's request for IIS technical assistance in: a) making letter and parcel bombs; b) making bombs which could be placed on aircraft and detonated by changes in barometric pressure; and c) making false passport."

Bin Laden asked that al-Ahmed, who is skilled in making car bombs, stay at the farm after al-Rashid departed.

- "Iraq al Qaeda link comes in focus"

l-Zawahri traveled to Baghdad in February 1998 and met with one of Iraq's vice presidents.

"The goal of the visit was to arrange for coordination between Iraq and bin Laden and establish camps in an-Nasiriyah and Iraqi Kurdistan under the leadership of Abdul Aziz," the intelligence report states.

- "Iraq al Qaeda link comes in focus"

(note: I really like this one since the Marines and 3rd ID fought the bloodiest and most deadly battle of OIF....in Nasariah and just north of it at Kifl.)

'During a custodial interview, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi [a senior al Qaeda operative] said he was told by an al Qaeda associate that he was tasked to travel to Iraq (1998) to establish a relationship with Iraqi intelligence to obtain poisons and gases training. After the USS Cole bombing in 2000, two al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq for CBW-related [Chemical and Biological Weapons] training beginning in Dec 2000. Iraqi intelligence was "encouraged" after the embassy and USS Cole bombings to provide this training'.

- "Publish this right now"

Statements that Iraq Posed an Urgent Threat

Won't a war against Iraq slow or stop our more urgent war against terrorism? To me, the two are inextricably linked. First, remember that Iraq under Saddam is one of only seven nations in the world to be designated by our State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, providing aid and training to terrorists who have killed Americans and others. Second, Saddam himself meets the definition of a terrorist -- someone who attacks civilians to achieve a political purpose. Third, though the relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam's regime is a subject of intense debate within the intelligence community, we have evidence of meetings between Iraqi officials and leaders of al Qaeda, and testimony that Iraqi agents helped train al Qaeda operatives to use chemical and biological weapons.

-Sen Joe Lieberman (D)

This is not an easy decision, and it carries many risks. It will also carry costs, certainly in resources, and almost certainly in lives. After careful consideration, I believe that the risk of inaction is far greater than the risk of action.

-Sen. John Edwards (D) 9/12/02

Why has military action against Saddam become so urgent? Why not give diplomacy and inspections another chance? Why now? For more than a decade we have tried everything -- diplomacy, sanctions, inspections, limited military action -- except war to convince Saddam to keep the promises he made, and the U.N. endorsed, to end the Gulf War. Those steps have not worked. In 1998, Bob Kerrey, John McCain, and I sponsored the Iraq Liberation Act declaring it national policy to change the regime in

Baghdad. The act became law, but until recently little has been done to implement it. In the meantime, Saddam has not wavered from his ambition for hegemonic control over the Persian Gulf and the Arab world: He has invested vast amounts of his national treasure in building inventories of biological and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them to targets near and far. Saddam once told his Republican Guard that its national honor would not be achieved until Iraq's arm reached out beyond its borders to "every point in the Arab homeland."

So, my answer to "Why now?" is, "Why not earlier?" And, of course, that question has new urgency since Sept. 11, 2001.

-Sen Joe Lieberman (D)

The path of confronting Saddam is full of hazards. But the path of inaction is far more dangerous. This week, a week where we remember the sacrifice of thousands of innocent Americans made on 9-11, the choice could not be starker. Had we known that such attacks were imminent, we surely would have used every means at our disposal to prevent them and take out the plotters. We cannot wait for such a terrible event – or, if weapons of mass destruction are used, one far worse – to address the clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

-Sen. John Edwards (D) 9/12/02

“Senator Reed, it means that any president, when he's presented with intelligence, has got to make a choice about how much risk he's prepared to run for the nation that he leads. It is my belief that regardless of political party, after 9/11, the shadowing effects of that horrible tragedy changed as a nation the level of risk that all of us are prepared to run, that we would like to avoid.

But where you place yourself on that spectrum of how much risk you're going to run is a political responsibility which elected officials have and I certainly don't have. And so, I think fundamentally that's why in a democracy, we elect people like you and we elect a president to make those determinations. It's not a fixed point that is ever going to be carved as pi is constant. It is, "What's the world look like and how much risk will I run?"

... I think it's often easy to forget that in the case of Saddam, here's an individual who had invaded two neighboring countries, used

chemical weapons against one of those, used them against his own neighbors and who, by U.N. testimony, had cheated and lied for a decade. So, I mean, as I look back on the evidence, I understand the decision while honoring the right of any elected leader to choose how much risk he's prepared to run. And that's what I mean by that. I don't think it's something that is a physics constant that you can just pull out of a table.”

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

"It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. What we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war,"

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

“I believe it is essential that when we see a threat, we deal with those threats before they become imminent. It's too late if they become imminent. It's too late in this new kind of war, and so that's why I made the decision I made.”

-President Bush interview with Meet the Press

Statements about Iraq's Nuclear Capabilities

Claims about the Status of Iraq's Nuclear Program

Iraq has maintained its nuclear scientists and technicians as well as sufficient dual-use manufacturing capability to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi defectors who once worked for Iraq's nuclear weapons establishment have reportedly told American officials that acquiring nuclear weapons is a top priority for Saddam Hussein's regime.

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

"There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years ... We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in development of weapons of mass destruction."

- Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D, WV), Oct 10, 2002

"Iraq has maintained its nuclear scientists and technicians as well as sufficient dual-use manufacturing capability to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi defectors who once worked for Iraq's nuclear weapons establishment have reportedly told American officials that acquiring nuclear weapons is a top priority for Saddam Hussein's regime. "

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I firmly believe that the issue of Iraq is not about politics. It's about national security. We know that for at least 20 years, Saddam Hussein has obsessively sought weapons of mass destruction through every means available. We know that he has chemical and biological weapons today. He has used them in the past, and he is doing everything he can to build

more. Each day he inches closer to his longtime goal of nuclear capability -- a capability that could be less than a year away.

-Sen. John Edwards (D) 9/12/02

"If Iraq could acquire this material from abroad, the CIA estimates that it could have a nuclear weapon within one year."

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

"I thought the White House did the right thing in just saying 'we probably shouldn't have said that,'

...

"You know, everybody makes mistakes when they are president," Clinton said. "I mean, you can't make as many calls as you have to make without messing up once in awhile. The thing we ought to be focused on is what is the right thing to do now. That's what I think."

-Former President Bill Clinton on CNN's Larry King

In October 2001, we picked up warnings that terrorists had acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb. If detonated in New York City, hundreds of thousands of Americans would have died, and most of Manhattan would have been destroyed. Sam Nunn had an important warning, "This intelligence report was judged to be false. But it was never judged to be implausible or impossible."

-Sen. John Kerry 1/23/03

Who is responsible for 911

Geraldo Rivera: “I don’t want the country to disintegrate back into that partisan bitterness...that marked the end of the Clinton years where everybody was just hating everybody because of your political party. To me that’s so irrelevant.”

Co-host Kelly Ripa: “Do you think that leaves us more susceptible to terrorist attacks when they know we’re so distracted by other things?”

Rivera: “Hundreds of FBI agents were working on Monica Lewinsky! I mean, there were 12 of them the day they busted her at that hotel in Virginia. Don’t you wish those guys were looking for terrorists before September 11th?”

– Exchange on the July 10 Live with Regis and Kelly.

“I think very definitely that foreign policy could have caused what has happened [last September 11]....It certainly should be apparent now – it should be, for goodness sakes understood now, but it is not – that the problem is this great division between the rich and the poor in the world. We represent the rich....Most of these other nations of Africa, Asia and South America and Central America are very, very poor.... This is a revolution in effect around the world. A revolution is in place today. We are suffering from a revolution of the poor and have-nots against the rich and haves and that’s us.”

– Walter Cronkite on CNN’s Larry King Live, September 9.

While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of the

attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, the Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the September 11 attacks, particularly when considered for its collective significance.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence

Community received a modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States. Nonetheless, testimony and interviews confirm that it was the general view of the Intelligence Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to attack in the domestic United States.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

Malaysia Meeting and Travel of al-Qa'ida Operatives to the United States 5.b. The Intelligence Community acquired additional, and highly significant, information regarding Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in early 2000. Critical parts of the information concerning al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi lay dormant within the Intelligence Community for as long as eighteen months, at the very time when plans for the September 11 attacks were proceeding. The CIA missed repeated opportunities to act based on information in its possession that these two Bin Ladin associated terrorists were traveling to the United States, and to add their names to watchlists.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

[Terrorist Communications in Spring 2000]

5.c. [In January 2000, after the meeting of al-Qa'ida operatives in Malaysia, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi entered the United States [classified]. Thereafter, the Intelligence Community obtained information indicating that an individual named "Khaled" at an unknown location had contacted a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East. The Intelligence Community reported some of this information, but did not report all of it. Some of it was not reported because it was deemed not terrorist-related. It was not until after September 11, 2001 that the Intelligence Community determined that these contacts had been made from future hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar while he was living within the domestic United States.]

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

5.e. On July 10, 2001, an FBI Phoenix field office agent sent an "Electronic Communication" to 4 individuals in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) and two people in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) at FBI headquarters, and to two agents on International Terrorism squads in the New York Field Office. In the communication, the agent expressed his concerns, based on his first-hand knowledge, that there was a coordinated effort underway by Bin Ladin to send students to the United States for civil aviation-related training. He noted that there was an "inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest" in this type of training in Arizona and expressed his suspicion that this was an effort to establish a cadre of individuals in civil aviation who would conduct future terrorist activity. The Phoenix EC requested that FBI Headquarters consider implementing four recommendations:

- accumulate a list of civil aviation university/colleges around the country;
- establish liaison with these schools;
- discuss the theories contained in the Phoenix EC with the Intelligence Community; and
- consider seeking authority to obtain visa information concerning individuals seeking to attend flight schools.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

However, the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the action requested by the Phoenix agent prior to September 11, 2001. The communication generated little or no interest at either FBI Headquarters or the FBI's New York field office. The FBI Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui 5.f. In August 2001, the FBI's Minneapolis field office, in conjunction with the INS, detained Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national who had enrolled in flight training in Minnesota. FBI agents there also suspected that Moussaoui was involved in a hijacking plot. FBI Headquarters attorneys determined that there was not probable cause to obtain a court order to search Moussaoui's belongings under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, personnel at FBI Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalism Unit and the National Security Law Unit, as well as agents in the Minneapolis field office, misunderstood the legal standard for obtaining an order under FISA. As a result, FBI Minneapolis Field Office personnel wasted valuable investigative resources trying to connect the Chechen rebels to al-Qa'ida. Finally, no one at the FBI apparently connected the Moussaoui investigation with the heightened threat environment in the summer of 2001, the Phoenix communication, or the entry of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi into the United States.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In June 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information from several sources that Bin Ladin was considering attacks in the United States, including Washington, D.C., and New York. This information was provided to [classified] senior government officials in July 1998.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The information was passed to the FBI and the FAA. The latter found the plot to be highly unlikely, given the state of the foreign country's aviation program. Moreover, the agencies believed that a flight originating outside the United States would be detected before it

reached its intended target inside the United States. The FBI's New York office took no action on the information, filing the communication in the office's bombing file. The Intelligence Community acquired additional information since then suggesting links between this group and other terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In September 1998, the Community prepared a memorandum detailing al-Qa'ida infrastructure in the United States, including the use of fronts for terrorist activities.

This information was provided to [classified] senior government officials in September 1998.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In September 1998, the Community obtained information that Bin Ladin's next operation might involve flying an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it. This information was provided to [classified] senior government officials in late 1998.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In October 1998, the Community obtained information that al-Qa'ida was trying to establish an operative cell within the United States. This information suggested an 1998 effort to recruit U.S. citizen Islamists and U.S.-based expatriates from the Middle East and North Africa.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In the fall of 1998, the Community received information concerning a Bin Ladin plot involving aircraft in the New York and Washington, D.C. areas.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In November 1998, the Community obtained information that a Bin Ladin terrorist cell was attempting to recruit a group of five to seven men from the United States to travel to the Middle East for training, in conjunction with a plan to strike U.S. domestic targets.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In November 1998, the Community received information that Bin Ladin and senior associates had agreed to allocate rewards for the assassination of four “top” intelligence agency officers. The bounty for each assassination was \$9 million. The bounty was in response to the U.S. announcement of an increase in the reward for information leading to Bin Ladin’s arrest.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In the spring of 1999, the Community obtained information about a planned Bin Ladin attack on a government facility in Washington, D.C.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In August 1999, the Community obtained information that Bin Ladin’s organization had decided to target the U.S. Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and DCI. “Target” was interpreted by Community analysts to mean “assassinate.”

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In September 1999, the Community obtained information that Bin Ladin and others were planning a terrorist act in the United States, possibly against specific landmarks in California and New York City.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In late 1999, the Community obtained information regarding possible Bin Ladin network plans to attack targets in Washington, D.C. and New York City during the Millennium celebrations.

200
-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressay was arrested as he attempted to enter the United States from Canada, and chemicals and detonator materials were found in his car. Ressay’s intended target was Los Angeles International Airport. Ressay was later determined to have links to Bin Ladin’s terrorist network.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In February 2000, the Community obtained information that Bin Ladin was making plans to assassinate U.S. intelligence officials, including the Director of the FBI.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In March 2000, the Community obtained information regarding the types of targets that operatives in Bin Ladin's network might strike. The Statue of Liberty was specifically mentioned, as were skyscrapers, ports, airports, and nuclear power plants.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In March 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained information suggesting that Bin Ladin was planning attacks in specific West Coast areas, possibly involving the assassination of several public officials.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In April 2001, the Community obtained information from a source with terrorist

connections who speculated that Bin Ladin was interested in commercial pilots as

[page 211] potential terrorists. The source warned that the United States should not

focus only on embassy bombings, that terrorists sought "spectacular and traumatic" attacks and that the first World Trade Center bombing would be the type of attack that would be appealing. The source did not mention a timeframe for an attack. Because the source was offering personal speculation and not hard information, the information was not disseminated within the Intelligence Community.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

Between late March and September 2001, the Intelligence Community identified numerous signs of an impending terrorist attack, some of which pointed specifically to the United States as a target:

□ In March, an intelligence source claimed that a group of Bin Ladin operatives was planning to conduct an unspecified attack in the United States in April 2001. One of the operatives allegedly resided in the United States.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In April, the Intelligence Community obtained information that unspecified terrorist operatives in California and New York State were planning a terrorist attack in those states for April.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ [Between May and July, the National Security Agency reported at least thirty-three communications suggesting a possibly imminent terrorist attack. The Intelligence Community thought at the time that one of them might have constituted a signal to proceed with terrorist operations. While none of these reports provided specific information on the attack, and it was not clear that any persons involved in the intercepted communications had first-hand knowledge of where, when, or how an attack might occur, they were widely disseminated within the Intelligence Community].

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In May, the Intelligence Community obtained a report that Bin Ladin supporters were planning to infiltrate the United States by way of Canada to carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives. This report mentioned without specifics an attack within the United States. In July, this information was shared with the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, and the State Department and was included in an intelligence report for senior government officials in August.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In May, the Department of Defense acquired and shared with other elements of the Intelligence Community information suggesting that seven persons associated with Bin Ladin had departed various locations for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In June, CTC obtained information that key operatives in Bin Ladin's organization were disappearing, while others were preparing for martyrdom.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In July, the CTC became aware of a person who had recently been in Afghanistan who reported, "Everyone is talking about an impending attack." The Intelligence Community was also aware that Bin Ladin had stepped up his propaganda efforts in the preceding months.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ On August 16, the INS detained Zacarias Moussaoui in Minneapolis, Minnesota. His conduct had aroused suspicions about why he was learning to fly large commercial aircraft and had prompted the flight school he was attending to contact the local FBI field office. FBI agents believed that Moussaoui might have intended to carry out a terrorist act.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ On August 23, CIA requested that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, who had first come to the attention of the CIA and NSA in 1999 as possible associates of Bin Ladin's network, be added to the Department of State watchlist for denying entry to the United States.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In late summer, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a person associated with al-Qa'ida was considering terrorist operations in the United States. There was no information as to the timing or possible targets.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ On September 10, NSA intercepted two communications [classified] suggesting imminent terrorist activity. These communications were not translated into English and disseminated until September 12. They were not specific, and it is unclear whether they referred to the September 11 attacks. During the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community also disseminated information

to a wide range of senior government officials at all federal agencies and military commands about the potential for imminent terrorist attacks.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ On June 25, the Intelligence Community issued a terrorist threat advisory warning government agencies that there was a high probability of an imminent “spectacular” terrorist attack resulting in numerous casualties against U.S. interests abroad by Sunni extremists associated with al-Qa’ida.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ Subsequently, intelligence information provided to [classified] senior government leaders on June 30 indicated that Bin Ladin’s organization expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences on governments or cause major casualties.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ [A briefing prepared for senior government officials at the beginning of July asserted: “Based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning].”

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ Later, on July 9, intelligence information provided to [classified] senior government leaders indicated that members of Bin Ladin’s organization continued to expect imminent attacks on U.S. interests.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

* National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice stated in a May 16, 2002 press briefing that, on August 6, 2001, the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) included information about Bin Ladin’s methods of operation from a historical perspective dating back to 1997. One of the methods was that Bin Ladin might choose to hijack an airliner

in order to hold passengers hostage to gain release of one of their operatives. She stated, however, that the report did not contain specific warning information, but only a generalized warning, and did not contain information that al-Qa'ida was discussing a particular planned attack against a specific target at any specific time, place, or by any specific method.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

The rise in threat reporting concerning Bin Ladin in 2001, though lacking in detail, did generate government terrorist advisories and warnings.”

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ An FAA Circular on June 22, 2001, referring to a possible hijacking plot by Islamic terrorists to secure the release of fourteen persons incarcerated in the United States in connection with the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ A public, worldwide caution issued by the State Department on June 22, warning Americans traveling abroad of the increased risk of a terrorist action.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ Four terrorism warning reports or warning report extensions issued by the Department of Defense on June 22 and 26, and July 6 and 20, primarily to alert U.S. military forces and the Department of Defense to signs that Bin Ladin's network was planning a near-term, anti-U.S. terrorist operation.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ A State Department démarche to Taliban representatives in Pakistan on June 26, 2001, declaring that the Taliban would be held responsible for terrorist attacks carried out by Bin Ladin or al-Qa'ida.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ An FBI communication on July 2, advising federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies of increased threat reporting about

groups aligned with or sympathetic to Bin Ladin. The communication noted that the majority of the reports suggested a potential for attacks against U.S. targets abroad and that the FBI had no information suggesting a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States, although the possibility could not be discounted.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In December 1994, Algerian Armed Islamic Group terrorists hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. French authorities deceived the terrorists into thinking the plane did not have enough fuel to reach Paris and diverted it to Marseilles. A French anti-terrorist force stormed the plane and killed all four terrorists.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In January 1995, a Philippine National Police raid turned up material in a Manila apartment suggesting that Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Murad, and Khalid Shaykh Mohammad planned, among other things, to crash an airplane into CIA Headquarters. The police said that the same group was responsible for the bombing of a Philippine airliner on December 12, 1994. Information on the threat was passed to the FAA, which briefed U.S. and major foreign carriers.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In January 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained information concerning a planned suicide attack by persons associated with Shaykh al-Rahman and a key al-Qa'ida operative to fly to the United States from Afghanistan and attack the White House.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In October 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv. A passenger would board the plane in the Far East, commandeer the aircraft, order it to fly over Tel Aviv, and crash the plane into the city.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In 1997, an FBI Headquarters unit became concerned about the possibility that an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) would be used in terrorist attacks. The FBI and CIA became aware of reports that a group had purchased a UAV and concluded that the group might use the plane for reconnaissance or attack. The possibility of an attack outside the United States was thought to be more likely, for example, by flying a UAV into a U.S. embassy or a U.S. delegation.
-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a group, since linked to al-Qa'ida, planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. As explained earlier, the FAA found the plot to be highly unlikely given the state of the foreign country's aviation program. Moreover, the agencies concluded that a flight originating outside the United States would be detected before it reached its target. The FBI's New York office took no action on the information.
-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In September 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that Bin Ladin's next operation might involve flying an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it. This information was provided to senior government officials in late 1998.
-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In November 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that the Turkish Kaplancilar, an Islamic extremist group, had planned a suicide attack to coincide with celebrations marking the death of Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. The conspirators, who were arrested, planned to crash an airplane packed with explosives into Ataturk's tomb during a ceremony. The Turkish press said the group had cooperated with Bin Ladin, and the FBI's New York office included this incident in a Bin Ladin database.
-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In February 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained information that Iraq had formed a suicide pilot unit that it planned

to use against British and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. The CIA commented that this was highly unlikely and probably disinformation.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In March 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding plans by an al-Qa'ida member, who was a U.S. citizen, to fly a hang glider into the Egyptian Presidential Palace and detonate explosives. The person, who received hang glider training in the United States, brought a hang glider to Afghanistan. However, various problems arose during the testing of the glider. He was subsequently arrested and is in custody abroad.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In April 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an alleged Bin Ladin plot to hijack a Boeing 747. The source, a "walk-in" to the FBI's Newark office, claimed that he had learned hijacking techniques and received arms training in a Pakistani camp. He also claimed that he was to meet five or six persons in the United States. Some of these persons would be pilots who had been instructed to take over a plane, fly to Afghanistan, or, if they could not make it there, blow the plane up. Although the source passed a polygraph, the Bureau was unable to verify any aspect of his story or identify his contacts in the United States.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

□ In August 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained information about a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Nairobi from an airplane or crash the airplane into it. The Intelligence Community learned that two people who were reportedly acting on instructions from Bin Ladin met in October 2000 to discuss this plot. The CIA disseminated several of these reports to the FBI and to agencies responsible for preventive actions. These included the FAA, which is responsible for issuing security directives, alerting domestic and international airports and airlines of threats the Intelligence Community has identified.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, DCI Tenet mentioned additional evidence developed since September 11 concerning al-Qa'ida's intention of to use airplanes as weapons: [After 11 September, we learned from a foreign government service that in 1996, Bin Ladin's second-in-command, Muhammad Atif, drew up a study on the feasibility of hijacking US planes and destroying them in flight, possibly influenced by Yousef's and Mukhtar's unrealized plans [the Bojinka Plot]. . . . Bin Ladin's determination to strike America at home increased with the issuance of the February 1998 fatwa targeting all Americans, both military and civilian. The ideas about destroying commercial airliners that had been circulating in al-Qa'ida leadership circles for several years appear to have been revived after that fatwa, in the early planning stages of the 9/11 plot. We believe that outside events also shaped al-Qa'ida leaders' thinking about an airliner attack. [CLASSIFIED] the October 1999 crash of Egypt Air Flight 990, attributed in the media to a suicidal pilot, may have encouraged al-Qa'ida's growing impression that air travel was a vulnerability for the United States].

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

On August 20, 1998, in an address to the nation on military action against terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, President Clinton declared: "A few months ago, and again this week, Bin Ladin publicly vowed to wage a terrorist war against America."

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

On August 22, 1998, in a radio address to the nation, President Clinton declared: "Our efforts against terrorism cannot and will not end with this strike. We should have realistic expectations about what a single action can achieve, and we must be prepared for a long battle."

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

December 1998, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet elaborated on the President's statements in a memorandum to senior CIA managers, the Deputy DCI for Community Management, and the Assistant DCI for Military Support, declaring war on Bin Ladin: We must now enter a new phase in our effort against Bin Ladin. . . .

We are at war. . . . I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside [the] CIA or the Community.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

The President also ordered the U.S. Navy to fire cruise missiles at targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. Some of the missiles were aimed at a location where Bin Ladin was thought to be, and the Joint Inquiry was told that one of the objectives of the strike was to kill Bin Ladin.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In April 2002, the Intelligence Community learned that KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] and his group conceived the September 11 plot. KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] is also known as Mukhtar or “the Brain].”

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

Investigators determined in 1995 that KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] was linked to the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

Investigators determined in 1995 that KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] was linked to the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Federal prosecutors gave CIA a copy of a financial wire transaction for \$660 between Qatar and the U.S., dated several days before the blast, from “Khaled Shaykh” in Doha to Muhammad Salameh, one of four defendants convicted in the World Trade Center bombing. With additional information that emerged from the Philippines investigation described below, CIA was able to determine that Khaled was KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD], that KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] was an uncle of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing plot, and that KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] had married the sister of Yousef’s wife.

[In 1995, Yousef's plots to bomb twelve U.S. airplanes flying Asian routes, kill the Pope, and crash a plane into CIA Headquarters were thwarted by Philippine police when a fire erupted in an apartment where Yousef was preparing explosives. The police seized a list of names and telephone numbers and found a notation for "Khalid Doha" with telephone and facsimile numbers in Qatar. [classified]. Yet another link to KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] was made when Yousef, who was apprehended shortly after fleeing the Philippines, made a call from detention to Qatar and asked to speak with "Khalid." This number was similar to the one found by the Philippine police.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

The Intelligence Community was not sure of KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD]'s alliances until after [classified]. For example, a December 1995 CIA cable stated, "As far as we know, Yousef and his confederates – such as KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD]] – are not allied with an organized terrorist group and cannot readily call upon such an organized unit to execute retaliatory strikes against the U.S. or countries that have cooperated with the U.S. in the extradition of Yousef and his associates."

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

[This assessment changed in 1996 when a foreign government shared information that Bin Ladin and KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] had traveled together to a foreign country the previous year. In August 1998, after the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, another foreign government sent CIA a list of the names of individuals who flew into Nairobi before the attack. Based on information delivered by another liaison service, CIA recognized that one of the passengers' names was an alias for KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD]. The liaison report also described KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] as close to Bin Ladin. In an interview, the FBI agent responsible for the KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] case could not remember this information, even though it had been disseminated by CIA. This information and subsequent reporting led the CIA to see KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] as part of Bin Ladin's organization. Several CIA

cables indicated that following up on information relevant to KSM [KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD] was essential, given his past activities and his links to al-Qa'ida].

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

On March 1, 2003, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan as a result of a joint operation by Pakistani and U.S. authorities.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

From interviews with flight school personnel and with Moussaoui himself in August 2001, the FBI pieced together the details of his arrival in the United States. Moussaoui contacted the Airman Flight School in Oklahoma by e-mail on September 29, 2000 and expressed interest in taking lessons to fly a small Cessna aircraft. On February 23, 2001, he entered the United States at Chicago's O'Hare Airport, traveling on a French passport that allowed him to stay in the country without a visa for 90 days until May 22, 2001. On February 26, he began flight lessons at Airman Flight School.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

August 16, 2001, FBI agents, along with two INS agents, went to Moussaoui's hotel.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In 1998, the Chief Pilot in the FBI's Oklahoma City Field Office informed an agent on the office's counterterrorism squad that he had observed many Middle Eastern men at Oklahoma flight schools. An intra-office communication to the counterterrorism squad supervisor was drafted noting the Chief Pilot's concern that the aviation education might be related to terrorist activity and his speculation that light planes would be an ideal means to spread chemical or biological agents. The communication was sent to the office's "Weapons of Mass Destruction" control file, apparently for informational purposes only with no follow-up requested or conducted. The FBI also received reports in 1998 that a terrorist organization might be planning to bring students to the United States for flight training. The FBI was aware that persons connected to the organization had performed surveillance and security tests at

airports in the United States and had made comments suggesting an intention to target civil aviation. In 1999, the FBI received reports that another terrorist organization was planning to send students to the United States for aviation training. The purpose of this training was unknown, but organization leaders viewed the plan as “particularly important” and reportedly approved openended funding for it. An operational unit in the Counterterrorism Section at Headquarters instructed 24 field offices to pay close attention to Islamic students from the target country engaged in aviation training. This communication was sent to the Phoenix Office’s International Terrorism squad, but the agent who wrote the Phoenix EC does not recall it. The communication requested that field offices “task sources, coordinate with the INS, and conduct other logical inquiries, in an effort to develop an intelligence baseline” regarding the terrorist group’s involvement with students. There is no indication that field offices conducted any investigation after receiving the communication. The analyst who drafted it explained that he received several calls from the field for guidance since it raised concerns about the Buckley Amendment, which bars post-secondary educational institutions that receive federal funding from releasing personal information without written student consent.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

late August 2001, when the CIA told the FBI, State, INS, and Customs that Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and two other “Bin Laden-related individuals” were in the United States, FBI Headquarters refused to accede to the New York field office recommendation that a criminal investigation be opened, which might allow greater resources to be dedicated to the search for the future hijackers than would be available in an intelligence investigation.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In 1996, CTC established its Bin Ladin unit as the Intelligence Community focal point for tracking Bin Ladin.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In the fall of 1998, NSA lost the ability to listen to Bin Ladin on his satellite phone. This loss was probably the result of, among other things, a media leak.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

In spring 2001, NSA noted another significant rise in threat activity. Again, the Intelligence Community assessed the threat to be directed at targets abroad.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

For example, in July 2001, a Bin Ladin operative was arrested in the [classified]. Because of this arrest, a plot to bomb an American Embassy in Europe was thwarted.

-Senate Intelligence Committee 9/11 Report 12/2002

Statements about Iraq's Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs

"Evidence suggests that it has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin and VX. Intelligence reports show that Iraq has invested more heavily in its biological weapons programs over the last four years, with the result that all key aspects of this program - R&D, production and weaponization - are active. Most elements of the program are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War. Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery on a range of vehicles such as bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers and covert operatives which could bring them to the United States homeland. "

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

Claims about Chemical and Biological Weapons

Claims about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

"Since inspectors left, the Iraqi regime has energized its missile program - probably now consisting of a few dozen Scud-type missiles with ranges of 650 to 900 kilometers that could hit Israel, Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies in the region. In addition, Iraq is developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents, which could threaten Iraq's neighbors as well as American forces in the Persian Gulf. "

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

[BUSH ADMIN. CLAIM:]

UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs.

-Sec. State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council

[UNMOVIC CONCURS:]

A spray device can be an efficient and effective means to disperse wet or dry chemical or biological warfare agents (CBW) over a large area. Such a delivery system does not involve the extreme temperatures and pressures associated with explosive dissemination. In general, spraying achieves a higher dissemination efficiency than explosive aerosolisation. Spray dissemination may be either along a line trajectory or from a point source, upwind or directly over the target. Spray devices can be employed with a variety of delivery systems such as fixed wing aircraft (manned and unmanned), helicopters, trucks, boats, special operations personnel and cruise missiles.

Two types of spray devices were acknowledged to have been considered by Iraq: modified auxiliary fuel tanks (tanks used to extend the range of an aircraft, known as “drop-tanks”) and modified agricultural sprayers.

-UNMOVIC Unresolved Disarmament Issues 3/6/03 rpt, Dr. Hans Blix

[BUSH ADMIN. CLAIM:]

The linkages over the past ten years between Iraq's UAV program and biological and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or, if transported, to other countries, including the United States.

-Sec. State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council

[UNMOVIC CONCURS:]

The June 1996 FFCD details a project to modify a Mirage F1 drop tank “for the dissemination of BW agents from fighter aircraft”. Despite this earlier declaration, Iraq declared in its September 1997 BW FFCD and in the CAFCD the modification of a MiG-21 fighter plane into a RPV “to deliver a munition” to a target as well as a separate project to modify Mirage F1 drop tanks for the dissemination of BW agent.

-UNMOVIC Unresolved Disarmament Issues 3/6/03 rpt, Dr. Hans Blix

[BUSH ADMIN. CLAIM:]

And in the little that Saddam Hussein told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth.

-Sec. State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council

[UNMOVIC CONCURS:]

Assessment

There is a clear contradiction in Iraq's explanation of its development of spray tanks. Iraq has maintained that it started its development work by producing a spray tank for biological agents and has denied that it had developed a similar system for chemical agents.

-UNMOVIC Unresolved Disarmament Issues 3/6/03 rpt, Dr. Hans Blix

[UNMOVIC CONCURS:]

Spraying devices modified for CBW purposes may still exist in Iraq. A large number of drop tanks of various kinds, both imported and locally manufactured, are available and could be modified. Since spraying devices are an efficient means of disseminating CBW agents, and since Iraq declared continued research after January 1991, it is likely to have been a high priority in the CBW program.

-UNMOVIC Unresolved Disarmament Issues 3/6/03 rpt, Dr. Hans Blix

[BUSH ADMIN. CLAIM:]

In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons.

-Sec. State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council

[UNMOVIC CONCURS:]

Work on another aircraft, the L-29 jet trainer, to convert it to a RPV started in November 1995 and continued until at least 2000. The L-29, although smaller and less capable than the MiG, could still be used to deliver CBW agent in quantities that would pose a significant threat to neighbouring countries.

-UNMOVIC Unresolved Disarmament Issues 3/6/03 rpt, Dr. Hans Blix

[BUSH ADMIN. CLAIM:]

One of these lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by intelligence we collected on June 27th last year. According to Iraq's December 7th declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here. Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers that the United Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq's December 7th declaration. The UAV was flown around and around and around in this circle and so that its 80-kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers, unrefueled and on autopilot -- violative of all of its obligations under 1441.

-Sec. State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council

[UNMOVIC CONCURS:]

Iraq has declared that the work on the L-29 has stopped but that work continues on smaller RPVs. Iraq has also declared in its BW CAFCD a number of smaller RPVs that are capable of carrying a payload of up to 20 kilogrammes to a range of less than 30 kilometres. This payload could represent a significant biological payload if dry agent is used. Of concern is the more general question of Iraq's intentions with respect to RPVs as CBW delivery systems and the relationship to the spray tank development. Iraq has also declared in its Missile CAFCD two other RPVs, both capable of a 100 kilometre range with a designed payload of 30 kilogrammes.

-UNMOVIC Unresolved Disarmament Issues 3/6/03 rpt, Dr. Hans Blix

Claims about Mobile Biological Laboratories

Statements about Iraq's Support of al Qaeda

We also know that al Qaeda leaders have been, and are now, harbored in Iraq.

Saddam's is the only regime that combines growing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and a record of using them with regional hegemonic ambitions and a record of supporting terrorists. If we remove his influence from the Middle East and free the Iraqi people to determine their own destiny, we will transform the politics of the region. That will only advance the war against terrorism, not set it back.

-Sen Joe Lieberman (D)

What's more, the terrorist threat against America is all too clear. Thousands of terrorist operatives around the world would pay anything to get their hands on Saddam's arsenal, and there is every possibility that he could turn his weapons over to these terrorists. No one can doubt that if the terrorists of September 11th had had weapons of mass destruction, they would have used them. On September 12, 2002, we can hardly ignore the terrorist threat, and the serious danger that Saddam would allow his arsenal to be used in aid of terror.

-Sen. John Edwards (D) 9/12/02

\$87 Billion Supplemental Military Funding and Reconstruction Aid for Afghanistan and Iraq

The events of the last 85 years provide ample evidence that our approach to winning the peace that follows war is almost as important as winning the war itself. The absence of enlightened nation building after World War I led directly to the conditions which made Germany vulnerable to fascism and the rise to Adolph Hitler and made all of Europe vulnerable to his evil designs. By contrast the enlightened vision embodied in the Marshall plan, NATO, and the other nation building efforts in the aftermath of World War II led directly to the conditions that fostered prosperity and peace for most the years since this city gave birth to the United Nations.

-Former Vice President Al Gore 9/23/02

Saddam Hussein is a menace to his own people, and a threat to the peace and stability of the entire region. As our soldiers risk their own lives to secure the lives and liberty of others, we pledge to repay their courage by guaranteeing that we will spare no resource and no effort to make sure nothing stands between them and victory.

-Sen. Tom Daschle (D) 3/20/03

"But I oppose spending \$87 billion - at the expense of health care, education and domestic priorities here at home - on a strategy that does not protect the troops, and does not make America safer."

-Sen John Kerry _____, 16 2003

"The bill also provides funds for the Coast Guard (within the Department of Homeland Security) (\$103 million); the Department of Justice (\$31 million); the Department of Energy (\$3 million); and the Intelligence Community Management Account (\$3 million).

Spending for the Coast Guard is \$23 million above the President's request, and spending for the Justice Department is \$15 million above the President's request."

-Appropriations Update: vol 3, no.20, 10/15/03, Committee on Budget; Majority Caucus

re: \$87bn "Defense and Iraq and Afghanistan"
appropriations bill H.R.3289

"The bill provides \$64.7 billion for military operations in Iraq, in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Of this, about \$51 billion is for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and \$10 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom. The remaining monies will cover costs with Operation Noble Eagle and support for allies in the war on terror."

-"President Signs \$87.5 Billion Package for Iraq, Afghanistan"
By K.L. Vantran, American Forces Press Service

"CHAPTER 1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY
MILITARY PERSONNEL

MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY

For an additional amount for "Military Personnel, Army",
\$12,858,870,000.

MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY

For an additional amount for "Military Personnel, Navy",
\$816,100,000.

MILITARY PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS

For an additional amount for "Military Personnel, Marine Corps",
\$753,190,000.

MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

For an additional amount for "Military Personnel, Air Force",
\$3,384,700,000.

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE, ARMY

For an additional amount for "Operation and Maintenance, Army",
\$23,997,064,000."

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108-106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn
Defense Supplemental)

“PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, ARMY

For an additional amount for “Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army”, \$101,600,000, to remain available until September 30, 2006.”

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108–106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

“DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES,

DEFENSE (INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS) For an additional amount for “Drug Interdiction and Counter- Drug Activities, Defense”, \$73,000,000: Provided, That these funds may be used only for such activities related to Afghanistan: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense may transfer the funds provided herein only to appropriations for military personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; and research, development, test and evaluation: Provided further, That the funds transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period, as the appropriation to which transferred: Provided further, That the transfer authority provided in this paragraph is in addition to any other transfer authority available to the Department of Defense.”

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108–106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

““DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

For an additional amount for “Defense Health Program”, \$658,380,000 for Operation and maintenance.”

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108–106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

FAMILY HOUSING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY

For an additional amount for “Family Housing Operation and Maintenance, Army”, \$11,420,000.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108–106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

**FAMILY HOUSING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE,
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS**

For an additional amount for “Family Housing Operation and Maintenance, Navy and Marine Corps”, \$6,280,000.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108–106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

**FAMILY HOUSING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AIR
FORCE**

For an additional amount for “Family Housing Operation and Maintenance, Air Force”, \$6,981,000.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108–106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES**

For necessary expenses for “Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities”, \$245,000,000, to remain available until expended.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108–106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

**BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS
INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING OPERATIONS**

For necessary expenses for “International Broadcasting Operations”, for activities related to the Middle East Television Network broadcasting to Iraq, \$40,000,000.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108–106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

**INTERNATIONAL DISASTER AND FAMINE ASSISTANCE
(INCLUDING TRANSFERS OF FUNDS)**

For necessary expenses for International Disaster and Famine Assistance utilizing the general authorities of section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, to respond to or prevent unforeseen complex foreign crises in Liberia and Sudan, \$110,000,000, and by transfer not to exceed 0.5 percent of the funds appropriated under any other heading in this chapter, to remain available to the

Secretary of State until September 30, 2005: Provided, That funds appropriated under this heading may be made available only pursuant to a determination by the President, after consultation with the appropriate congressional committees, that it is in the national interest and essential to efforts to reduce international terrorism to furnish assistance on such terms and conditions as he may determine for such purposes, including support for peace and humanitarian intervention operations: Provided further, That none of these funds shall be available to respond to natural disasters: Provided further, That funds made available under this heading to respond to or prevent unforeseen complex foreign crises shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations: Provided further, That not less than \$100,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be made available for assistance for Liberia.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108-106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

For an additional amount for “International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement”, \$170,000,000, to remain available until December 31, 2004, for accelerated assistance for Afghanistan.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108-106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

NONPROLIFERATION, ANTI-TERRORISM, DEMINING AND RELATED PROGRAMS

For an additional amount for “Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs”, \$35,000,000, for accelerated assistance for Afghanistan.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108-106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

For an additional amount for “Peacekeeping Operations”, \$50,000,000, to support the global war on Terrorism.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108-106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT
(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

For an additional amount for “Intelligence Community Management Account”, \$21,500,000, to remain available until September 30, 2005; of which \$3,000,000 may be transferred to and merged with the Department of Energy, “Other Defense Activities”, and \$15,500,000 may be transferred to and merged with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Salaries and Expenses”.

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108-106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army

“For an additional amount for ‘Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army’, \$101,600,000, to remain available until September 30, 2006.”

-Text of PUBLIC LAW 108-106—NOV. 6, 2003 (The \$87bn Defense Supplemental)

The Inspection Process

We were never supposed to play the role of detectives.

-Australian Ambassador Richard Butler, fmr head of UNSCOM, *The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security*

The only job the inspectors can expect to accomplish is confirming whether Iraq has voluntarily disarmed.

-Dr. David Kay, January 19, 2003

Iraq has continued to develop its arsenal in defiance of the collective will of the international community, as expressed through the United Nations Security Council. It is violating the terms of the cease-fire that ended the Gulf War and ignoring as many as 16 UN Security Council resolutions – including 11 resolutions concerning Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. These UN resolutions are not unilateral American demands. They involve obligations Iraq has undertaken to the international community. By ignoring them, Saddam Hussein is undermining the credibility of the United Nations, openly violating international law, and making a mockery of the very idea of international collective action which is so important to the United States and our allies.

-Sen. John Edwards (D) 9/12/02

President Bush made the right decision on September 12 when he expressed America's willingness to work with the United Nations to prevent Iraq from using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The President's address to the General Assembly challenging the United Nations to enforce its long list of Security Council Resolutions on Iraq was powerful -- and for me, it was persuasive.

But to maintain the credibility he built when he went to the U.N., the President must follow the logic of his own argument. Before we go to war, we should give the international community the chance to meet the President's challenge – to renew its resolve to disarm Saddam Hussein completely and effectively. This makes the resumption of inspections more imperative and perhaps more likely than at any time since they ended in 1998. So this should be the first aim of our policy – to get U.N. inspectors back into Iraq without conditions. I hope the Security Council will approve a new resolution requiring the Government of Iraq to accept unlimited and unconditional inspections and the destruction of any weapons of mass destruction. The resolution should set a short timetable for the resumption of inspections.

- Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D) 9/27/02

We UNSCOM inspectors simply did not have the resources to win a game of hide and seek. The same is true today.

(-Dr. David Kay, January 19, 2003)

Today the Administration has refocused their aim and made clear we are not in an arbitrary conflict with one of the world's many dictators, but a conflict with a dictator whom the international community left in power only because he agreed not to pursue weapons of mass destruction. That's why arms inspections -- and I believe ultimately Saddam's unwillingness to submit to fail-safe inspections -- is absolutely critical in building international support for our case to the world. That's how you make clear to the world we are contemplating war not for war's sake, but because it may be the ultimate weapons inspections enforcement mechanism.

–Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

"Some consider the few token gestures made by the Iraqi regime these past few weeks to be progress. That is naïve. They are guile, obfuscation, and distraction for yet more delay.

-Sen Joe Lieberman 3/17/03

Having decided to cheat from day one, Iraq's fundamental purpose had always been to mask and obfuscate. It wasn't a matter of

“losing patience” at all. Iraq’s patience was endless. It would resist and wait the Security Council out.

-Australian Ambassador Richard Butler, fmr head of UNSCOM, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security

"The Declaration repeats the assertion that there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that there is no more evidence to present. However, in order to create confidence that it has no more weapons of mass destruction or proscribed activities relating to such weapons, Iraq must present credible evidence. It cannot just maintain that it must be deemed to be without proscribed items so long as there is no evidence to the contrary. A person accused of the illegal possession of weapons may, indeed, be acquitted for lack of evidence, but if a state, which has used such weapons, is to create confidence that it has no longer any prohibited weapons, it will need to present solid evidence or present remaining items for elimination under supervision. "

-Hans Blix 01/09/03

"If evidence is not presented, which gives a high degree of assurance, there is no way the inspectors can close a file by simply invoking a precept that Iraq cannot prove the negative. In such cases, regrettably, they must conclude, as they have done in the past, that the absence of the particular item is not assured."

-Hans Blix 01/09/03

Any "false statements or omissions" in its December declaration were, according to Resolution 1441, supposed to "constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations." And "material breach" is the Security Council's standard for measuring whether military force is required to compel disarmament.

(-Dr. David Kay, January 19, 2003)

“UNSCOM Cannot prove to me that Iraq is not disarmed!” he [Tariq Aziz] said.

“You misstate the matter, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister,” I replied.

“Our job is to verify your claim. It is not to prove a case to you.

We are not prosecutors or inquisitors. The council established a

three-step system, and you know it very well: Iraq declares, UNSCOM verifies, and together we destroy, remove, or render harmless. That's what the law says. It says nothing about proving any case to you or to your government.”

-Australian Ambassador Richard Butler, fmr head of UNSCOM, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security

The onus is clearly on Iraq to provide the requisite information or devise other ways in which UNMOVIC can gain confidence that Iraq's declarations are correct and comprehensive.

(-UNMOVIC UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT ISSUES

6 March 2003 Dr. Hans Blix Executive Chairman)

Proscribed items may well have been moved around Iraq before inspectors arrived, and possibly continued after their return. However, based on inspections and the information UNMOVIC has seen so far, it is not possible for UNMOVIC to reach any conclusions on the matter. This is another area where Iraq's active assistance and cooperation will be required in UNMOVIC developing and implementing a system of road/rail traffic monitoring to help dispel concerns that movements of proscribed materials are taking place.

(-UNMOVIC UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT ISSUES

6 March 2003 Dr. Hans Blix Executive Chairman)

Given the history of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes (see Appendix), Iraq potentially could have made considerable advancements in that time, particularly in the biological and chemical fields.

(-UNMOVIC UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT ISSUES

6 March 2003 Dr. Hans Blix Executive Chairman)

The restrictions imposed in 1998 are not acceptable and will not do the job. There should be a deadline and no lack of clarity about what Iraq must do. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein's regime poses a threat to his people, his neighbours and the world at large because of his biological and chemical

weapons and his nuclear programme. They admitted to vast stores of biological and chemical stocks in 1995.

-Former President Bill Clinton 10/2/02 at British Labour Party Conference

During the seven years of weapons inspections, the Iraqi regime repeatedly frustrated the work of the UNSCOM (UN Special Commission) inspectors, culminating in 1998 in their ouster. Even during the period of inspections, Iraq never fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in declarations provided to the inspectors of its pre-Gulf War WMD programs nor did the Iraqi regime provide credible proof that it had completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

International Support

If, however, the United Nations Security Council is prevented from supporting this effort, then we must act with as many allies as possible to ensure that Iraq meets its obligations to existing Security Council resolutions. After all, that's what the U.S. and its NATO allies did during the 1999 war in Kosovo, when a UN Security Council resolution was impossible.

-Sen. John Edwards (D) 9/12/02

"Can we really leave this to chance, when we could eliminate this deadly threat by acting now in concert with the international community, or alone if the threat is imminent -- which it is not now? In my view, we cannot. "

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

I take it almost everybody in this room supports what Prime Minister Blair and I did in Kosovo. It was a clear and present emergency, you had a million people being driven from their homes, but in the end, even though we had all the Muslim world for it and most of the developing nations for it, all of Nato for it, we could not get a UN resolution because of the historic ties of the Serbs to the Russians. So we went in anyway and as soon as the conflict was over the Russians came in and did a very responsible job participating with the United States in an international UN sanction peacekeeping environment. Why? Why did that happen? Because the UN is still becoming.

-Former President Bill Clinton 10/2/02 at British Labour Party Conference

Second, without question, we need to disarm Saddam Hussein. He is a brutal, murderous dictator, leading an oppressive regime. We all know the litany of his offenses. He presents a particularly grievous threat because he is so consistently prone to miscalculation. He miscalculated an eight-year war with Iran. He miscalculated the invasion of Kuwait. He miscalculated America's response to that act of naked aggression. He miscalculated the result of setting oil rigs on fire. He miscalculated the impact of sending scuds into Israel and trying to assassinate an American President. He miscalculated his own military strength. He miscalculated the Arab world's response to his misconduct. And now he is miscalculating America's response to his continued deceit and his consistent grasp for weapons of mass destruction. That is why the world, through the United Nations Security Council, has spoken with one voice, demanding that Iraq disclose its weapons programs and disarm.

-Sen. John Kerry 1/23/03

Recall that Iraq was required to submit a "full and complete declaration" of all its weapons programs to the U.N. Security Council early last December. But that 12,000-page declaration was hardly complete, and its omissions (as well as gaps identified in 1998 -- more about that in a moment) should have become the focus of the inspections process.

(-Dr. David Kay, January 19, 2003

Regime Change

The United States wants Iraq to rejoin the family of nations as a freedom-loving and law-abiding member. This is in our interest and that of our allies within the region.

(-October 31, 1998 Statement by Clinton on the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 :HR 4655s)

The United States favors an Iraq that offers its people freedom at home. I categorically reject arguments that this is unattainable due to Iraq's history or its ethnic or sectarian make-up. Iraqis deserve and desire freedom like everyone else.

(-October 31, 1998 Statement by Clinton on the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 :HR 4655s)

My Administration has pursued, and will continue to pursue, these objectives through active application of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The evidence is overwhelming that such changes will not happen under the current Iraq leadership.

(-October 31, 1998 Statement by Clinton on the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 :HR 4655s)

H.R.4655: Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))
SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES
POLICY TOWARD IRAQ.

It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.

SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
IRAQ.

(e) REIMBURSEMENT RELATING TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE-
(1) IN GENERAL- Defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under subsection (a)(2) shall be made available without

reimbursement to the Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2).

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for each of the fiscal years 1998 and 1999 such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for the value (as defined in section 644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, or military education and training provided under subsection (a)(2).

"Iraq's search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to deter and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power."

- Al Gore, Sept. 23, 2002

"We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandated of the United Nations and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them."

- Sen. Carl Levin (d, MI), Sept. 19, 2002

I believe that Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime represents a clear threat to the United States, to our allies, to our interests around the world, and to the values of freedom and democracy we hold dear.

-Sen. John Edwards (D) 9/12/02

The Iraqi regime's record over the decade leaves little doubt that Saddam Hussein wants to retain his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and to expand it to include nuclear weapons. We cannot allow him to prevail in that quest. The weapons are an unacceptable threat. And if the Iraqi regime refuses to allow the international community to find and destroy those weapons through a non-negotiable, immediate, unfettered and unconditional inspection process, then together with the international community, we will be justified in going to war to eliminate the threat. "

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

That is not surprising. For 12 years and through 17 Security Council Resolutions, Saddam has flouted the will of the world and refused to disclose and destroy the weapons of mass destruction that the United

Nations has asserted are in his possession. If military action is necessary, the fault will clearly be Saddam's.

-Sen Joe Lieberman 3/17/03

It would be naive to the point of grave danger not to believe that left to his own devices, Saddam Hussein will provoke, misjudge, or stumble into a future, more dangerous confrontation with the civilized world. He has as much as promised it.

And he has already created a stunning track record of miscalculation.

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

"All these facts and more explain why many of us were convinced that Saddam Hussein and his weapons posed an unacceptable threat to the stability of his region and the security of the world long before George W. Bush became our President-in fact, even before Bill Clinton became our President. If we do not disarm Saddam now, he will inevitably use his weapons against us or give them to terrorists who will.

-Sen Joe Lieberman 3/17/03

I mention these not because they are a cause to go to war in and of themselves - as the President previously suggested - but because they tell us a lot about the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the nature of this man. We should not go to war because these things are in his past but we should be prepared to go to war because of what they tell us about the future. It is the total of all these acts that provided the foundation for the world's determination in 1991, at the end of the Gulf War, that Saddam Hussein must

"unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision," of his chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems and "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material." I believe the record of Saddam Hussein's ruthless, reckless breach of international values and standards of behavior, which is at the core of the cease-fire agreement, with no reach or stretch, is cause enough for the world community to hold him accountable, by use of force if necessary.

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

Regime change has been American policy under the Clinton administration and the current U.S. administration. It is a policy that I support. But regime change in and of itself is not sufficient justification for going to war unless regime change is the only way to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction

–Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

Intelligence Was Manipulated?

“The Clinton Administration launched a massive series of air strikes against Iraq for the state purpose of setting back his capacity to pursue weapons of mass destruction.”

-Former Vice President Al Gore 9/23/02

In December of 1998 after the inspectors were kicked out along with the support of Prime Minister Blair and the British military we launched Operation Desert Fox for four days. An air assault on those weapons of mass destruction, the air defence and regime protection forces. This campaign had scores of targets and successfully degraded both the conventional and non-conventional arsenal. It diminished Iraq's threat to the region and it demonstrated the price to be paid for violating the Security Council's resolutions. It was the right thing to do, and it is one reason why I still believe we had to stay at this business until we get all those biological and chemical weapons out of there.

-Former President Bill Clinton 10/2/02 at British Labour Party Conference

Reports from the field indicate that [Operation] Desert Fox did damage Iraq's Weapons of mass destruction capability, but perhaps because of its brevity (four days), it was not decisive.

-Australian Ambassador Richard Butler, fmr head of UNSCOM, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security

What has happened in the last four years? No inspectors, a fresh opportunity to rebuild the biological and chemical weapons programme and to try and develop some sort of nuclear capacity.

Because of the sanctions Saddam Hussein is much weaker militarily than he was in 1990, while we are stronger, but that probably has given him even more incentive to try and amass weapons of mass destruction.

-Former President Bill Clinton 10/2/02 at British Labour Party Conference

"We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction."

- Sen. Ted Kennedy (D, MA), Sept. 27, 2002

Let me say it plainly: I not only concede, but I am convinced that President Bush believes genuinely in the course he urges upon us.

- Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D) 9/27/02

It is clear that in the four years since the UNSCOM inspectors were forced out, Saddam Hussein has continued his quest for weapons of mass destruction.

-Sen. John Kerry (D) 10/09/2002

"This is a day to face facts. Saddam has weapons of mass destruction. That is a fact.

-Sen Joe Lieberman 3/17/03

"[W]ithout question, we need to disarm Saddam Hussein. He is a brutal, murderous dictator, leading an oppressive regime ... He presents a particularly grievous threat because he is so consistently prone to miscalculation . And now he is miscalculating America's response to his continued deceit and his consistent grasp for weapons of mass destruction ... So the threat of Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is real ..."

- Sen. John F. Kerry (D, MA), Jan. 23. 2003

"He has systematically violated, over the course of the past 11 years, every significant UN resolution that has demanded that he disarm and destroy his

chemical and biological weapons, and any nuclear capacity. This he

has refused to do"

- Rep. Henry Waxman (D, CA), Oct. 10, 2002

"We are in possession of what I think to be compelling evidence that Saddam Hussein has, and has had for a number of years, a developing capacity for the production and storage of weapons of mass destruction."

- Sen. Bob Graham (D, FL), Dec. 8, 2002

"We know that he has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country."

- Al Gore, Sept. 23, 2002

"In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al Qaeda members ... It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons."

- Sen. Hillary Clinton (D, NY), Oct 10, 2002

"The last UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in October of 1998. We are confident that Saddam Hussein retains some stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and that he has since embarked on a crash course to build up his chemical and biological warfare capabilities. Intelligence reports indicate that he is seeking nuclear weapons..."

- Sen. Robert Byrd (D, WV), Oct. 3, 2002

I have given this a lot of thought and effort, and I am trying to do the right thing for the people I represent and the people of this country. But I don't know -- no more than I knew in 1991 that what I had decided was the right thing to do. I gave it the same analysis in 1991, and I came down on the side of not authorizing a use of force. I said, let's use diplomatic means and sanctions to try to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. In retrospect, I conclude that was not the correct decision. Is it because I didn't want to make the correct

decision in 1991? Of course not. I wanted to do the right thing. But I didn't know everything that I now know. I didn't see what Saddam Hussein did in the last 11 years. And so now I come to a different conclusion. It is a different situation. It is a totally different set of facts. So I am not saying that you just take the history of the last 11 years and automatically say you are going to use force, but you have to take into account all of the facts and material that has happened over the last 11 years and then, in this new situation, try to figure out what to do.

-Congressman Richard A. Gephardt (D) 10/03/02

Having reached the conclusion I have about the clear and present danger Saddam represents to the U.S., I want to give the president a limited but strong mandate to act against Saddam. Five hundred and thirty-five members of Congress cannot wage war; we can only authorize it. The rest is up to the president and our military.

-Sen Joe Lieberman (D)

"I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority to use force-- if necessary-- to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security."

- Sen. John F. Kerry (D, MA), Oct. 9, 2002

So the threat of Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is real, but it is not new. It has been with us since the end of the Persian Gulf War. Regrettably the current Administration failed to take the opportunity to bring this issue to the United Nations two years ago or immediately after September 11th, when we had such unity of spirit with our allies. When it finally did speak, it was with hasty war talk instead of a coherent call for Iraqi disarmament. And that made it possible for other Arab regimes to shift their focus to the perils of war for themselves rather than keeping the focus on the perils posed by Saddam's deadly arsenal. Indeed, for a time, the Administration's unilateralism, in effect, elevated Saddam in the eyes of his neighbors to a level he never would have achieved on his own, undermining America's standing with most of the coalition

partners which had joined us in repelling the invasion of Kuwait a decade ago.

-Sen. John Kerry 1/23/03

“We have to remember that this view of Iraq (prewar assessment of WMD capabilities) was held during the Clinton administration and did not change in the Bush administration.”

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

“I would also point out that many governments that chose not to support this war -- certainly, the French president, Chirac, as I recall in April of last year, referred to Iraq's possession of WMD. The German certainly -- the intelligence service believed that there were WMD.”

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

“They [the intelligence community] knew the history of the Iraqi regime, its use of chemical weapons on its own people and its neighbors. They knew what had been discovered during the inspections after the Persian Gulf War, some of which was far more advanced, particularly the nuclear program, than the pre-Gulf War intelligence had indicated. They were keen observers of the reports of UNSCOM in the 1990s, and they and others did their best to penetrate the secrets of the regime of Saddam Hussein after the inspectors left in 1998. It was the consensus of the intelligence community, and of successive administrations of both political parties, and of the Congress, that reviewed the same intelligence, and much of the international community, I might add, that Saddam Hussein was pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein's behavior throughout that period reinforced that conclusion. He did not behave like someone who was disarming and wanted to prove he was doing so. He did not open up his country to the world, as did Kazakhstan, Ukraine, South Africa had previously done, and as Libya is doing today -- Libya. Instead, he continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues under U.N. sanctions when he could have had the sanctions lifted and received those billions of dollars simply by demonstrating that he'd disarmed, if in fact he had. Why did he do this? His regime filed with the United Nations what almost everyone agreed was a fraudulent

declaration, and ignored the final opportunity afforded him by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. Why? The Congress, the national security teams of both the Clinton and the Bush administrations looked at essentially the same intelligence and they came to similar conclusions that the Iraqi regime posed a danger and should be changed. The Congress passed regime-change legislation in 1998.”

-Def Sec Rumsfeld testimony 020404

“I went to Congress with the same intelligence Congress saw the same intelligence I had, and they looked at exactly what I looked at, and they made an informed judgment based upon the information that I had. The same information, by the way, that my predecessor had. And all of us, you know, made this judgment that Saddam Hussein needed to be removed.”

-President Bush interview with Tim Russert on Meet The Press

“Much of the current controversy centers on our prewar intelligence on Iraq, summarized in the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002. National Estimates are publications where the intelligence community as a whole seeks to sum up what we know about a subject, what we do not know, what we suspect may be happening, and where we differ on key issues. This Estimate asked if Iraq had chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. We concluded that in some of these categories, Iraq had weapons. And that in others—where it did not have them—it was trying to develop them. Let me be clear: analysts differed on several important aspects of these programs and those debates were spelled out in the Estimate. They never said there was an “imminent” threat. Rather, they painted an objective assessment for our policymakers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests. No one told us what to say or how to say it.”

-CIA Director Tenet Speech at Georgetown Univ 020504

“... I had innumerable analysts who came to me in apology that the world that we were finding was not the world that they had thought existed and that they had estimated. Reality on the ground differed in advance. And never -- not in a single case -- was the explanation,

"I was pressured to do this." The explanation was, very often, "The limited data we had led one to reasonably conclude this. I now see that there's another explanation for it."

And each case was different, but the conversations were sufficiently in depth and our relationship was sufficiently frank that I'm convinced that, at least to the analysts I dealt with, I did not come across a single one that felt it had been, in the military term, "inappropriate command influence" that led them to take that position."

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

"There was pressure and a lot of debate and people should have a lot of debate," Richard Kerr, a former deputy CIA director who is leading the CIA's review of its prewar Iraq assessments, told the newspaper. "But the bottom line is, over a period of several years, (the analysts' judgments) were very consistent. They didn't change their views," the Post quoted Kerr as saying.

-31 Jan 2004 No White House influence in CIA Iraq views -Reuters

"All I can say is if you read the total body of intelligence in the last 12 to 15 years that flowed on Iraq, I quite frankly think it would be hard to come to a conclusion other than Iraq was a gathering, serious threat to the world with regard to WMD.

And I remind you, it was Secretary Cohen who stood, I think, in this very committee room with five pounds of flour and talked about anthrax."

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

CORNYN: And until your report after your long work with the Iraqi Survey Group, have you found that any one of those people or groups that I have identified have in fact learned that it was not true, but nevertheless tried to manipulate it and present it as fact for some improper purpose?

KAY: No, I know of no manipulation. I know of a lot of skepticism. And because it was such a widely held view and wanting to know the facts, I view that as absolutely appropriate.

CORNYN: So you know of no evidence, no indication that anyone tried to intentionally manipulate the intelligence that we got in order to justify going to war in Iraq.

KAY: I've seen no evidence of that, nor have I seen any evidence after the fact of anyone trying to influence the conclusions that I or others are reaching as part of the survey group.

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

“Do you think the vice president or other administration leaders should be criticized for talking with individual intelligence agencies as they try to make a decision about whether or not to go to war?”

KAY: Absolutely not. In fact, Senator Sessions, you know, it's -- I won't say funny.

KAY: It's one of these strange things that for those of us inside worried. I've had analysts complain that no one talked to them and then analysts who were talked to complained.

Look, analysts are not generally shrinking good ones, shrinking violets. They know the difference between people. They're used to being questioned closely. They should be questioned closely and they are. And that's why I think I've never met an analyst who felt in this case with regard to these set of issues that there was any inappropriate pressure. And in most cases, they would love to have been questioned more, certainly by the vice president or the president or anyone else. That's their profession.

SESSIONS: They long for the opportunity to talk to someone in authority.

KAY: That's what they do.”

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

“Senator Warner asked in his opening statement if I know of any pressure or -- on intelligence people or manipulation of intelligence, and the answer is absolutely not. I believe that Senator Roberts has attested to that from the analysts and witnesses that he and his committee have interrogated over a period of many, many months. I believe that Dr. Kay answered exactly the same way, that he talked to analyst after analyst and knows no manipulation of the data and no indication of anyone expressing concern about pressure.”

-Def Sec Rumsfeld testimony 020404

“ROBERTS: So the intelligence community can't have it both ways. First, we really criticize them for saying wait, wait, wait, wait until you have the appropriate jigsaw puzzle in place that you can really

read the intelligence. After 9/11, why we have a situation, say, if you have two or three of the dots connected, why then you're criticized as well.

Now, that's a speech, not a question. But if you have any thoughts on this, I'd appreciate hearing from you.

KAY: No, I think the appropriate thing, Senator Roberts, would be to concur.”

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

“They decided to reduce the thing that they were most vulnerable to and that's large retained stocks, knowing that they could -- at some point they get rid of us, they thought, and they could restart production. KAY: So they kept the scientists and they kept the technology, but they came to what I think is a fair conclusion: Why keep stockpiles of weapons that are vulnerable to inspectors when you've lost your delivery capability? Wait till you have your delivery capability, and then it's a relatively short order. We have documentary evidence and testimony that Saddam and Uday and Qusay asked in both 2000 and 2001 how long it would take to restart production of mustard and of VX nerve gas.”

-1/28/04 Dr. David Kay testimony to Sen. Intel. Committee

In U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, the United Nations has now affirmed that Saddam Hussein must disarm or face the most serious consequences. Let me make it clear that the burden is resoundingly on Saddam Hussein to live up to the ceasefire agreement he signed and make clear to the world how he disposed of weapons he previously admitted to possessing.

-Sen. John Kerry 1/23/03

APPENDIX A

Timeline of America's War with Iraq

9/11/90-12/14/03

- 7/16/1990 Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accuses Kuwaitis of "direct aggression" against Iraq by producing oil above OPEC quotas and slant-drilling into the Rumaila oilfield, which straddles the Kuwait-Iraq border.
- 8/2/1990 Iraqi forces invade Kuwait in the early morning hours and quickly establish military control of Kuwait. U.S. President George Bush harshly condemns the invasion, orders economic sanctions on Iraq and occupied Kuwait, and freezes Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States. The UN Security Council (UNSC) passes Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The UNSC threatens to impose mandatory sanctions against Iraq unless it complies with the resolution. There are six U.S. Navy Middle East Force ships in the Persian Gulf (continuous Middle East Force presence since 1949). USS Independence Carrier Battle Group is in the Indian Ocean and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Battle Group is in the Mediterranean.
- 8/3/1990 Iraq claims it will withdraw from Kuwait by Aug. 5. Convoys of "withdrawn" equipment found by journalists to include captured Kuwaiti material.
- 8/6/1990 Aug. 6-7: Bush sends U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia to assist in the defense of the kingdom against possible Iraqi aggression. U.S. forces grow to over 200,000 by late October.
- 8/8/1990 Iraq announces its annexation of Kuwait.
- 8/9/1990 The UNSC unanimously declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait "null and void."
- 8/10/1990 An emergency Arab summit meeting in Cairo, Egypt, votes to send Arab troops to Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to assist in defending them against possible Iraqi attack.
- 8/11/1990 Aug. 11: Egyptian and Moroccan troops begin arriving in Saudi Arabia.
- 8/14/1990 Syrian forces arrive in Saudi Arabia.
- 8/17/1990 Iraq announces that it will "play host" to citizens of countries in the international coalition using them as "human shields" against possible coalition attacks.
- 8/18/1990 The UNSC passes Resolution 664 calling on Iraq to release all foreign citizens and warns Iraq against harming them.
- 8/25/1990 The UNSC authorizes naval forces in and around the Persian Gulf to use force to prevent violations of UN economic sanctions on Iraq.
- 9/1/1990 An emergency meeting of the Arab League in Cairo calls for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, pay reparations and allow foreigners to leave Iraq and Kuwait.
- 9/13/1990 Pakistan announces it has agreed to send troops to Saudi Arabia.
- 10/29/1990 The UNSC passes Resolution 674 making Iraq liable for damages, injuries and financial losses resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
- 11/8/1990 The United States announces decision to deploy 200,000 more troops to the Persian Gulf to build up capability for an offensive.
- 11/29/1990 The UNSC approves Resolution 678 authorizing use of "all necessary means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait if Iraq does not withdraw by Jan. 15, 1991.
- 12/6/1990 First ship with equipment of Germany-based VII Corps offensive troops arrives in Saudi Arabia.
- 1/9/1991 Secretary of State James Baker meets Aziz in Geneva in an unsuccessful effort to resolve the conflict.

- 1/12/1991 The U.S. Congress authorizes Bush to use "all necessary means" to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
- 1/16/1991 Desert Storm begins at 7 p.m. EST (3 a.m. Jan. 17 in Iraq) with massive air and missile attacks on targets in Iraq, Kuwait.
- 1/16/1991 President Bush: "We will not fail."
- 1/17/1991 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declares: "The great showdown has begun! The mother of all battles is under way."
- 1/17/1991 Iraqi Scud missiles strike Israel.
- 1/17/1991 Scud fired at Saudi Arabia is downed by U.S. Patriot missile - first anti- missile missile fired in combat.
- 1/18/1991 Amid retaliation speculation, President Bush says Israel has promised not to respond to Iraq's attack.
- 1/19/1991 At least three Scuds explode in Tel Aviv, Israel, injuring about 17. Israel vows to defend itself but refrains. United States rushes in Patriots, making Army crews first U.S. soldiers to defend Israel.
- 1/19/1991 U.S. troops raid oil platforms off Kuwait, capturing first Iraqi prisoners of war.
- 1/20/1991 Iraqi TV airs interviews with captured allied airmen.
- 1/20/1991 Iraq fires 10 Scuds at Saudi Arabia; nine are intercepted, one falls offshore.
- 1/21/1991 U.S. officials say despite more than 8,000 sorties in five days, elusive mobile Scud missile launchers remain a threat.
- 1/21/1991 Iraq says it has scattered prisoners of war as shields at allied air targets.
- 1/22/1991 Iraq launches a Scud missile attack against Israel. This follows similar attacks on Saudi Arabia.
- 1/22/1991 Iraq fires six Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia; one is destroyed by Patriot, others fall harmlessly.
- 1/22/1991 Iraq torches Kuwaiti oil wells, tanks.
- 1/22/1991 A Scud eludes U.S. Patriot missiles and hits Tel Aviv. Three people die.
- 1/23/1991 Iraqi military forces deliberately create a huge oil spill in the Persian Gulf, the largest oil spill on record. U.S. officials term the spill an act of "environmental terrorism."
- 1/23/1991 U.S. officials deny Saddam Hussein's claim that allies bombed baby-formula plant, saying plant was a chemical factory.
- 1/23/1991 Iraq fires Scuds at Israel and Saudi Arabia; no casualties.
- 1/23/1991 President Bush urges Saddam Hussein be brought to "justice," suggesting removal of Iraqi president could be a goal.
- 1/24/1991 Number of allied sorties surpasses 15,000.
- 1/24/1991 Saudi officials report two oil slicks moving south of Kuwait. Allies say Iraq released oil; Iraq blames allied bombs.
- 1/25/1991 Japan says it will send military aircraft to assist allies in non-combat situations.
- 1/25/1991 Scud missiles are fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia. Two people killed.
- 1/26/1991 Massive oil spill grows, threatening Saudi Arabia's industrial and desalination plants and gulf environment.
- 1/26/1991 Iraqi warplanes land in Iran. Iran says it has seized them.
- 1/26/1991 U.S. F-15s enter war's first major dogfight, shoot down three Iraqi MiG- 23s.
- 1/26/1991 Pentagon confirms USS Louisville is first sub to launch cruise missile in combat.
- 1/26/1991 Scuds fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia; no casualties.
- 1/26/1991 More than 75,000 protesters march in Washington, D.C.
- 1/27/1991 Allies bomb Iraqi-held oil facilities in Kuwait to stop Iraq from dumping oil into gulf.
- 1/27/1991 Amid fears of terrorism, Super Bowl XXV goes off without a hitch.
- 1/28/1991 Iraq says captured allied pilots have been injured in allied bombing raids.
- 1/29/1991 Iraqi troops attack Khafji, Saudi Arabia, and are defeated by coalition forces.
- 1/29/1991 In largest ground battle yet, battalion-size force of U.S. Marines (up to 800) fire artillery, mortars, TOW missiles, at Iraqi bunkers half-mile away in Kuwait. No U.S. casualties.

- 1/29/1991 United States, Soviet Union issue communique offering Iraq cease-fire if it makes "unequivocal commitment" to withdraw.
- 1/30/1991 Scores of Iraqi tanks, thousands of troops advance into Saudi Arabia. Attacks are countered by U.S. Marines, Saudi and Qatari troops. Eleven Marines die.
- 1/30/1991 Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, allied commander, says allies have air supremacy and are reducing Scud threat.
- 1/31/1991 Saudi and Qatari troops, backed by U.S. artillery, retake Khafji, Saudi Arabia.
- 1/31/1991 Sheik Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz, Saudis' leading interpreter of Islamic law, calls Saddam Hussein "enemy of God."
- 2/1/1991 Allies bomb 10-mile-long Iraqi armored column headed into Saudi Arabia.
- 2/2/1991 Two Scuds hit central Israel; no casualties. Patriot downs Scud over Saudi Arabia; two injured.
- 2/3/1991 Allied air campaign passes 40,000-sortie mark - 10,000 more missions than were flown against Japan in final 14 months of World War II.
- 2/4/1991 Iran offers to mediate peace talks, resume official relations with United States.
- 2/4/1991 Battleship Missouri fires at Iraqi positions inside Kuwait - first time ship has fired in combat since Korean War.
- 2/5/1991 Iraq suspends fuel sales to civilians, worsening heating and transportation problems.
- 2/5/1991 Syrian troops, in first combat action, repulse Iraqi probe at Saudi-Kuwait border.
- 2/6/1991 U.S. F-15 fighters shoot down four Iraqi jets as they try to join 120 Iraqi aircraft that have been flown to Iran.
- 2/7/1991 President Bush's top two war advisers - Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell - leave for gulf to assess war.
- 2/7/1991 Battleship Wisconsin joins Missouri in firing huge 16-inch guns at sites in Kuwait - first combat firing for Wisconsin since Korean War.
- 2/8/1991 Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, en route to Saudi Arabia, gives strongest indication to date ground war is coming. Open question: when.
- 2/9/1991 Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell meet for more than eight hours with Desert Storm commander, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, other military leaders.
- 2/9/1991 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev warns that military operations in Persian Gulf war threaten to exceed U.N. mandate; he says he's sending envoy to Baghdad for talks with Saddam Hussein.
- 2/10/1991 Saddam Hussein addresses his nation for first time since three days after war started, pledging victory and praising "steadfastness, faith and light in the chests of Iraqis."
- 2/11/1991 President Bush, after meeting with top two military advisers, says alliance is in no hurry to begin ground war.
- 2/11/1991 News reports in Egypt say Iraq's government estimates privately that more than 15,000 Iraqi troops have been killed.
- 2/12/1991 Allied forces open combined land-sea-air barrage against Iraqis in Kuwait - largest battlefield action to date.
- 2/12/1991 Officials say cost of fighting effects of oil slick lapping at Saudi Arabia's coast will be \$1 billion over next six months.
- 2/13/1991 U.S. Stealth fighters drop two bombs on fortified underground facility in Baghdad. Iraqi officials claim at least 500 civilians are killed in facility, which they describe as public bomb shelter. U.S. military officials release information they say proves underground facility was military command center.
- 2/14/1991 Pentagon says allied planes have destroyed at least 1,300 of Iraq's 4,280 tanks, 800 of 2,870 armored vehicles and 1,100 of 3,110 artillery pieces.
- 2/14/1991 United Nations Security Council meets in closed session to discuss war.
- 2/15/1991 Iraq offers to withdraw from Kuwait. Coalition forces reject the offer due to numerous conditions attached to it.
- 2/15/1991 Iraq says it is prepared to withdraw from Kuwait, but adds conditions, including Israeli pullout from occupied Arab territories, forgiveness of Iraqi debts and allied payment of costs of rebuilding Iraq. President Bush dismisses Iraqi offer

as "cruel hoax." - Allied forces continue moving supplies toward front in preparation for launch of ground war.

- 2/16/1991 U.S. attack helicopters make first nighttime raids on Iraqi positions.
- 2/16/1991 Iraqi authorities claim 130 civilians were killed by British Tornado jet strikes.
- 2/16/1991 Iraq fires two Scuds at Israel, hitting southern part of country for first time; no injuries.
- 2/16/1991 Iraq's ambassador to U.N., Abdul Amir al-Anbari, says Iraq will use weapons of mass destruction if U.S. bombing continues.
- 2/16/1991 Pentagon says Iraq deliberately staged damage of civilian areas as propaganda.
- 2/17/1991 President Bush says Iraq's takeover of Kuwait will end "very, very soon."
- 2/17/1991 U.S. and Iraqi troops clash in seven incidents along Saudi-Kuwait border; 20 Iraqis surrender to Apache helicopter fire.
- 2/17/1991 Iraq's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, arrives in Moscow for talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. He is quoted en route as saying it's up to allies to act on Iraq's peace proposal.
- 2/17/1991 U.S. military, intelligence officials estimate 15% of Iraq's fighting forces in Kuwait area have been killed or wounded.
- 2/18/1991 Floating mines strike two U.S. warships in gulf. USS Tripoli and USS Princeton damaged but still operational.
- 2/18/1991 Air Force helicopter search team rescues U.S. pilot who parachuted from disabled plane 40 miles north of Saudi border.
- 2/19/1991 Baghdad Radio reports Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz has returned to Baghdad with Soviet peace proposal.
- 2/19/1991 President Bush says Soviet proposal falls "well short" of what's needed to end war.
- 2/19/1991 Iranian newspaper cites Iraqi official as saying Iraq has suffered 20,000 dead, 60,000 wounded.
- 2/19/1991 U.S. Marines bombard Iraqi targets inside Kuwait with heavy artillery fire for second consecutive day.
- 2/19/1991 Saudi officials say gulf oil slick is smaller than originally feared - 60 million gallons, not 400 million.
- 2/20/1991 One American killed, seven wounded in fighting along Saudi border. U.S. helicopters destroy Iraqi bunker complex; up to 500 Iraqis taken prisoner.
- 2/20/1991 U.S. planes attack 300 Iraqi vehicles 60 miles into Kuwait, destroying 28 tanks.
- 2/20/1991 Baghdad Radio says Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz will travel to Moscow "soon" with Saddam Hussein's reply to Soviet peace proposal.
- 2/20/1991 Allied commander Norman Schwarzkopf is quoted as saying Iraq's military is on "verge of collapse."
- 2/20/1991 U.S. officials want Iraq to announce specific timetable for withdrawing from Kuwait as condition for peace settlement.
- 2/21/1991 Soviet spokesman Vitaly Ignatenko announces Iraq, Soviet Union have agreed on plan that could lead to Iraqi withdrawal.
- 2/21/1991 Saddam Hussein declares Iraq remains ready to fight ground war.
- 2/21/1991 Defense Secretary Dick Cheney says allies are preparing "one of the largest land assaults of modern times."
- 2/21/1991 Seven U.S. soldiers killed in helicopter crash - war's deadliest non-combat accident to date.
- 2/22/1991 President Bush rejects Soviet peace plan, deplores Iraq's "scorched-earth" destruction of Kuwaiti oil fields. He demands Iraq begin withdrawal from Kuwait by noon Feb. 23 to avoid ground war.
- 2/22/1991 Iraqi information official brands U.S. position "shameful ultimatum."
- 2/22/1991 Soviet Union announces eight-point withdrawal plan.
- 2/22/1991 Iraq sets ablaze one-sixth of Kuwait's 950 oil wells.
- 2/23/1991 Allies' ground offensive begins at 8 p.m. EST (4 a.m. Feb. 24 Saudi time).
- 2/23/1991 Defense Secretary Dick Cheney halts news briefings on war.
- 2/23/1991 At 10:02 p.m. EST, President Bush tells nation, "The liberation of Kuwait has entered the final phase." Bush authorizes commander Norman Schwarzkopf to

- "use all forces available, including ground forces, to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait."
- 2/23/1991 U.S. officials say Iraqi soldiers are rounding up Kuwaitis to torture, execute.
 - 2/23/1991 At least 200 oil wells and facilities are ablaze in Kuwait.
 - 2/24/1991 Given the failure of several efforts to avert conflict, and the lack of an Iraqi troops' withdrawal from Kuwait, allied forces begin their long-planned land, sea and air offensive aimed at driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Iraqi forces begin destroying Kuwaiti oil wells and other oilfield infrastructure.
 - 2/24/1991 Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf hails first day of allied ground offensive as "dramatic success." Allied casualties are very light; more than 5,500 Iraqis are captured.
 - 2/24/1991 Saddam Hussein urges troops to kill "with all your might" in radio speech.
 - 2/24/1991 More than 300 attack and supply helicopters strike more than 50 miles into Iraq, largest such assault in military history.
 - 2/24/1991 Queen Elizabeth II, in first wartime broadcast of 39-year reign, tells her country she has prayed for victory.
 - 2/24/1991 Iraq fires two Scud missiles into Israel; no injuries.
 - 2/25/1991 Baghdad Radio reports Saddam Hussein has ordered troops to withdraw from Kuwait in accordance with Soviet peace proposal.
 - 2/25/1991 Says White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater: "The war goes on."
 - 2/25/1991 On Kuwait's Independence Day, allied forces are reported on outskirts of Kuwait City, poised to liberate capital as more reports surface of Iraqi killings of civilians and torching of buildings.
 - 2/25/1991 Iraqi Scud missile hits barracks in Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia. Eventual toll: 28 U.S. soldiers killed, 90 wounded.
 - 2/25/1991 U.S. officials report four U.S. soldiers killed, 21 wounded in first two days of allied ground assault; nearly 20,000 Iraqis taken prisoner; 270 tanks destroyed.
 - 2/25/1991 Iraqi-launched Silkworm anti-ship missile shot down by allied warships.
 - 2/26/1991 Brig. Gen. Richard Neal in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, says Iraqi forces are in "full retreat" with allied forces pursuing; Iraqi POWs number 30,000-plus, number to climb to 63,000.
 - 2/26/1991 Saddam Hussein announces Iraqi occupation forces will withdraw completely.
 - 2/26/1991 Residents of Kuwait City celebrate end to occupation. Resistance groups set up headquarters to control city.
 - 2/26/1991 U.S. Marine in Kuwait City says U.S. Embassy is back under U.S. control.
 - 2/27/1991 Kuwaiti troops raise emirate's flag in Kuwait City.
 - 2/27/1991 President Bush declares suspension of offensive combat and lays out conditions for permanent cease-fire.
 - 2/28/1991 Bush announces a cease-fire, ending the Gulf War.
 - 3/1/1991 March: Iraq puts down revolt in 14 of 18 governorates, with the help of attack helicopters.
 - 3/2/1991 UNSC adopts RES 686 ordering cessation of hostilities
 - 3/3/1991 Iraq accepts RES 686
 - 3/3/1991 At cease-fire talks with the Iraqis at Safwan, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf warn the Iraqis that coalition forces would shoot down any Iraqi military aircraft flying over the country. However, he allows the Iraqis use of helicopters to aid communication and governance of southern Iraq. He does not anticipate that Iraq will use this permission to suppress revolts using armed helicopters.
 - 3/20/1991 U.S. F-15C shoots down an Iraqi SU-22 flying over northern Iraq.
 - 3/22/1991 A U.S. F-15C shoots down another Iraqi SU-22 over northern Iraq. That same day, another U.S. pilot forced the pilot of an Iraqi PC-9 (a training aircraft) to eject. Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft stayed on the ground for the next 12 months.
 - 4/3/1991 UNSC adopts RES 687 outlining provisions of cease-fire and setting up inspections
 - 4/5/1991 UNSC adopts RES 688 ordering cessation of Baghdad's repression of Iraqi civilians
 - 4/6/1991 Iraq accepts RES 687

- 4/6/1991 US, UK, France begin enforcing no-fly zone covering territory north of 36th parallel
- 4/6/1991 Joint Task Force Provide Comfort is formed and deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, to conduct humanitarian operations in northern Iraq.
- 4/10/1991 U.S. officials warn Iraq not to interfere with Kurdish relief operations. No Iraqi planes (fixed- or rotary-winged) are to fly north of the 36th parallel.
- 4/19/1991 UNSCOM is created to carry out RES 687
- 5/15/1991 IAEA conducts first nuclear inspection in Iraq
- 5/20/1991 UNSC adopts RES 692 establishing UN Compensation Fund / Commission
- 6/9/1991 UNSCOM conducts first chemical weapons inspection
- 6/17/1991 UNSC adopts RES 699 approving UN Secretary-General plan to eliminate Iraq's WMD programs
- 6/17/1991 UNSC adopts RES 700 approving guidelines for monitoring Iraqi arms embargo
- 6/23/1991 Iraq caught attempting to conceal nuclear equipment
- 6/23/1991 June 23-28: For the first time, Iraqi troops fire shots to prevent UNSCOM/IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors from intercepting Iraqi vehicles carrying nuclear-related equipment. Equipment is later found and destroyed under cease-fire rules.
- 6/25/1991 The United States announces formation of an intervention force to protect Kurds in northern Iraq.
- 6/28/1991 UNSC presidential statement condemns Iraq for flagrant violations of RES 687 in denying inspectors access
- 6/30/1991 UNSCOM conducts first missile inspection
- 7/18/1991 July 18-20: Iraqi ballistic missile concealment is revealed. UNSCOM discovers and destroys undeclared decoy missiles and launch support equipment.
- 8/2/1991 UNSCOM conducts first biological weapons inspection
- 8/2/1991 Aug. 2-8: UNSCOM uncovers a major Iraqi biological weapons program, including seed stocks of three biological warfare agents and three potential warfare strains.
- 8/11/1991 UNSCOM begins reconnaissance flights over Iraq
- 8/15/1991 UNSC adopts RES 705 stating that Gulf War compensation paid by Iraq shall not exceed 30% of annual value of oil exports
- 8/15/1991 Iraq has never accepted RES 706
- 8/15/1991 UNSC adopts RES 706 authorizing 6-month export of Iraqi petroleum products to finance purchase of humanitarian supplies
- 8/15/1991 UNSC adopts RES 707 demanding that Iraq halt all nuclear activities and provide full disclosure of weapons programs
- 8/16/1991 Iraq objects to RES 705 and 707
- 9/6/1991 Iraq blocks UNSCOM's use of helicopters on inspections, accepts on 24 Sept
- 9/6/1991 Iraq has never accepted RES 712
- 9/6/1991 Sept. 6-13: Iraq blocks UNSCOM's use of helicopters to conduct inspections.
- 9/19/1991 UNSC adopts RES 712 addressing various aspects of Iraqi petroleum sales in RES 706
- 9/21/1991 Iraq refuses to allow IAEA inspectors to leave inspection site with nuclear documents
- 9/24/1991 Iraq agrees to allow UN helicopters to make unrestricted flights over its territory.
- 10/6/1991 Last Kuwaiti oil fires are extinguished.
- 10/9/1991 A cease-fire is agreed between Kurdish and Iraqi forces.
- 10/11/1991 UNSC adopts RES 715 approving plans for system of ongoing monitoring to verify Iraqi compliance and to detect WMD reconstitution
- 12/11/1991 Iraq releases information on its nuclear program
- 2/19/1992 UNSC presidential statement endorses visit of UNSCOM chairman to Iraq to obtain unconditional Iraqi acceptance of UN resolutions
- 2/19/1992 Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz discusses compliance with UNSC
- 2/28/1992 UNSC presidential statement deplores Iraq's failure to disclose WMD programs
- 3/11/1992 UNSC presidential statement reviews Iraqi noncompliance with UN resolutions

- 3/19/1992 Iraq agrees to provide UNSCOM full, final and complete declaration of its weapons program
- 4/5/1992 Iranian warplanes attack rebel bases inside Iraq. Iraq responds by scrambling fighters and (unsuccessfully) pursuing the intruders. U.S. forces do not interfere. The Iraqis continue to fly on succeeding days, effectively overturning the ban on all their flying, which they had observed since March 22, 1991.
- 6/19/1992 UNSC presidential statement notes concern over Iraqi statements critical of boundary demarcation
- 7/5/1992 Iraq refuses to provide UNSCOM with access to the Ministry of Agriculture until the UNSC president's statement
- 7/6/1992 UNSC presidential statement declares that Iraq is in material breach of RES 687
- 8/26/1992 UNSC adopts RES 773 endorsing the work of the UN Iraq-Kuwait boundary demarcation commission
- 8/26/1992 Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz addresses UNSC and claims Iraqi compliance, criticizing RES 687
- 8/26/1992 Bush announces air exclusion zone below 32nd parallel, banning the flying of both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.
- 8/27/1992 No-fly zone covering territory below 32nd parallel in southern Iraq is created by coalition states in response to renewed Iraqi airstrikes against its civilian population
- 8/27/1992 Iraq announces it cannot guarantee the safety of UN aircraft flying over Iraqi territory
- 10/2/1992 UNSC adopts RES 778 designating proceeds of Iraqi petroleum sales to UN escrow account
- 11/23/1992 UNSC presidential statement reviews Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions
- 12/27/1992 U.S. fighter planes shoot down an Iraqi aircraft violating the southern no-fly zone.
- 1/8/1993 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraqi restrictions of UN aircraft a material breach of RES 687
- 1/10/1993 Iraq removes equipment from the Kuwaiti side of DMZ
- 1/11/1993 UNSC presidential statement condemns Iraq for material breach of RES 687 in preventing UNSCOM from flying its own aircraft
- 1/13/1993 US, UK, France conduct air raids on Iraqi anti-aircraft missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq
- 1/17/1993 US fires missiles at industrial complex in suburban Baghdad
- 1/18/1993 US and UK launch air raids against radar sites in southern and northern Iraq
- 1/21/1993 An F-16 and an F-4G escorting a French Mirage reconnaissance plane over northern Iraq attack an Iraqi missile battery after the site's search radar began tracking them.
- 1/22/1993 An F-4G fires two missiles at a surface-to-air-missile (SAM) site in northern Iraq.
- 2/3/1993 Iraqi gunners fire at a U.S. aircraft on routine patrol over northern Iraq.
- 2/5/1993 UNSC adopts RES 806 allowing UNIKOM to take direct action to prevent or redress violations in DMZ
- 4/9/1993 Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites fire on Provide Comfort aircraft near the Saddam dam in northern Iraq.
- 4/18/1993 An Iraqi radar site illuminates two U.S. F-4Gs flying north of the 36th parallel. The site was south of the parallel. One of the aircraft fires an AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile at the tracking radar and destroyed it.
- 5/27/1993 UNSC adopts RES 833 reaffirming Kuwaiti border issues in RES 733; guarantees inviolability of border
- 6/10/1993 Iraq refuses to allow emplacement of UN monitoring cameras at weapons facilities
- 6/18/1993 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraq's refusal of cameras material breach of RES 687, warns of serious consequences
- 6/27/1993 US launches cruise missile at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in retaliation for assassination plot against former President Bush

- 6/27/1993 U.S. missile strike is launched against Baghdad on basis of "compelling evidence" that Iraq was involved in the April 1993 assassination attempt on former President Bush in Kuwait.
- 6/28/1993 UNSC presidential statement criticizes Iraqi statements on boundary demarcation
- 6/29/1993 A Southern Watch F-4G fires an anti-radar missile at an anti-aircraft artillery site after the Iraqis illuminated it and another F-4G patrolling the southern no-fly zone.
- 7/19/1993 Iraq agrees to emplacement of monitoring cameras following Rolf Ekeus visit to Baghdad
- 7/29/1993 In separate incidents, two U.S. Navy EA-6Bs, part of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, fire anti-radar missiles at Iraqi SAM sites after being illuminated by the sites' surveillance radars.
- 8/19/1993 Two U.S. F-16s report possible SA-3 missile launches west of Mosul and respond with cluster bombs. Two F-15s drop four laser-guided bombs on the site an hour later.
- 11/16/1993 Iraqi demonstrators cross into Kuwaiti territory protesting border demarcation
- 11/23/1993 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraqi border violations breach of RES 687
- 11/26/1993 Iraq accepts RES 715
- 12/21/1993 Iraqi troops fire on a U.S. patrol near Faydah in northern Iraq. The patrol is within the security zone established on May 22, 1991. The Iraqis were over a mile away and outside the security zone. Baghdad denies Western reports of the incident as "fabricated and baseless."
- 1/1/1994 Iraq does not attempt to challenge coalition aircraft in the no-fly zones during the first nine months of 1994.
- 3/4/1994 UNSC adopts RES 899 stating that compensation may be made to Iraqi citizens for loss of assets from demarcation of Iraq-Kuwait border
- 10/6/1994 Iraq threatens to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, moves troops towards Kuwaiti border
- 10/6/1994 Iraq threatens to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, and moves troops toward the border with Kuwait.
- 10/7/1994 US buildup of forces in region begins
- 10/8/1994 UNSC presidential statement expresses grave concern over Iraqi actions toward UNSCOM and Kuwait
- 10/8/1994 UNSC meeting expresses "grave concern" over deployment of Iraqi troops near the Kuwait border. In the next two days, United States begins deploying troops to Kuwait.
- 10/14/1994 Iraq announces that as of Oct. 12 it had withdrawn its troops to their previous positions.
- 10/15/1994 UNSC adopts RES 949 condemning Iraq's large-scale deployment of military units toward Kuwaiti border
- 10/15/1994 The UNSC adopts Resolution 949, which demands that Iraq "cooperate fully" with UNSCOM and that it withdraw all military units deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions. Iraq resumes working with UNSCOM.
- 10/20/1994 US, UK issue demarche to Iraq prohibiting "enhancement" of military capabilities south of 32nd parallel, establishing no-drive zone
- 11/10/1994 Iraq formally recognizes Kuwait and UN border demarcation in compliance with RES 833
- 11/16/1994 UNSC presidential statement welcomes Iraqi recognition of Kuwait
- 4/14/1995 UNSC adopts RES 986 offering Iraq another opportunity to export petroleum products and to use proceeds to meet humanitarian needs
- 4/15/1995 Iraq rejects RES 986
- 6/14/1995 Iraq threatens to halt cooperation with UN by August if UNSCOM report is unfavorable
- 7/1/1995 Iraq admits for the first time existence of offensive biological weapons program

- 7/1/1995 As a result of UNSCOM's investigations and in the light of irrefutable evidence, Iraq admits for the first time the existence of an offensive biological weapons program but denies weaponization.
- 8/4/1995 Iraq submits "full, final, and complete declaration" on its biological weapons program
- 8/8/1995 Hussein Kamal—Saddam's son-in-law and figure in charge of Iraq's WMD effort—defects
- 8/8/1995 Gen. Hussein Kamel, minister of Industry and Minerals and former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programs, leaves Iraq for Jordan. Iraq claims that Kamel had hidden from UNSCOM and the IAEA important information on the prohibited weapons programs. Iraq withdraws its third biological Full, Final and Complete Disclosure and admits a far more extensive biological warfare program than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq also admits having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range missiles than had previously been declared. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation hidden on a chicken farm, ostensibly by Kamel, related to its prohibited weapons programs. The documentations subsequently lead to further Iraqi disclosures concerning the production of the nerve agent VX and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon.
- 8/17/1995 Iraq withdraws June deadline and admits that its biological weapons program is more extensive than previously acknowledged
- 11/1/1995 November 1995: The government of Jordan intercepts a large shipment of high-grade missile components destined for Iraq. Iraq denies that it had sought to purchase these components, although it acknowledged that some of them were in Iraq. UNSCOM conducts an investigation, which confirms that Iraqi authorities and missile facilities have been involved in the acquisition of sophisticated guidance and control components for proscribed missiles. UNSCOM retrieves additional similar missile components from the River Tigris. The components had been allegedly disposed of there by Iraqis involved in the covert acquisition.
- 11/7/1995 Iraq submits new declarations on its BW and CW programs to UNSCOM
- 11/10/1995 Under UN mandate, Jordan intercepts shipment of Russian-origin missile gyroscopes intended for Iraq
- 3/8/1996 Iraq refuses UNSCOM access to Ministry of Irrigation for 18 hours
- 3/11/1996 Iraq refuses UNSCOM access to Republican Guard training facility for 12 hours
- 3/27/1996 UNSC adopts RES 1051 establishing export-monitoring mechanism and review for dual-use goods
- 5/20/1996 Iraq accepts RES 986
- 6/11/1996 Iraq denies UNSCOM access to Republican Guard facility and refuses to allow UNSCOM helicopter to monitor site
- 6/12/1996 UNSC adopts RES 1060 demanding that Iraq grant immediate access to sites and terms Iraqi actions as clear violations of UN resolutions
- 6/13/1996 Iraq blocks UNSCOM access to two additional facilities
- 6/14/1996 UNSC issues presidential statement sending Rolf Ekeus to Baghdad to secure access
- 6/16/1996 Iraq refuses UNSCOM access to two facilities
- 6/24/1996 UNSCOM reaches agreement with Iraq establishing procedures for inspections
- 8/23/1996 UNSC issues presidential statement terming Iraqi obstruction gross violation of Iraq's obligations
- 8/31/1996 Iraqi troops enter Irbil in alliance with Kurdish Democratic Party. They withdraw days later.
- 9/3/1996 US and UK expand southern no-fly zone to 33rd parallel and strike targets in response to Iraq's 31 August move into Kurdish-held territory
- 9/3/1996 U.S. President Bill Clinton extends the southern no-fly zone to 33rd parallel.
- 9/11/1996 Iraqi gunners fire an SA-6 missile at two U.S. F-16s over northern Iraq but miss. A fighter and helicopter briefly violate the southern no-fly zone.

- 11/2/1996 A Southern Watch F-16CJ fires a HARM missile at an Iraqi mobile missile radar near the 32nd parallel after the pilot received radar warning signals. Later analysis indicates that the Iraqi radar had not tracked the aircraft, a conclusion reversed on Nov. 4 after further study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 11/4/1996 A Southern Watch F-16CJ fires a HARM missile at an Iraqi mobile missile radar near the 32nd parallel after the pilot received radar warning signals.
- 11/16/1996 Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM removal of missile remnants
- 12/30/1996 UNSC presidential statement deplores Iraqi refusal to allow removal of missile engines from Iraq
- 1/1/1997 January: The United Nations implements the oil-for-food program, which will permit Iraq to sell oil and direct the funds made toward humanitarian aims.
- 1/1/1997 The Turkish government approves a continuing air operation from Turkey, and Operation Northern Watch commences.
- 2/23/1997 Iraq allows UNSCOM to remove Scud missile engines from Iraq
- 6/1/1997 Iraq interferes with UNSCOM's aerial operations in four separate incidents
- 6/10/1997 Iraq blocks UNSCOM access to site for seven hours
- 6/10/1997 Iraqis video-taped burning documents at sensitive sites as inspectors wait at gate
- 6/12/1997 Iraq denies UNSCOM access to two sites
- 6/13/1997 UNSC presidential statement deplores Iraq's interference with UN aerial inspections
- 6/21/1997 UNSC adopts RES 1115 condemning "clear and flagrant violations" of relevant resolutions, suspends sanctions reviews
- 6/21/1997 Iraq states it will no longer accept US personnel in UNSCOM and demands that U-2 flights end
- 9/1/1997 Iraq blocks UNSC access to presidential site
- 9/17/1997 UNSC press statement expressing concern over Iraqi interference with inspections
- 9/17/1997 While seeking access to a site for inspection declared by Iraq to be "sensitive," UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape the movement of files, the burning of documents and dumping of ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.
- 10/23/1997 UNSC adopts RES 1134 condemning Iraq's noncompliance and threatens travel ban for Iraqi officials
- 10/23/1997 Iraq demands that all US inspectors leave within 24 hours
- 10/29/1997 UNSC presidential statement condemns Iraq's announcement and demands that it reverse its decision unconditionally
- 11/2/1997 Iraq warns that UNSCOM U-2 missions will fly "at their own risk"
- 11/12/1997 UNSC adopts RES 1137 banning travel of Iraqi officials responsible for Iraq's obstruction of UNSCOM inspections
- 11/13/1997 UNSCOM withdraws all personnel except for only a skeleton staff in Baghdad; UNSC presidential statement condemns Iraq
- 11/20/1997 Iraq agrees to reverse decision to expel US UNSCOM inspectors
- 12/22/1997 UNSCOM inspects "sensitive sites" after Iraq delays entry; UNSC presidential statement terms Iraqi obstruction a clear violation of relevant UN resolutions
- 1/12/1998 Iraq announces that it will bar further inspections by UNSCOM team led by Scott Ritter because of "imbalance" of US and UK inspectors
- 1/14/1998 UNSC presidential statement declares Iraqi actions a clear violation
- 1/16/1998 UNSCOM team led by Scott Ritter leaves Iraq
- 2/20/1998 UNSC adopts RES 1153 expanding oil sales to \$5.2 billion
- 2/20/1998 UN Secretary-General visits Iraq and reaches an agreement with Baghdad for limited inspections of presidential sites
- 3/2/1998 UNSC adopts RES 1154 endorsing agreement between UNSCOM Chief Ekeus and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Aziz, warns of severest consequences if Baghdad fails to heed agreement
- 3/26/1998 UN inspectors accompanied by diplomats inspect presidential sites
- 4/4/1998 Iraq allows access to presidential sites
- 5/14/1998 UNSC presidential statement on transition of IAEA to long-term monitoring

- 6/19/1998 UNSC adopts RES 1175 authorizing the allocation of \$300 million for oil spare parts
- 8/5/1998 Iraq's RCC and Ba'ath Party Command halt cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA, end no-notice inspections; monitoring activities are allowed to continue
- 9/9/1998 UNSC adopts RES 1194 condemning Iraq and suspending reviews of sanctions until UNSCOM is permitted to resume full operations
- 10/31/1998 UNSC press statement condemns Iraq, calls move a flagrant violation of UN resolutions
- 10/31/1998 Saddam ends all cooperation with UNSCOM
- 11/5/1998 UNSC adopts RES 1205 ordering Iraq to resume cooperation with UNSCOM
- 11/14/1998 Saddam allows UNSCOM to return to Iraq
- 11/14/1998 US airstrikes aborted after Saddam allows UNSCOM's return; US and UK threaten without full cooperation, they will strike without warning
- 11/15/1998 U.S. aborts airstrikes on Iraq as the regime promises cooperation with the UNSCOM weapons inspectors.
- 12/6/1998 Operation Desert Fox
- 12/9/1998 UNSCOM team obstructed during inspections of suspect sites
- 12/15/1998 UNSCOM reports to UNSC that it is unable to perform disarmament mandate, withdraws inspectors
- 12/19/1998 Iraq declares that UNSCOM will never be allowed back in Iraq
- 12/30/1998 An SA-6 site near Talil fires 6-8 missiles at a Southern Watch aircraft. F-16s retaliate by dropping six GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on the site. They also launch two HARMs "as a preemptive measure" to deter Iraqi radar operators.
- 1/4/1999 Iraq advises UN that it will not renew visas for US and UK Oil-for-Food monitors because it could not guarantee their safety
- 1/5/1999 In two separate incidents, two F-15s and two F-14s fire a total of six missiles at four Iraqi MiG-25s over the southern no-fly zone. None of the missiles finds its target.
- 1/7/1999 At approximately 11:20 a.m. Iraqi time, Saddam Hussein's regime locked a surface-to-air missile radar on to coalition forces. An Air Force F-16CJ acted in self defense, and fired a high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) at a Roland surface-to-missile site 15 miles northwest of Mosul after being targeted by the site's radar to suppress the offensive site.
- 1/11/1999 At approximately 10:45 a.m. Iraqi time, an Iraqi SAM radar began tracking Northern Watch aircraft and coalition aircraft were illuminated by multiple Iraqi surface-to-air missile systems. The aircrews acted in self-defense and suppressed one ground-based missile launch site because it posed a threat to coalition forces. A flight of two U.S. F-15Es launched two AGM-130s at an SA-6 site near Mosul and an U.S. F-16CJ fired a HARM at an Iraqi radar site a short while later.
- 1/12/1999 Five Iraqi jets violate the southern no-fly zone and two enter the north, bringing the total violations in both zones since Desert Fox to more than 70, Pentagon officials say.
- 1/12/1999 At approximately 11:01 a.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were illuminated by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile system. An F-16CJ acted in self-defense, firing a HARM at the Iraqi early warning radar in response to this hostile act. The incident occurred east of Mosul. Five Iraqi jets violated the southern no-fly zone and two entered the north, bringing the total violations in both zones since Desert Fox to more than 70, Pentagon officials said.
- 1/13/1999 Iraqi SAM systems tracked and fired on coalition planes over northern Iraq. During the morning, coalition aircraft were illuminated by several Iraqi surface-to-air missile systems. The aircraft were fired upon by at least one surface-to-air missile. The aircrews acting in self-defense suppressed the ground-based missile launch sites because they posed a significant threat to coalition forces. A flight of four U.S. Air Force F-15Es fired two AGM-130s, and an F-16CJ and U.S. Marine Corps EA-6B each fired a HARM against a SAM radar. The incident occurred near Mosul. The two AGM-130s were direct hits on the Iraqi SAM sites.

- 1/14/1999 During the morning, an F-16CJ fired a HARM at an Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system that posed a threat to coalition aircraft over northern Iraq. In a separate incident, an F-15E launched an AGM-130 precision guided missile at a surface-to-air missile system that threatened coalition forces.
- 1/24/1999 Between 2:30 and 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were again targeted by Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems near Mosul. An EA-6B Prowler and two F-16CJs fired HARMs in self defense. The aircraft responded to being targeted by Iraqi radars used to guide anti-aircraft artillery. Another F-16CJ fired a HARM at an Iraqi surface-to-air missile system. Earlier in the day, an F-15E Strike Eagle scored a direct hit on an Iraqi SA-3 SAM site with an AGM-130, which posed a threat to coalition forces in the region.
- 1/25/1999 Between 1:57 and 2:30 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were again illuminated and fired upon by Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems in several incidents. An F-15E was fired upon by an anti-aircraft artillery system. Two F-15Es then dropped one GBU-12 each on the system. In another incident, an EA-6B launched a HARM at an SA-2 SAM site that posed a threat to coalition forces in the area. An F-16CJ launched a HARM at a different SA-2 SAM site that posed a threat to coalition forces in the area. Coalition forces observed an Iraqi SAM launch in the vicinity of coalition aircraft. Coalition aircraft departed the area and continued operations.
- 1/26/1999 Between 1:25 and 1:50 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were targeted by Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems in three separate incidents near Mosul. An EA-6B Prowler, acting in self defense after being targeted by Iraqi radar, launched a HARM at an Iraqi radar site. An F-15E dropped a GBU-12 500-pound precision-guided munition in response to an anti-aircraft artillery system which posed a threat to coalition aircraft. In another incident, two F-15Es fired one AGM-130 each at a radar site which had targeted coalition aircraft. In another incident between 3 and 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were again targeted by anti-aircraft artillery systems near Mosul. Three F-15Es, acting in self defense after being targeted by Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery systems, dropped GBU-12 500-pound precision-guided munitions.
- 1/27/1999 Hans von Sponeck visits southern Iraq and reports on damage caused by air strikes
- 1/27/1999 Iraq has yet to accept RES 1284
- 1/28/1999 At approximately 3:45p.m. Iraqi time, two F-15Es observed fire by an anti-aircraft artillery site located north of Mosul. In self-defense, the two F-15Es dropped a total of three GBU-12s on the anti-aircraft artillery site.
- 1/30/1999 At approximately 3 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were targeted by Iraqi radars near Mosul. A U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle responded in self defense by launching an AGM-130 at the radar site. A second incident occurred shortly after 3 p.m. Iraqi time. A group of U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles acting in self defense after being targeted, dropped two GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an Iraqi Skyguard surface-to-air missile site. In a third incident at about the same time, F-15Es acting in self defense dropped two GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an anti-aircraft artillery system and its associated radar which threatened coalition aircraft. The fourth incident occurred close to 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, when F-15Es acting in self-defense dropped GBU-12s on another anti-aircraft artillery site. In a fifth incident at approximately 4:30 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Marine EA-6B Prowler fired a high-speed antiradiation missile in response to being targeted by a radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery system. Finally in the sixth incident a minute later, F-15Es responded defensively by dropping GBU-12s on a separate anti-aircraft artillery site.
- 1/31/1999 At approximately 3:20 p.m. Iraqi time today, a U.S. Air Force F-16CJ Fighting Falcon acting in self defense launched a high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) at a radar system north of Mosul.
- 2/2/1999 At 2:20 p.m. Iraqi time, two U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped two GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an anti-aircraft artillery battery in

response to being targeted by Iraqi radar near Mosul. In a separate incident approximately 15 minutes later, two additional F-15Es, also responding after being targeted by Iraqi radar, dropped GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on the same anti-aircraft artillery site. In a third incident at approximately 3:15 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Marine EA-6B launched a high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) at an SA-2 radar site. In a fourth incident at approximately 3:20 p.m. Iraqi time, F-15Es dropped GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an anti-aircraft artillery site. Finally, in a fifth incident which occurred at approximately 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, F-15Es dropped GBU-12s on another anti-aircraft artillery site.

- 2/3/1999 UN Secretary-General Annan orders all US and UK Oil-for-Food monitors out of Iraq
- 2/10/1999 U.S. and British warplanes fire at two air defense sites in Iraq after three waves of Iraqi fighter jets violate the southern no-fly zone.
- 2/11/1999 Between approximately 12:15 and 12:30 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle flight observed Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fire and was also illuminated by an Iraqi radar system near Mosul. Acting in self-defense, one F-15E dropped GBU-12s on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile communications site. Two F-15Es launched an AGM-130 and dropped GBU-12s on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile system. At 1:32 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle dropped GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile site west of Mosul. Two minutes later, a U.S. Air Force F-16CJ Fighting Falcon launched an AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missile at an Iraqi radar site northwest of Mosul. Close to 1:38 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Air Force F-15E dropped GBU-12s on a surface-to-air missile communications site east of Mosul.
- 2/12/1999 At approximately 1:30 p.m. Iraqi time, an F-15E enforcing the Northern no-fly zone over Iraq was fired upon by an anti-aircraft artillery site north of Mosul. The F-15E dropped a GBU-12 in response to this hostile act.
- 2/15/1999 At approximately 11:20 a.m. Iraqi time, a flight of F-15Es enforcing the Northern no-fly zone over Iraq today was fired upon by an anti-aircraft artillery site north of Mosul. In response to this hostile act, one of the F-15Es dropped a GBU-12 on the AAA site. Also, at approximately 12:26 p.m. Iraqi time, a Marine Corps EA-6B launched a high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) in self defense at a radar site that had targeted the aircraft.
- 2/19/1999 Between 12:10 p.m. and 12:30 p.m. Iraqi time, while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone, two U.S. F-16CJs launched AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) in self defense at a radar site near Mosul that had illuminated the aircraft.
- 2/22/1999 Between 11:15 and 1:30 p.m. Iraqi time, while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone, a flight of U.S. F-15Es dropped GBU-12 and GBU-10 precision guided bombs on multiple Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery and radar sites near Mosul after being fired upon and targeted by those sites.
- 2/23/1999 Between 1:45 and 2:00 p.m. Iraqi time, while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone, and in response to anti-aircraft artillery fire, three U.S. F-15Es dropped GBU-24 precision guided bombs on an Iraqi command and control bunker.
- 2/24/1999 U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft attack two Iraqi SAM sites near Al Iskandariyah, some 30 miles south of Baghdad, in response to anti-aircraft artillery fire and an Iraqi aircraft violation of southern no-fly zone.
- 2/28/1999 Between 1:55 and 2:15 p.m. Iraqi time, while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone, and in response to anti-aircraft artillery fire, a flight of U.S. F-15Es launched AGM-130 air-to-ground guided missiles and dropped GBU-24 laser-guided bombs on an Iraqi air defense headquarters and radio relay site. Additionally, between 2:13 and 2:35 p.m. Iraqi time, F-15Es dropped GBU-12 and GBU-24 laser-guided bombs on the radio relay site, as well as on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile site. The Iraqi radio relay site was being used by the Iraqi government to pass targeting data from Iraqi's radars to Iraqi anti-aircraft

artillery guns shooting at coalition aircraft. Coalition forces did not target nor was there damage to an Iraqi pipeline or an Iraqi oil pumping station. The incidents happened near Mosul, Iraq.

- 3/1/1999 Iraq rejects UN proposal for Hajj pilgrims
- 3/1/1999 Between 2:30 and 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone, and in response to several incidents of Iraqi radar targeting coalition aircraft, U.S. F-15Es dropped more than thirty 2,000 pound and 500 pound laser guided bombs on Iraqi communications sites, radio relay sites, and anti-aircraft artillery sites. The incidents happened near Mosul, Iraq.
- 3/6/1999 Between 12:20 and 2:20 p.m. Iraqi time, Operation Northern Watch coalition aircraft observed Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fire while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Responding in self defense to this attack and to threats from Iraqi surface-to-air missile radar systems, U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles attacked five Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites located south of Saddam Lake with GBU-12 laser guided bombs.
- 3/8/1999 Between approximately 12:35 p.m. and 1:35 p.m. Iraqi time, Operation Northern Watch coalition aircraft detected several active Iraqi radars posing a threat to coalition forces. Responding in self-defense, U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on several Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites around Saddam Lake. Coalition aircraft have been enforcing the Northern no-fly zone nearly eight years. Since Dec. 28, 1998, Saddam Hussein has opted to challenge this enforcement by targeting coalition aircraft with radar, surface-to-air missile systems and anti-aircraft artillery. Operation Northern Watch coalition aircraft will respond in self defense to these threats while continuing to enforce the no-fly zone.
- 3/9/1999 Between approximately 12:35 and 1 p.m. Iraqi time, Operation Northern Watch coalition aircraft detected several active Iraqi radars posing a threat to coalition forces. Responding in self defense, U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on several Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites west and south of Mosul.
- 3/12/1999 Between 10:30 a.m. and noon Iraqi time today, Operation Northern Watch aircraft detected several active Iraqi radars posing a threat to coalition aircraft. Responding in self-defense, U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped GBU-12 laser guided bombs and a U.S. Marine Corps EA-6B Prowler fired a High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile on several Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites north and northwest of Mosul.
- 3/14/1999 Between approximately 12:45 p.m. and 1:20 p.m. Iraqi time today, Operation Northern Watch aircraft observed Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fire and detected Iraqi radar posing a threat to coalition aircraft. Responding in self-defense, U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped GBU-12 laser guided bombs on several anti-aircraft artillery sites northwest and west of Mosul.
- 3/15/1999 Between approximately 12:15 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. Iraqi time today, Operation Northern Watch (ONW) aircraft detected Iraqi radar posing a threat to coalition aircraft. Responding in self-defense, U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped GBU-12 laser guided bombs on several anti-aircraft artillery sites northwest of Mosul.
- 3/16/1999 Between approximately 11:45 p.m. and 12:15 p.m. Iraqi time today, Operation Northern Watch (ONW) aircraft detected Iraqi radar posing a threat to coalition aircraft. Responding in self-defense, U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped GBU-12 laser guided bombs on several anti-aircraft artillery sites northwest of Mosul.
- 10/1/1999 UNSC adopts RES 1266 allowing Iraq to exceed oil sales ceiling
- 11/22/1999 Navy fighters fire missiles at a SAM site after Iraqi anti-aircraft guns fired at a coalition aircraft. The site was located near the city of an-Najaf, about 85 miles south of Baghdad.
- 12/17/1999 UNSC adopts RES 1284 specifying conditions under which sanctions would be suspended; establishes United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection

- Commission (UNMOVIC) to continue UNSCOM's mandate; eliminates cap on Iraqi oil exports
- 12/17/1999 The UNSC adopts Resolution 1284 replacing UNSCOM by the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
 - 1/9/2000 As of this date, there had been more than 420 separate incidents of Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery and SAM fire directed at coalition pilots since December 1998. Iraqi aircraft violated the southern no-fly zone more than 140 times since Operation Desert Fox.
 - 1/27/2000 Hans Blix is appointed chairman of UNMOVIC
 - 3/1/2000 Iraq rejects UN proposal for Hajj pilgrims
 - 3/31/2000 UNSC adopts RES 1293 doubling allocations for oil spare parts
 - 4/4/2000 Coalition aircraft target four Iraqi military sites with precision-guided munitions, including a military radar site at Nasiriyah, 17 miles southeast of Baghdad. Iraq says two people were killed in U.S.-British air raid in the south.
 - 4/7/2000 UNMOVIC chairman Blix submits organizational plan to UNSC
 - 4/13/2000 UNSC approves UNMOVIC organizational plan
 - 5/22/2000 As of this date, there had been more than 470 separate incidents of Iraqi SAM and anti-aircraft artillery fire directed against coalition pilots since December 1998. Iraqi aircraft violated the southern no-fly zone more than 150 times during the same period.
 - 6/8/2000 UN Secretary-General reports that Iraq has sufficient revenues to take care of food and nutrition and solve health problems; UNSC adopts RES 1302 improving implementation of humanitarian program
 - 11/9/2000 Iraq attempts to gain direct control over some oil
 - 11/20/2000 UN Sanctions Committee rejects Iraqi oil surcharge proposal
 - 11/30/2000 Iraq rejects UN Secretary-General offer to discuss weapons inspections
 - 12/1/2000 Iraq temporarily halts oil exports
 - 1/1/2001 U.S. aircraft launch two attacks on Iraqi radar sites in the southern no-fly zone.
 - 1/16/2001 U.S. and British aircraft launch attacks on five air defense sites both in the southern no-fly zone and in the central area of Iraq. Some two dozen aircraft participate in the first major military action ordered by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, Jr.
 - 1/20/2001 U.S. aircraft launch attacks on radar systems and anti-aircraft guns in the southern no-fly zone. All coalition aircraft depart the area safely.
 - 1/24/2001 Iraqi forces launch SAM and fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
 - 1/24/2001 Iraqi missiles and AAA fired at ONW aircraft Jan 24, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft again today. Iraqi forces launched surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
 - 2/11/2001 U.S. aircraft strike anti-aircraft guns in the southern no-fly zone in response to anti-aircraft fire.
 - 2/12/2001 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul while coalition aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. The aircraft responded to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
 - 2/12/2001 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar Feb 12, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone. Coalition aircraft were also targeted by Iraqi radar.
 - 2/13/2001 U.S. aircraft strike Iraqi SAM sites in the southern no-fly zone "following recent Iraqi violations of UN Security Council resolutions."

- 2/16/2001 Following Iraqi SAM and anti-aircraft gun fire on U.S. aircraft enforcing the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft strike air defense targets.
- 2/22/2001 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft guns from sites north of Mosul while coalition aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft are also targeted by Iraqi radar from sites southeast of Mosul. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 2/22/2001 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar Feb 22, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone. Coalition aircraft were also targeted by Iraqi radar from sites southeast of Mosul.
- 2/28/2001 U.S. aircraft strike Iraqi SAM sites in the southern no-fly zone "following recent Iraqi violations of UN Security Council resolutions."
- 3/2/2001 UN Secretary-General reports Iraq's underproduction of oil is affecting critical humanitarian programs
- 3/7/2001 UN-Iraq talks in NY on renewing weapons inspections
- 3/30/2001 Responding to Iraqi anti-aircraft fire, U.S. aircraft launch precision-guided weapons on an anti-aircraft gun site in the southern no-fly zone.
- 4/6/2001 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by bombing Iraqi air defense installations.
- 4/6/2001 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft April 06, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch(ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 4/8/2001 Iraq suspends oil production
- 4/12/2001 Responding to Iraqi anti-aircraft fire, U.S. aircraft launch precision-guided weapons on an anti-aircraft gun site in the southern no-fly zone.
- 4/18/2001 UN-Iraq talks in NY on renewing weapons inspections
- 4/19/2001 U.S. warplanes bomb a mobile early warning radar in southern Iraq in response to Iraq's aggressive action against U.S. and British planes monitoring a no-fly zone over southern Iraq.
- 4/20/2001 US, UK strike mobile early warning radar in response to increasing Iraqi acts against coalition aircraft in the southern no-fly zone
- 4/20/2001 Coalition aircraft strike a mobile early warning radar in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons in response to hostile Iraqi acts against coalition aircraft.
- 4/30/2001 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites northwest of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 4/30/2001 AAA fired at ONW aircraft April 30, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch(ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites northwest of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 5/1/2001 UN-Iraq talks in NY on renewing weapons inspections
- 5/18/2001 U.S. and British warplanes attack an air defense installation 180 miles southeast of Baghdad to counter Iraqi firings of SAM and anti-aircraft artillery in the southern no-fly zone.
- 5/23/2001 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north and west of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft are also targeted by Iraqi radar. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 5/23/2001 ONW aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar May 23, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north and west of Mosul

while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone. Coalition aircraft were also targeted by Iraqi radar.

- 6/1/2001 UNSC adopts RES 1352 to revise economic sanctions to improve flow of civilian goods into Iraq
- 6/5/2001 Coalition aircraft attack an anti-aircraft gun site in the southern no-fly zone. The next day, a radar site also in the southern no-fly zone is struck.
- 6/14/2001 Coalition aircraft are targeted by Iraqi missile guidance radar systems from sites north of Mosul while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Iraqi gunners later attack aircraft with anti-aircraft artillery fire. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. The same day, aircraft enforcing the southern no-fly zone attack a radar site.
- 6/14/2001 ONW aircraft respond to targeting radar, AAA Jun 14, 2001 -- Operation Northern Watch aircraft were targeted by Iraqi missile guidance radar systems from sites north of Mosul while conducting routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone. Iraqi gunners later attacked ONW aircraft with anti-aircraft artillery fire.
- 6/25/2001 U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone. The following day, another anti-aircraft gun site is struck.
- 7/7/2001 U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons.
- 7/17/2001 U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons.
- 7/18/2001 A U.S. Air Force F-16 Falcon crash at about 10:14 a.m. Turkish local time near Batman, Turkey. The F-16's home base was Aviano Air Base, in Italy. At the time of the accident, the aircraft was flying over Turkey en route to a mission enforcing the northern no-fly zone over Iraq. The piloted ejected and was uninjured.
- 8/7/2001 Iraqi forces launch SAM and fired anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul while coalition aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 8/7/2001 Iraqi missiles and AAA fired at ONW aircraft Aug 07, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces launched surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 8/10/2001 Coalition aircraft bomb three communications, radar and missile sites in the southern no-fly zone after Iraq increases efforts to shoot down allied pilots.
- 8/14/2001 In response to Iraqi threats to coalition aircraft in the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft strike a SAM site.
- 8/17/2001 Iraqi forces threaten coalition aircraft by firing anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul. Coalition aircraft are also targeted by Iraqi radar while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond in self defense to the Iraqi attacks by delivering ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 8/17/2001 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar Aug 17, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today by firing anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul. Coalition aircraft were also targeted by Iraqi radar while conducting routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 8/25/2001 Coalition aircraft fire precision-guided munitions at a mobile early warning radar in the southern no-fly zone in response to Iraqi threats against coalition aircraft.
- 8/27/2001 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft guns from sites north of Mosul while coalition aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. In the southern no-fly zone, an unarmed U.S.

- Air Force Predator unmanned aerial vehicle monitoring the zone is reported missing, possibly crashed or shot down.
- 8/27/2001 ONW aircraft fired upon, coalition responds Aug 27, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
 - 8/28/2001 Coalition aircraft use precision-guided weapons to attack command and control facilities in the southern no-fly zone. Two days later, a military radar site is struck.
 - 9/3/2001 Iraq orders 5 UN Oil-for-Food workers to leave Baghdad without consulting UN
 - 9/4/2001 Sept. 4: Iraqi anti-aircraft guns north of Mosul fire at coalition aircraft conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft are also targeted by Iraqi radar. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by delivering munitions on parts of the Iraqi air defense system. In the southern no-fly zone, precision-guided weapons are used to attack anti-aircraft gun and SAM sites.
 - 9/4/2001 Iraqi AAA fired at, radar targets ONW aircraft Sept 4, 2001 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today while firing anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone. Coalition aircraft were also targeted by Iraqi radar.
 - 9/9/2001 Sept. 9: Coalition aircraft attack SAM sites in the southern no-fly zone in response to Iraqi hostile actions against coalition aircraft monitoring the zone.
 - 9/11/2001 A Predator unmanned aerial vehicle is lost in the course of a surveillance mission monitoring the southern no-fly zone.
 - 9/18/2001 U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons.
 - 9/20/2001 Coalition aircraft strike anti-aircraft guns in the southern no-fly zone following Iraqi threats against earlier coalition patrols. A day later, further attacks are launched upon command and control vehicles and equipment in the southern no-fly zone.
 - 9/27/2001 Coalition aircraft attack anti-aircraft guns and command and control vehicles and equipment in open fields in the southern no-fly zone following Iraqi threats to aircraft monitoring the zone.
 - 10/2/2001 U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons, in response to Iraqi threats against aircraft monitoring the zone. A day later, two more anti-aircraft gun sites are struck.
 - 10/10/2001 A U.S. Air Force RQ-1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle is reported missing during a monitoring mission of the southern no-fly zone.
 - 10/13/2001 Coalition aircraft fire precision-guided munitions at a command and control facility within the southern no-fly zone.
 - 11/27/2001 (between Nov. 26 and Nov. 28, exact date unknown) Coalition aircraft use precision-guided weapons to strike a command and control facility within the southern no-fly zone in response to Iraqi threats against coalition planes.
 - 2/4/2002 Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery from sites northeast of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. All coalition aircraft depart the area safely.
 - 2/4/2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft Feb 4, 2002 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites northeast of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone
 - 2/11/2002 UN Special Rapporteur visits Baghdad
 - 2/28/2002 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul at U.S. aircraft conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond in self defense to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision munitions on

elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. All coalition aircraft depart the area safely.

- 2/28/2002 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar Feb 28, 2002 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 3/29/2002 Reports say that reallocation of forces in Afghanistan leaves key U.S. unit, 5th Special Forces Group, available for Iraq buildup.
- 4/19/2002 Iraqi air defense radar actively target coalition aircraft from locations east of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by firing precision ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 4/19/2002 Iraq targets Coalition aircraft April 19, 2002 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) Coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces air defense radar actively targeted Coalition aircraft from locations east of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 5/1/2002 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites in the vicinity of Saddam dam around 3:20 p.m. local time while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 5/1/2002 Iraq fires AAA at Northern Watch Aircraft May 01, 2002 -- Iraqi forces attacked Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites in the vicinity of Saddam Dam around 3:20 p.m. local time while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 5/14/2002 UNSC adopts RES 1409, revised 300-page Goods Review List
- 5/28/2002 Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery from a site in the vicinity of Saddam dam while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attack by dropping precision guided ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 5/28/2002 ONW aircraft fired upon, Coalition responds May 28, 2002 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from a site in the vicinity of Saddam Dam while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 6/19/2002 Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites in the vicinity of Saddam dam while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided ordnance on an element of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 6/19/2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft, Coalition responds June 19, 2002 -- Iraqi forces attacked Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites in the vicinity of Saddam Dam while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 6/26/2002 Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery from a site north of Ayn Zalah while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided ordnance on an element of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 7/4/2002 ONW aircraft threatened, Coalition responds July 4, 2002 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft near Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 7/5/2002 Talks in Vienna between the United Nations and Iraq break down without agreement.
- 8/1/2002 Iraq invites UN chief weapons inspector to Baghdad.
- 8/12/2002 Reports appear of U.S. troops buildup at airbases on the Jordanian/Iraqi border.

- 8/13/2002 An announcement is made that two shiploads of military equipment are to be moved into the Persian Gulf.
- 8/14/2002 5:00 p.m. EDT. U.S. CENTCOM said that aircraft from the U.S. and British coalition attacked two Iraqi air defense sites in southern Iraq with precision-guided weapons as a response to Iraqi actions that threatened the coalition aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone.
- 8/17/2002 6:30 a.m. EDT. The Pentagon stated that British and U.S. fighter jets used precision-guided weapons to target a mobile radar unit in southern Iraq's no-fly zone in response to recent hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. Iraq claims the strikes hit civilian and public buildings. Earlier in the week, Britain confirmed that coalition plans attacks targets in the same region.
- 8/20/2002 1:40 a.m. EDT. In response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense command and control facility in southern Iraq, Al Amarah, about 120 miles southeast of Baghdad.
- 8/21/2002 Second tour is given to journalists in August by Iraqi officials of a site that U.S. officials suspect may be a biological weapons facility. (The Washington Post, Aug. 21, 2002, p. A18)
- 8/22/2002 U.S. CENTCOM stated that U.S. aircraft attacked air defense and command and control facilities in the Missan province in southern Iraq "in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone." According to the Iraqi Air Force Command, three civilians were killed.
- 8/23/2002 U.S. warplanes bombed an air defense site in northern Iraq, near Irbil, after being targeted by an Iraqi missile guidance radar system, according to the U.S. military. In Baghdad, an unidentified Iraqi military spokesman said Iraqi anti-aircraft and missile units fired at enemy warplanes, forcing them to leave Iraqi skies, according to the Iraqi News Agency.
- 8/23/2002 Iraqi targets coalition aircraft August 23, 2002 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. An Iraqi missile guidance radar system in an area near Irbil targeted coalition aircraft while they were conducting routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 8/25/2002 2:30 a.m. EDT. In response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike two air defense radar systems near Al Basrah in southern Iraq.
- 8/26/2002 U.S. CENTCOM stated that, "coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike two air defense radar systems near Al Basrah" in southern Iraq, in response to hostile acts by Iraq. According to the official Iraqi News Agency, U.S. and British planes attacked "civilian and service installations in Basrah province". Eight people were killed and nine were injured in "35 sorties" flown from "air bases in Kuwait" according to the Iraqi News Agency. A British Defense Ministry spokesman would not say if British aircraft, U.S. aircraft or both were involved in the strikes.
- 8/26/2002 Allied warplanes hit an Iraqi radar guidance facility in northern Iraq after "an Iraqi missile guidance radar system in an area near Irbil targeted coalition aircraft while they were conducting routing enforcement of the northern no-fly zone," according to U.S. defense officials.
- 8/27/2002 2:30 a.m. EDT. In response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an air defense command and control facility near An Nukhayb in southern Iraq.
- 8/27/2002 Iraqi targets coalition aircraft August 27, 2002 -- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today in the Northern No-Fly zone today by illuminating them with a radar system near Mosul.
- 8/29/2002 3:45 p.m. EDT. Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a military radar system in southern Iraq, near Al Kut, about 150 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone.

- 8/30/2002 U.S. and British fighters attacked a major Iraq army intelligence and air-defense installation in southern Iraq, in Ashar, south of Basra, according to Iraqi opposition sources. Four air-to-ground missiles struck the facility. A later attack on Tuesday destroyed a radar site in the north according to Iraqi opposition sources. The hit facility was headquarters to Iraqi Army intelligence in the southern region and was also the site of advanced radar and surveillance equipment used to monitor ground and air traffic in Iran.
- 8/30/2002 2:30 a.m. EDT. Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a surface-to-air missile site in southern Iraq, near Al Kut, about 150 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone.
- 9/3/2002 Reports in The Wall Street Journal indicate that U.S. pre-positioned equipment in Qatar has been moved to Kuwait, bringing the total of equipment in the emirate to levels capable of equipping two heavy brigades.
- 9/4/2002 Sept. 4: Reports surface that a large civilian cargo ship to carry tanks and heavy armor to the Persian Gulf has been contracted by the U.S. Navy. It is chartered by the U.S. Military Sealift Command to arrive in the Persian Gulf in late September. This marks the third shipment in a month. The ship will originate from a port on the southeastern coast of the United States. According to the formal tender document, the ship will carry 67 units of track general cargo, containerized cargo and rolling stock in measurements that match those of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank.
- 9/5/2002 American and British aircraft participated in an attack on Iraq's major western air defense installation at the H3 airfield, about 240 miles west of Baghdad, close to Jordan. According to the Pentagon, the strike was a response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. Marine Corps Lt. Col. David Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman, said that the raid involved 24 aircraft, including 12 that dropped about 20 bombs. Lapan also stated that there have been three other strikes carried out this year that used 24 total aircraft. The London Daily Telegraph reported that up to 100 aircraft were involved in this strike. If correct, this would be an unusually large strike; U.S. officials refused to confirm that 100 aircraft took part, and later on, the British RAF tried to dispel that impression, saying there had been a mistake. Reportedly, this is the biggest single operation over the country for four years. The raid seemed designed to destroy air defenses to allow easy access for Special Forces helicopters to fly into Iraq via Jordan or Saudi Arabia to hunt down Scud missiles before a possible war.
- 9/6/2002 5:45 p.m. EDT. Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a ground-launched anti-ship missile in southern Iraq, near Al Basrah, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to recent Iraqi hostile threats against coalition ships in the Arabian Gulf.
- 9/7/2002 12:45 p.m. GMT. U.S. Air Force aircraft attacked an Iraqi Silkworm anti-ship missile site in southern Iraq, near Basra, in response to attempts by the radar of an Iraqi Silkworm missile to lock on to a U.S. ship transferring arms and equipment from its al-Udeid base in Qatar to Kuwait. This attack marks an apparent escalation of operations over the no-fly zones--previously coalition forces have concentrated fire on air defense sites directly threatening their aircraft. The Chinese-made Silkworm surface-to-air anti-ship missile has a range of 59 miles, which would allow it to hit any ship preparing to dock in Kuwait.
- 9/7/2002 4:15 a.m. EDT. In response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a military communications facility in southern Iraq, near Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad.
- 9/9/2002 1:30 a.m. EST. Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an air defense command and control facility in southern Iraq, near Al Amarah, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone.

- 9/11/2002 U.S. military sources reveal that U.S. Central Command headquarters will be moved from Tampa, Fla., to Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, the capital of Qatar. Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the commander in chief, did not confirm this, but he did admit that shifting some operations and personnel to Qatar permanently is under consideration. This move would signify an escalation in preparations for possible military action against Iraq, and the emergence of Qatar as a key strategic U.S. ally in the region.
- 9/12/2002 UNSC begins discussion on Iraqi non-compliance with UN resolutions
- 9/12/2002 U.S. President George W. Bush delivers his speech to the United Nations making a case for action against Iraq. Sept. 11 reports on moving CENTCOM headquarters are clarified; the HQ will shift to Qatar in November for the period of a week-long exercise.
- 9/12/2002 President Bush addresses UN to put the case for war against Iraq.
- 9/15/2002 At 9:35 a.m. local time, American and British aircraft violated Iraqi airspace "flying from bases in Kuwait and carrying out 38 sorties," according to an Iraqi military spokesman. The spokesman said that coalition aircraft attacked civilian and service installations in the Dhi-Qar province, about 230 miles south of Baghdad, and retreated after meeting with Iraqi air defense fire. According to U.S. CENTCOM, the air strikes were carried out in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts. CENTCOM also confirmed that U.S. and British aircraft struck an air defense communications facility near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad. (The Washington Post)
- 9/16/2002 The Pentagon asks Britain for permission to build special shelters on its air base on the Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean for as many as six B-2 bombers. Should Britain agree, it would mark the first time B-2 stealth bombers have been based overseas for a combat mission, said a defense official. It would also mark a significant escalation in preparations for possible U.S. military action against Iraq. "Even a small number of B-2s can wipe out Iraqi air defenses in a few days and clear the skies for coalition air power to take out Iraqi targets," said Daniel Goure, a Lexington Institute senior analyst. According to defense officials, the U.S. has also been transferring munitions to warehouses in Diego Garcia and Qatar from the United States. (The Wall Street Journal)
- 9/16/2002 U.S. officials admit that U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones in Iraq have adopted new tactics designed to cause increased and more lasting damage to Iraqi air defenses. These new tactics include more emphasis on strikes on buildings — especially command and communication links in Iraq's air defense system — and other fixed targets rather than mobile targets such as radars and surface-to-air launchers. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the change last month because U.S. and British aircraft were coming under more effective Iraqi fire. British officials have confirmed that RAF Tornado GR.4s will be equipped with stand-off cruise missiles in the next few months when patrolling no-fly zones. (The London Telegraph)
- 9/16/2002 Iraq accepts 'unconditional' return of UN inspectors.
- 9/17/2002 Iraq says it will permit UN weapons inspections
- 9/20/2002 Sept. 20: Hussein announces that Iraq "is clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons." He appealed to the United Nations to resist the Bush administration's call for support for a military strike against the Iraqi government. Hussein also stated that Baghdad is "ready to cooperate with the Security Council" regarding renewed UN weapons inspections, and demanded that the United Nations lift sanctions on Iraq and force Israel to eliminate all its weapons of mass destruction according to UN resolutions calling for the removal of all such weapons from the Middle East.
- 9/24/2002 Sept. 24: In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an Iraqi radar facility near Al Amarah, about 165 miles southeast of Baghdad, and a defense communications facility in Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad at approximately 2:15 p.m. EDT. According to an Iraqi military spokesman, coalition aircraft violated Iraqi airspace at about 9:30 p.m.

local time flying in from Kuwait, and "attacked... civilian and service installations in Dhi qar and Meisan provinces, hurting one civilian." The spokesman said that coalition aircraft returned to their bases after being fired upon by Iraqi ground air defenses. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Washington Post)

- 9/24/2002 Britain publishes dossier saying Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon within one or two years, if it obtains fissile material and other components from abroad.
- 9/25/2002 Sept. 25: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike Iraqi air defense facilities near Al Kufa, about 80 miles south of Baghdad, and Al Basrah at approximately 4:45 p.m. EDT. The strikes were in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. According to the official Iraqi News Agency, Iraqi government officials said that the targets hit were civilian and service installations. They also claimed that civilians were injured at Al Basrah. A U.S. government official produced a classified photograph that showed the targets hit were remote from any houses, stores or major roads, and that although two precision-guided missiles went astray, they hit only empty desert. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld accused Iraq of "lying to inflame the public opinion against the United States." Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that radar targets hit at Al Basrah were in a stretch of desert beyond the military side of the dual-use civilian military airport located there. Rumsfeld emphasized that "the only reason anybody would be out in this vicinity of this particular radar at any time of day would be to actually be functioning as part of the radar team." (U.S. CENTCOM, The New York Times)
- 9/26/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike two Iraqi surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites near Qalat Sikur, about 130 miles southeast of Baghdad, and in Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad at 3:45 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. EDT, respectively. The strikes were in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 9/26/2002 British and U.S. aircraft used precision munitions to strike an Iraqi air defense communications facility near Al Amrah, about 200 miles south of Baghdad, in the southern no-fly zone. (The Associated Press)
- 9/27/2002 In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a SAM control radar and a SAM launcher near Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, and an air defense operations center near Al Amarah, about 165 miles southeast of Baghdad, at approximately 4:30 p.m. EDT. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 9/28/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a military mobile radar near Al Basrah, and a SAM site near Qalat Sikur, in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone at approximately 5:00 p.m. EDT. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 9/30/2002 UN negotiators and an Iraqi delegation meet in Vienna for three days of talks to agree terms for resuming weapons inspections. But talks leave eight presidential compounds off-limits, and US rejects inspectors' return without a new security council resolution.
- 10/1/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a mobile radar in Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, after Iraq placed the mobile radar past the 33rd parallel in the southern no-fly zone, and Iraqi aircraft penetrated the restricted area. (Los Angeles Times, U.S. CENTCOM)
- 10/3/2002 President George W. Bush signed a National Security Presidential Directive authorizing U.S. combat training for Iraqi opposition fighters, allocating \$92 million in Defense Department funds to the effort and marking a break from the 1998 directive signed by former President Bill Clinton restricting expenditures to non-lethal instruction. About 5,000 recruits have been identified for an initial training program scheduled to begin next month, the force they will form is expected to eventually number about 10,000. The Iraqis will be instructed in basic combat and special skills to serve as battlefield advisers, scouts and interpreters in support of U.S. ground troops in the event of an invasion. Later

phases of the program will include training Iraqis as forward spotters for laser-guided bombs and as military police to run prisoner of war camps inside Iraq. Many of the names of recruits were part of a list of exiles provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in London. The recruits will be trained outside of the United States and not in the Middle East. The move indicates further preparation for a possible attack on Iraq. (The Washington Post)

- 10/3/2002 In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft struck an Iraqi air defense sector headquarters and integrated operations center with precision-guided weapons near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 10/7/2002 U.S. President George W. Bush delivers a speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center outlining the case for possible military action against Iraq. Bush stresses that the threat from Iraq stands alone because it gathers the most serious dangers - a tyrant with a history of aggression and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - in one place. He uses many of the same arguments posed during his speech to the United Nations on Sept. 12, 2002, notably citing new evidence to link al Qaeda with the Iraqi regime, and satellite photographs proving that Iraq is rebuilding nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) production facilities anew. Bush says that Iraq can avoid conflict if it adheres to UN resolutions.
- 10/9/2002 09 Oct. 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft 22 Oct 2002-- Coalition aircraft responded in self-defense to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided munitions on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 10/9/2002 09 Oct. 2002 Iraq threatens coalition aircraft 09 Oct. 2002-- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft in the Northern No-Fly zone northwest of Mosul.
- 10/10/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) site near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Washington Post)
- 10/10/2002 At the same time as the Tallil strike, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an air defense radar system near Basra, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to Iraqi hostile SAM and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire. According to the Iraqi News Agency, the radar system was destroyed and passenger and service buildings at the Basra airport were damaged. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Washington Post)
- 10/11/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a mobile SAM site near Tallil in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Los Angeles Times)
- 10/11/2002 The U.S. Army's V Corps and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force have orders from the Pentagon to deploy headquarters staff to Kuwait. According to defense officials, this is the first non-routine dispatch of conventional ground forces to the Persian Gulf and is part of preparations for possible military action against Iraq. (The Washington Post)
- 10/11/2002 Commercial bids on two large merchant ships are being sought by the Navy, according to the Navy's Military Sealift Command. One ship will be scheduled to load in California in mid-October, and the other will come from ports in Belgium and Italy concurrently. According to the U.S. military, this now brings to six the total number of large cargo ships chartered in support of military exercises in Kuwait and Jordan by the Navy since August.
- 10/15/2002 In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a command and control communications facility near Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 10/16/2002 Saddam Hussein wins re-election by a reported 11 million-to-0 margin in a one-man, yes or no referendum, further extending his two-decade rule. (CNN)
- 10/16/2002 Iraq renews offer to UN weapons inspectors, after 'referendum' gives Saddam Hussein another seven-year term as president with 100% of the vote.

- 10/21/2002 According to Iraqi opposition officials, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established two formal field offices in Kurdish-controlled territory protected by coalition aircraft, marking the first time the CIA has had a permanent base in northern Iraq since 1996. One office is in Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled territory, another is in Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) controlled territory. (The Washington Times)
- 10/22/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense communications facility near Al Jarrah, about 90 miles southeast of Baghdad, and an air defense operations center near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile fire against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Washington Post); Northeast of Mosul, about 250 miles north of Baghdad, coalition aircraft targeted other elements of the air defense system after being targeted by Iraqi fire, according to the U.S. European Command. (The Washington Post)
- 10/22/2002 The first of two large Military Sealift Command ships was loaded with cargo at the Army dock of the Charleston Naval Weapons Station. The 841st Transportation Battalion supervised the loading of 2,000 pieces of cargo, mostly fuel trucks and engineering equipment. Command spokesman Frank Randall said, "This is surge sealift, in response to a specific requirement. It is mostly Army Reserve equipment and part of the war on terrorism, but I can't say if it has anything to do with Iraq." The ships, both Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on roll-off vessels (LSMRs), are bound for the Middle East to support U.S. CENTCOM activities, although the precise destination of the ships has not been released. The first ship, the Bob Hope, has been loaded with 8,300 metric tons worth of equipment. The second ship, the Fisher, is scheduled to be loaded with 6,600 metric tons in the next few days. (The Baltimore Sun)
- 10/24/2002 Oct. 24: According to top military officers, the U.S. Air Force has begun using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) called Predators to strike targets in southern Iraq. Predators are able to hover for 24 hours over a target, record high-resolution images and communicate them to command centers in real-time, and are armed with Hellfire missiles. Predators have been helping to monitor the southern no-fly zone in conjunction with other coalition aircraft for about a month, but usually unarmed and strictly for performing surveillance. Now, Predators identify the source of surface-to-air and anti-aircraft artillery fire in the no-fly zone and respond by launching Hellfire missiles at the targets. (The Washington Post)
- 10/25/2002 Oct. 25: According to a Croatian police source, there is evidence that a seized ship leaving Yugoslavia was heading to Iraq loaded with military equipment. The ship was seized this week in the port of Rijeka on Croatia's Adriatic Coast with the help of the United States and NATO allies. The ship was apparently carrying material used in the ignition of Scud missiles. (The Associated Press)
- 10/26/2002 Oct. 26: A solicitation is posted for a U.S. or foreign-flag self-sustaining container vessel to transport dry cargo consisting of approximately 550 TEUs of ammunition from the U.S. East Coast to four ports located in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. (Military Sealift Command via www.eps.gov)
- 10/30/2002 30 Oct. 2002 ONW aircraft defend against Iraqi anti-aircraft threat 30 Oct 2002-- Iraqi forces threatened Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft weapons while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 11/2/2002 02 Nov 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone 02 Dec 2002-- Coalition aircraft responded in self-defense to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided munitions on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 11/4/2002 Nov. 4: Kuwait offers the use of its military bases to American forces in the case of a UN-backed attack on Iraq. Kuwaiti forces, however, would not be involved in such an attack. (Washington Times)

- 11/4/2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone 04 Dec 2002-- Coalition aircraft responded in self-defense to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided munitions on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
- 11/6/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target two surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) near Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, and a control communications facility near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 11/7/2002 In response to hostile fire from Iraqi SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense operations facility and integrated operations center near Al Kut. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 11/8/2002 UNSC adopts RES 1441 outlining provisions for enhanced weapons inspections
- 11/8/2002 The UN Security Council unanimously passes the tough Resolution 1441 on Iraq calling for Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to disband all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs or face 'serious consequences'. Through the new resolution, inspectors have the authority to demand "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to all sites, including presidential palaces. (The Washington Post)
- 11/8/2002 UN security council votes unanimously to back a US-British resolution requiring Iraq to reinstate weapons inspectors after a four year absence.
- 11/10/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target two SAM sites near Tallil that were relocated into the southern no-fly zone by Iraq in violation of UN resolutions the sites were perceived as a threat for aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 11/13/2002 Iraq accepts RES 1441
- 11/13/2002 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein announces that Iraq will "deal with" UN Resolution 1441, according to which he will have to allow UN inspectors to search for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and production facilities for such weapons. (Los Angeles Times, CBSNews.com)
- 11/13/2002 President Saddam sends a letter to the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, accepting the UN resolution.
- 11/15/2002 In response Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fire and surface-to-air missiles targeting coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense communications facility near An Najaf, about 85 miles southeast of Baghdad. This marks the first exchange of fire between Iraqi and coalition forces since UN Resolution 1441; although the Bush administration says that the incident puts Iraq in 'material breach' of the resolution, it is improbable that it will trigger a U.S.-led attack on Iraq. (U.S. CENTCOM, Los Angeles Times)
- 11/17/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense system northeast of Mosul in response to Iraqi fire targeting coalition aircraft monitoring the northern no-fly zone. According to an Iraqi military spokesman, coalition aircraft bombed civilian targets near Mosul. (The Washington Post)
- 11/17/2002 17 Nov. 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone 17 Nov 2002-- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites northeast of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 11/18/2002 UNMOVIC and IAEA chairman in Baghdad for technical talks
- 11/18/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target two air defense communications facilities and one air defense radar facility. The radar facility and one communication facility were located near Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad. The other air defense facility was located near Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM); Several hundred Marines based in Camp Pendleton were dispatched to the Middle East to join the central command area of operations. The units included many battle planners and senior staff officers. Some of the troops will participate in military exercises

in Kuwait to test the military's capability to assemble and deploy forces over long distances. According to Camp Pendleton Capt. David Romley, "Units from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force are departing to support Operation Enduring Freedom." Another several hundred Marines left San Diego for the Gulf region around the same time. (Orange County Register)

- 11/18/2002 18 Nov 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone 18 Nov 2002-- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites northeast of Mosul while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 11/18/2002 United Nations weapons inspectors arrive in Baghdad to re-launch the search for weapons of mass destruction.
- 11/20/2002 In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target three unmanned air defense communications facilities located between Al Basrah, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, and Al Kut. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 11/21/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi air defense radar site near Ash Shuaybah, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, after Iraq moved the radar south of the 33rd parallel in violation of the established southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM); In response to the movement of an air defense radar site south of the 33rd parallel by Iraq in violation of the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target the radar site near Tallil. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 11/22/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target unmanned communications facilities south of Al Amarah, about 165 miles south of Baghdad, after an Iraqi military jet violated the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 11/22/2002 Vladimir Putin warns the US not to go it alone against Iraq, sounding a note of caution after an otherwise warm welcome to President Bush in Russia.
- 11/23/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target a mobile radar system located south of Al Amarah after Iraq moved the mobile radar south of the 33rd parallel in violation of the established southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 11/27/2002 The weapons inspectors start inspections, visiting two sites, and thank the Iraqis for their cooperation but do not comment on findings.
- 11/28/2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone 28 Nov 2002-- Iraqi forces threatened Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coalition aircraft today. Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from sites south of Tall Afar while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone.
- 12/1/2002 In response to Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fire against coalition aircraft in the northern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target Iraqi air defense facilities located between Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, and Al Basrah, about 240 miles southeast of Baghdad. Thirteen coalition aircraft dropped 23 precision-guided weapons, marking one of the biggest coalition strikes this year. This also marks the first time that U.S. military officials cited an incident in the north as the reason for a military response in the south since the no-fly zones were established 10 years ago, signaling an escalation in the U.S. response to Iraq and increasing pressure for Iraq to disarm. This incident also reflects that the U.S. military can more freely carry out retaliatory attacks in the southern no-fly zone than in the northern no-fly zone due to Turkey's close involvement with operations in the north. Turkey is more sensitive about which targets get hit by coalition aircraft than are the countries that facilitate coalition operations in the south. An Iraqi military spokesman claims that the coalition warplanes targeted a state-run Southern Oil Company on the outskirts of Al Basrah, and that four people were killed and 27 were injured in the attack. He also said that coalition aircraft attacked two other civilian targets in the south and that Iraqi defenses had fired in response. An oil company official identified the casualties as company employers and passers-by.

(U.S. CENTCOM, The New York Times, The Washington Times, The Washington Post)

- 12/2/2002 In what looks like further preparation for a possible war with Iraq, the United States is installing a command center at As Sayliyah base in Qatar for the official purpose of conducting a major military exercise called Internal Look in December. The exercise will involve the same command and control procedures that would be used in a war with Iraq. This will mark the first time the U.S. military has conducted a war game of this type outside of the United States. The As Sayliyah base covers 262 acres and cost more than \$100 million to build. It can store hundreds of M1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and other armored vehicles and is capable of housing enough armored equipment for a heavy Army brigade. The base currently houses about 300 American troops. Many weapons continue to be shipped from As Sayliyah to Kuwait. Given the base's existing capabilities, the new command center at As Sayliyah may lead to the establishment of a future U.S. military headquarters there. (The New York Times)
- 12/2/2002 The British government publishes a dossier documenting human rights abuses in Iraq. It is attacked by Amnesty International for being 'opportunistic and selective'. Critics say it uses longstanding human rights abuses to achieve current military goals, and ignores US and UK support for Saddam at the time of some of the worst atrocities.
- 12/3/2002 In a public relations coup for Iraq, government officials cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors when a surprise search is sprung on one of Saddam Hussein's Baghdad palaces.
- 12/3/2002 Iraq says it will hand the security council a declaration about weapons programmes on December 7, one day ahead of the deadline.
- 12/4/2002 The UN security council agrees to extend the UN oil for food programme in Iraq for another six months, but concedes to US demands to review the list of goods Baghdad is barred from importing.
- 12/7/2002 The Iraqi government delivered a declaration approximately 12,000 pages long to the United Nations today in compliance with the Dec.18 deadline set by the UN Resolution 1441. According to Iraqi officials, the documents contain full and complete details about Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear programs while maintaining that the country harbors no weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In so doing, Iraq has passed up a final opportunity to acknowledge any WMD it may have, and so, protect itself against evidence UN inspectors may uncover. The declaration mainly focuses on accounting for civilian facilities and equipment that could be used to make weapons. (The Washington Post)
- 12/7/2002 Iraqi officials in Baghdad present the UN with a 12,000 page dossier disclosing Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction, as demanded by UN resolution 1441.
- 12/7/2002 General Hasam Amin of Iraq's national monitoring directorate says the dossier shows 'that Iraq is empty of weapons of mass destruction. I reiterate Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction. This declaration has some activities that are dual-use'.
- 12/7/2002 The contents of the Iraqi dossier are met with widespread scepticism in Washington and London, prompting fears that Iraq is now set on a collision course with the US, which claims to have intelligence that Iraq retains banned weapons and is expected to hotly dispute Iraq's declaration.
- 12/7/2002 In a surprise move, Saddam Hussein uses a televised address to apologise to the people of Kuwait for invading their country in 1990.
- 12/8/2002 Copies of the dossier are flown to the UN inspection agency in New York, the security council and the UN nuclear agency in Vienna for examination.
- 12/8/2002 General Amir al-Sadi, an adviser to President Saddam Hussein, admits that Iraq had come 'close' to developing a nuclear bomb but that programme had long been abandoned.
- 12/10/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target a mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) system located south of Al Amarah after Iraqi forces moved

the SAM system south of the 33rd parallel in violation of the established southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)

- 12/14/2002 In response to violation of the southern no-fly zone by Iraqi military aircraft, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target multiple Iraqi military air defense communications facilities located near Al Kut; Aal'at Sukkar, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad; and Al Amarah, about 165 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 12/15/2002 Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi mobile radar and cable repeater sites located near An Nasiriyah, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, and Al Basra, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, after Iraqi forces moved the mobile radar south of the 33rd parallel in violation of the southern no-fly zone and targeted coalition aircraft with SAM artillery fire. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 12/16/2002 Dec. 16, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped 480,000 leaflets at about 4 a.m. EST over southern Iraq . Leaflets containing six separate messages were dropped at six locations, including near communications facilities that were damaged or destroyed by coalition aircraft flying Operation Southern Watch missions on Dec. 14. Leaflets dropped at those locations warned Iraqi forces that the coalition has targeted fiber optic cables for destruction and that repairing the facilities would place Iraqi military lives at risk. Other leaflets: • referred Iraqis to radio frequencies where they could hear broadcasts by coalition forces providing information; • warned Iraqi air defenses that targeting coalition aircraft or tracking them with radar could result in coalition air strikes; • stated that coalition aircraft enforce the no-fly zones to protect the Iraqi people, and that threatening coalition aircraft may result in air strikes. This was the seventh leaflet drop over southern Iraq over the October-December period. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 12/16/2002 Dec. 16: In response to Iraqi SAM artillery fire against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi communication site located south of Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)
- 12/17/2002 Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, hints that the White House will reject the Iraqi weapons declaration, saying there were problems with the 12,000-page document.
- 12/18/2002 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi military air defense radar site. The site was located south of Al Kut, approximately 100 miles southeast of Baghdad , and it was struck at approximately 4:30 a.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi forces moved the radar system into the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)
- 12/18/2002 The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, indicates that the UK government believes Iraq has made a "material breach" of the UN resolution. Meanwhile the Ministry of Defence reveals that ships are being chartered to carry troops and heavy armour to the Gulf.
- 12/19/2002 The United States accuses Baghdad of being in "material breach" of the UN resolution after the UN's chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, says the Iraqi arms declaration contains little new information about its weapons of mass destruction capability.
- 12/20/2002 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target two Iraqi air defense communication facilities. The sites were located near An Nasiriyah and Al Basrah in southern Iraq . The strikes occurred at approximately 2:30 a.m. EST. The coalition forces executed the strike after Iraqi military aircraft flew into the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
- 12/21/2002 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped leaflets over Al Amarah at approximately 4:30 a.m. EST and over As Samawah at approximately 5 a.m. EST. Al Amarah is approximately 165 miles southeast of Baghdad , and As Samawah is approximately 130 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 240,000 leaflets over both locations. (CENTCOM)

- 12/22/2002 Baghdad fights back in the propaganda war between Iraq, the US and Britain by inviting the CIA to enter the country and track down its alleged weapons of mass destruction.
- 12/23/2002 At approximately 7:30 a.m. (EST), a U.S. RQ-1A Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance aircraft was reported missing in Southern Iraq after being fired upon by Iraqi military aircraft. The Predator was assumed destroyed. (CENTCOM)
- 12/23/2002 For the ninth time in three months, U.S. aircraft dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 4:30 a.m. EST over Ash Shahtra and Ar Rifa, approximately 140 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 120,000 leaflets over both locations. (CENTCOM)
- 12/26/2002 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, use precision-guided weapons to target Iraqi military command and control communication facilities. The facilities were located near Tallil, approximately 175 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 12:00 a.m. EST. The coalition launched the attack after Iraqi military aircraft violated the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
- 12/27/2002 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi military air defense command and control system near Al Kut that supported highly mobile surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. The strike occurred at approximately 2:00 p.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi forces moved the system, a threat to coalition aircraft, into the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
- 12/27/2002 For the tenth time in three months, U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 6:30 a.m. EST south of Ad Diwaniyah, approximately 75 south of Baghdad , Ar Rumaytha, approximately 200 miles southeast of Baghdad and Qawam Al Hamzah, approximately 240 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 240,000 leaflets over the three locations. (CENTCOM)
- 12/28/2002 Coalition aircraft dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped leaflets at approximately 8:00 a.m. EST over Al Majar and Qal at Sukkar. Al Majar is approximately 200 miles southeast of Baghdad , and Qal at Sukkar is approximately 130 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 120,000 leaflets over both locations. (CENTCOM)
- 12/29/2002 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target two Iraqi military radar sites. The sites were located near Ad Diwaniyah, approximately 75 miles south of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 7:40 a.m. EST. The Coalition mounted the strike after Iraqi forces moved the systems into the Southern No-Fly zone. Its presence was a threat to coalition aircraft. (CENTCOM)
- 12/30/2002 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target Iraqi military air defense communications facilities and a mobile air defense radar. The coalition struck the communications facilities at approximately 2:30 p.m. EST ; they struck the mobile radar at approximately 3:40 p.m. EST. The communications facilities were targeted after Iraq earlier flew military aircraft into the Southern No-Fly zone. The mobile radar was attacked after Iraqi forces moved it into the Southern No-Fly Zone, as its presence was a direct threat to coalition aircraft and crews. (CENTCOM)
- 12/30/2002 It emerges that the Reagan administration and its special Middle East envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, did little to stop Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction in the 1980s, even though they knew Saddam Hussein was using chemical weapons "almost daily" against Iran.
- 12/31/2002 A UN inspection team member in Iraq admits to finding "zilch" evidence of weapons of mass destruction and says that the teams have been provided with little guidance from western intelligence agencies.

- 1/1/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi military air defense radar. The site was located near Al Qurnah, approximately 130 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strike occurred at approximately 1:15 a.m. EST. The U.S. Central Command said the radar was targeted after it was moved into the no-fly zone, thus becoming a threat to U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/2/2003 For the twelfth time in three months, U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 5:15 a.m. EST over Basrah and An Nasiriyah. Basrah is approximately 245 miles southeast of Baghdad , and An Nasiriyah is approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad . The aircraft dropped a total of 480,000 leaflets, directing Iraqis to radio frequencies where coalition forces are broadcasting information, over both locations. The same day, aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target four Iraqi air defense cable repeaters after Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fired at coalition aircraft in the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/4/2003 Jan. 4, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over the southern Iraqi towns of Al Amarah, about 165 miles southeast of Baghdad, and As Samawah, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. The drop, totaling 240,000 leaflets, occurred at approximately 6:15 a.m. EST. The same day, precision-guided weapons were used to target three Iraqi military air defense cable repeater sites after Iraqi air defense forces fired multiple anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/5/2003 Jan. 5, 2003 : The Boston Globe reports that about 100 U.S. Special Forces personnel and 50 CIA officers have been operating throughout Iraq for four months, adding weight to earlier stories reporting a U.S. covert presence.
- 1/6/2003 Jan. 6, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target two Iraqi military mobile radars. The radars were located near Al Amarah, approximately 165 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 3:30 p.m. EST. and came after Iraqi forces moved the radars into the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/6/2003 Saddam Hussein says he is ready for war, accuses UN weapons inspectors of being spies and calls his enemies the "friends and helpers of Satan".
- 1/8/2003 Jan. 8, 2003 : U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to attack two Iraqi air defense cable repeater sites in the southern No-fly zone at about 5 a.m. EST. The attack occurred after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone, as well as in response to Iraqi military aircraft violating the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/9/2003 Hans Blix says UN weapons inspectors have not found any "smoking guns" in their search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but acknowledges that Iraq's 12,000 page weapons declaration was incomplete.
- 1/10/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi military air defense command and control site at Tallil, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, and four cable repeater sites. The strikes occurred at approximately 7:15 a.m. EST. The coalition mounted the attack after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/11/2003 A British naval task force leaves for the Gulf headed by the HMS Ark Royal aircraft carrier and carrying some 3,000 marines.
- 1/13/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped the leaflets at approximately 7:10 a.m. EST over An Najaf , about 85 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 240,000 leaflets over the location. This was the fourteenth leaflet drop over southern Iraq by Coalition aircraft in three months. (CENTCOM)

- 1/13/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an Iraqi anti-ship missile launcher near Basrah, approximately 300 miles southeast of Baghdad, at approximately 4:10 a.m. EST. The anti-ship missile launcher was targeted because it was threatening coalition ships operating in the North Arabian Gulf . (CENTCOM)
- 1/13/2003 In his monthly televised briefing, Tony Blair says that weapons of mass destruction will reach terrorists and that Britain could act against Iraq with the US without a second UN resolution.
- 1/13/2003 Mohammed el-Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), says that UN weapons inspectors would need "a few months" to finish their work in Iraq.
- 1/14/2003 The international development secretary, Clare Short, makes an impassioned appeal for countries to reach "agreement by consensus" through the UN.
- 1/16/2003 In their first significant discovery, UN weapons inspectors find 12 warheads designed to carry chemical weapons. The inspectors believe the warheads were not accounted for in Iraq's 12,000 page submission to the security council.
- 1/17/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target two cable repeater sites that are part of Iraq's military air defense command and control system. The sites were located between Al Kut, approximately 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, and An Nasiriyah, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. The strikes occurred at approximately 1:15 p.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/18/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, aircraft dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . The leaflets were dropped at approximately 3:45 a.m. EST over Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 180,000 leaflets. The leaflets referred Iraqis to radio frequencies where coalition forces are broadcasting information about UN Security Council Resolution 1441, UN weapons inspectors in Iraq , Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's reign and other topics. (CENTCOM)
- 1/18/2003 It emerges that the Saudi government is canvassing a plan to give President Saddam a last-ditch chance to go into exile if the United Nations security council passes a new resolution authorising war against Iraq, western and Arab diplomats confirm.
- 1/18/2003 Anti-war demonstrators take to the streets of cities from Tokyo to San Francisco to protest against the build-up of American and British military forces in the Gulf.
- 1/19/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target eight unmanned cable repeater sites that are part of Iraq's military air defense command and control system. The sites were located between Al Kut, and An Nasiriyah, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 7:10 a.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone. The same day other aircraft dropped a total of 360,000 leaflets at approximately 7:16 a.m. EST over Ar Rumaythah, Qawam Al Hamazah, Ash Shahtra, Ar Riffa, Qal' at Sukkar and Al Majar. The six cities are all located approximately 130 to 225 miles southeast of Baghdad . (CENTCOM)
- 1/19/2003 The US offers President Saddam immunity from prosecution if his departure from Baghdad would avert war.
- 1/23/2003 Jan. 23, 2003 : U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 12:30 p.m. EST over a communication facility near Al Amarah, approximately 165 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 240,000 leaflets. The leaflets urged Iraqi military not to repair previously bombed communication equipment and facilities that aid in tracking and

engaging aircraft enforcing the No-fly zone. This was the sixth leaflet drop over southern Iraq by coalition aircraft in 2003. (CENTCOM)

- 1/24/2003 Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 07:15 a.m. EST over communication facilities near An Najaf , approximately 85 miles east southeast of Baghdad , and Umm Qasr and Al Zubayr, both located on the Al Faw Peninsula, approximately 290 miles southeast of Baghdad . A total of 360,000 leaflets were dropped.
- 1/24/2003 The same day, U.S. aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi air defense command and control communication facility, about 5 miles southeast of Al Haswah. The facility was targeted because its presence was a hostile threat to coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/25/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British participation, used precision-guided weapons to target an anti-air artillery site near Tallil, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 6:20 a.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
- 1/26/2003 U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target five cable repeater sites that could be used for communications in targeting coalition aircraft. The cable repeater sites were located between Al Kut, approximately 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, and An Nasiriyah, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. The strikes occurred at approximately 7:00 a.m. EST , and were mounted after Iraqi military aircraft violated the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
- 2/5/2003 Colin Powell uses satellite photographs, tapes of intercepted conversations and newly opened CIA files to make the United States case against Iraq in a determined attempt to win over international opinion.
- 2/6/2003 Around 100 aircraft and 7,000 RAF personnel are to be deployed in the build up for a possible war against Iraq, the defence secretary, Geoff Hoon, announces.
- 2/7/2003 Downing Street admits that much of its dossier on Iraq, released a week earlier in an attempt to reinforce the case for war, was lifted from academic sources and compiled by mid-level officials in Alastair Campbell's Downing Street communications department.
- 2/8/2003 Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei are given new documents by Iraq, and describe key talks with Iraqi officials in Baghdad as 'very substantial'.
- 2/9/2003 The US reacts furiously to a Franco-German peace initiative to triple the number of arms inspectors in Iraq and back them up with surveillance flights. The Bush administration sees it as a thinly-disguised attempt to derail the US timetable for war.
- 2/10/2003 France, Germany and Belgium veto a US request for Nato to make plans to protect Turkey if Saddam Hussein attacks, throwing the Atlantic alliance into one of its worst-ever crises.
- 2/11/2003 Nato's plans to defend Turkey in case of war with Iraq remain deadlocked after France, Germany and Belgium ignore the entreaties of their fellow allies to back down.
- 2/12/2003 The UN weapons inspectors announce they have discovered that Iraq possesses illegal missiles: its Samoud 2 rockets exceed the maximum range of 150km set down in the 1991 Gulf war ceasefire agreement.
- 2/14/2003 Hans Blix gives his latest report on Iraqi compliance with resolution 1441 to the UN security council, surprising the members with a more upbeat assessment of the pace of Iraq's disarmament than had been expected. The report, which lists examples of Iraqi compliance with the inspectors, thus failing to provide any clear casus belli, throws into confusion British and American plans to draft a new resolution mandating military action. It severely embarrasses Colin Powell by questioning the US intelligence on Iraqi munitions that he presented to the council earlier in the month.
- 2/15/2003 Anti-war protesters take to the streets of London and cities around the world. Around one million people march through the British capital to hear speakers,

including Jesse Jackson, address the crowds in Hyde Park, in what is the UK's biggest-ever protest. More than 50,000 gather in Glasgow.

- 2/16/2003 The Nato deadlock over Turkey is broken after the organisation strikes a deal to send military hardware into the country for its defence in the event of war.
- 2/17/2003 Amid growing domestic opposition to war, the Turkish government delays a parliamentary vote on whether to allow US troops into the country, to form a northern front during a war on Iraq.
- 2/24/2003 Russia, France and Germany put forward a counter-proposal to America and Britain's draft resolution: a step-by-step programme for Iraqi disarmament. The Turkish cabinet strikes a deal with America to allow US troops to be deployed there for in exchange for a billion-dollar aid package, but it still has to be passed by the Turkish parliament. Meanwhile, the first consignment of Nato equipment to defend Turkey from an attack by Iraq in the event of war arrives.
- 2/25/2003 ONW Coalition Forces Target Iraqi Surface-to-Surface Missile System 25 Feb 2003 -- In response to Iraqi threats to coalition forces monitoring Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, Operation Northern Watch aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target three surface-to-surface missile systems today from 5 to 6:30 p.m. EST.
- 2/26/2003 Britain's biggest parliamentary revolt against a governing party in more than a century sees 121 Labour MPs vote against Tony Blair's war strategy at the end of an impassioned debate on Iraq. In a major blow to the prime minister, 198 MPs vote for an amendment arguing that the case for war is not yet made.
- 2/27/2003 Coalition Aircraft Respond to Iraqi Attacks in Northern No-Fly Zone EUCOM 27 Feb 2003 -- In response to Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery attacks in the northern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft dropped precision-guided weapons on fiber-optic, cable and microwave communication sites that support Iraqi military operations today at approximately 2:20 p.m. EST.
- 2/27/2003 Saddam Hussein agrees 'in principle' to destroy his Samoud 2 missiles, discovered by weapons inspectors to break range limits set down by the UN. The US and Britain dismiss the concession as game-playing by the Iraqi leader.
- 2/28/2003 Hans Blix's interim report to the UN is published, giving a mixed assessment of Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspectors, but hailing Saddam Hussein's commitment to comply with tomorrow's UN deadline for the destruction of Iraq's illegal Samoud 2 missiles.
- 3/1/2003 Coalition Drops First Leaflets in Northern Iraq 01 Mar 2003 -- For the first time, coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone in northern Iraq dropped informational leaflets near Iraqi anti-aircraft-artillery batteries at approximately 8:45 a.m. EST.
- 3/1/2003 In an unpleasant surprise for the Bush administration, the Turkish parliament narrowly rejects a plan to deploy 62,000 US troops in the country, to form a northern front in the event of war.
- 3/2/2003 It emerges that Britain and the US have been increasing their air strikes on Iraq in recent days, in an apparent bid to 'soften up' the country's defences ahead of a war. The two countries insist that there has been no change in the policy of no-fly zone bombing.
- 3/3/2003 Iraq claims that six civilians were killed and 15 wounded in last night's allied raid on the port city of Basra. Meanwhile, the Russian foreign minister, Ivan Ivanov, hints, on BBC radio, that his country may use its UN veto to block a resolution authorising war.
- 3/4/2003 The chancellor, Gordon Brown, makes clear his support for war by saying he is prepared to 'spend what it takes' to disarm Iraq. Mr Brown has already earmarked £1.75bn to fund a war.
- 3/5/2003 The foreign ministers of France, Russia and Germany release a joint declaration stating that they will 'not allow' a resolution authorising military action to pass the UN security council. The hardening stance from the anti-war bloc increases the pressure on the US and Britain to compromise on their draft UN resolution.
- 3/6/2003 In a nationwide television address, the US president, George Bush, indicates that war is very close.

- 3/7/2003 Hans Blix gives another ambivalent report to the UN security council on Iraqi compliance, which is followed by a tense debate that further deepens the divide within the council. The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, proposes the UN sets an ultimatum that Iraq will be invaded unless the country demonstrates 'full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation' by March 17. France makes a clear threat that it will veto such a resolution.
- 3/9/2003 Following lobbying from undecided UN security council members, the US and Britain agree to set out the precise acts of disarmament that Saddam would have to undertake by March 17 to avoid war. Meanwhile, Clare Short, the international development secretary, threatens to resign if the UN fails to pass a second resolution authorising war. A parliamentary aide to Margaret Beckett, Andy Reed, earlier resigned over the issue.
- 3/10/2003 Coalition Drops Leaflets in Northern Iraq 10 Mar 2003 -- Coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone in northern Iraq dropped informational leaflets near Iraqi anti-aircraft-artillery batteries at approximately 9:25 a.m. EST.
- 3/10/2003 Britain announces 'six key tests' for Iraq to comply to if it is to avoid war, including President Saddam making a TV address admitting having weapons of mass destruction. The idea galvanises some diplomatic support, but not enough to suggest the US/UK could win a second UN resolution, effectively authorising an attack.
- 3/11/2003 The US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, causes a political storm after suggesting America could attack President Saddam alone. Mr Blair later stresses Britain will fight alongside the US in any attack.
- 3/13/2003 Coalition Drops Leaflets in Northern Iraq EUCOM 13 Mar 2003 -- Coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone in northern Iraq dropped informational leaflets near Iraqi anti-aircraft-artillery batteries at approximately 8:41 a.m. EST.
- 3/14/2003 Coalition Drops Leaflets in Northern Iraq EUCOM 14 Mar 2003 -- Coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone in northern Iraq dropped informational leaflets near Iraqi anti-aircraft-artillery batteries at approximately 8:50 a.m. EST.
- 3/14/2003 The French president, Jacques Chirac, removes any lingering doubts about France's intentions on Iraq, confirming to Mr Blair in a brief phone call that France was willing to seek a compromise on disarming Saddam Hussein but would not accept any UN resolution that set an ultimatum.
- 3/16/2003 Speaking at a hastily-arranged summit in the Azores, Mr Bush and Mr Blair give the United Nations a 24-hour ultimatum to enforce its own demands for immediate Iraqi disarmament, or face an American- and British-led coalition that will go to war within days.
- 3/17/2003 With China, France and Russia opposed to an attack, the US and UK abandon hope of gaining security council support for a second resolution authorising war on Iraq. They withdraw the resolution, blaming the French veto threat.
- 3/17/2003 The leader of the Commons, Robin Cook, resigns in protest at the government's decision to back a war without 'international authority nor domestic support'.
- 3/18/2003 In a televised address at 0100GMT, Mr Bush gives Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq or face invasion.
- 3/18/2003 During the course of the day, British government ministers John Denham and Lord Hunt resign in protest, along with four government aides. In the evening parliament holds a debate over military action in Iraq. The government's motion endorsing an attack is passed by 412 to 149, although the number of rebel Labour MPs voting for an anti-war amendment rises to 139, up from 122 three weeks ago.
- 3/19/2003 Government aide David Kinley confirms he has resigned, bring the total of government casualties over Iraq to nine.
- 3/19/2003 With 170,000 coalition troops massed on the Kuwaiti border, coalition aircraft bomb military targets in Iraq to 'soften up' the country's defences ahead of a US and British invasion.
- 3/19/2003 The foreign ministers of Germany, France and Russia condemn the impending military action in strong terms, saying that the use of force against Iraq has not been approved by any UN resolution.

- 3/20/2003 War begins.
- 3/20/2003 At around 0230 GMT, shortly after the 48-hour deadline for Saddam to quit Iraq expires, America launches its first series of air strikes on Baghdad. George Bush says the US has begun attacks against 'targets of military opportunity'. Saddam Hussein gives a televised address to the Iraqi people at around 0530 GMT, calling the attack a 'shameful crime' and vowing to win the war. China, France and Russia denounce the US-led action.
- 3/20/2003 At around 1805 GMT, US planes begin a heavy bombardment of military targets in central Baghdad. Later on, British marines invade the Faw peninsula in the south of the country.
- 3/21/2003 Parts of the port town of Umm Qasr, south of Basra, are seized by US military. To the west of Basra, British troops help US soldiers to secure oilfields from possible sabotage. Some 15 oilfields are reportedly set on fire by Iraq. Coalition forces suffer their first casualties when eight British and four American servicemen die in a helicopter accident over Kuwait. It is later revealed that a US marine died during the battle for Umm Qasr, where sporadic fighting is continuing. Bombs and missiles begin to strike Baghdad for a third successive night, in a massive scaling-up of air strikes that are designed, say the US military, to 'shock and awe' the Iraqi people into submission.
- 3/22/2003 Bombing continues in Baghdad. Two British Sea King helicopters collide in another apparent accident, killing all seven crew. US troops attempting to take the southern city of Nassiriya encounter stiff resistance. A US officer is killed in a grenade attack by one of his own men on an army base in Kuwait. ITN reporter Terry Lloyd and two of his news crew are reported missing en route to Basra. There are conflicting reports over whether Turkish troops have crossed their border into northern Iraq.
- 3/22/2003 More than 200,000 people take to the streets in London as anti-war protests are held in cities around the world.
- 3/23/2003 American B-52 bombers continue their heavy raids on Baghdad: Iraq says last night's raids killed 106 civilians. An RAF Tornado is accidentally shot down by a US Patriot missile, killing its two crewmen. Fierce fighting continues in the southern port town of Umm Qasr and five US soldiers are captured by Iraqi forces near Nassiriya. TV images of them, and the bodies of five other US soldiers, are later broadcast by al-Jazeera TV, in what the US brands as a contravention of the Geneva convention. ITN confirms that its reporter Terry Lloyd was killed by 'friendly fire'.
- 3/24/2003 In day five of the war on Iraq, coalition forces staying back to secure the push to Baghdad, in key towns such as Nassiriya and Basra, continue to suffer casualties in the face of stronger than expected resistance from Iraqi soldiers. Two British soldiers are confirmed as missing in southern Iraq while the US confirms one of its Apache helicopters has been shot down. It is revealed that a US missile hit a Syrian passenger bus near the Iraqi border yesterday, killing five people. The Red Cross warns of an humanitarian emergency as water supplies begin to run out in Basra.
- 3/24/2003 As B-52s begin heavy bombardments on Iraqi Republican Guard bunkers encircling Baghdad, US and British forces - some now just 50 miles south of the city - begin to dig in in preparation for a major assault on the capital.
- 3/25/2003 US planes heavily bomb Republican Guard encampments south of Baghdad in a bid to soften up the city's defences, amid fears that Saddam may unleash chemical weapons when troops invade the city. Further south in Najaf, a fierce battle between US and Iraqi forces may have killed as many as 700 enemy soldiers.
- 3/25/2003 British forces bombard the southern city of Basra in an apparent reversal of an earlier decision not to take the city, amid reports of a popular uprising and an increasingly critical humanitarian situation. British marines finally secure the town and harbour of Umm Qasr, fuelling hopes that humanitarian aid supply lines will soon be established.

- 3/25/2003 Two British soldiers - the UK's first combat fatalities of the war - are confirmed to have been killed in action in the south, bringing the British death toll up to 18, with two other soldiers missing since March 23. An opinion poll shows British public support for the war has surged to 54%.
- 3/26/2003 Iraq says that a US missile has struck a busy Baghdad market, killing 'many' civilians. Overnight strikes aimed at Baghdad's national television station fail to take the state channel off the air.
- 3/26/2003 Britain and the US say aid is now on its way to Iraq, as the Sir Galahad supply ship sets sail for the now 'secure' port of Umm Qasr. The MoD reveals that two British tank crew were killed on March 24 in another 'friendly fire' incident, bringing the UK death toll to 20.
- 3/27/2003 US forces advancing towards Baghdad are held up by fierce fighting in the city of Samawah against 1,500 Iraqi paramilitaries guarding a bridge across the Euphrates river, which they eventually capture.
- 3/27/2003 Iraq says 350 civilians have died in air raids since the conflict began. British tanks destroy 14 Iraqi tanks outside Basra. The US military airlifts troops and equipment into northern Iraq after about 1,000 paratroopers secure a key airfield.
- 3/28/2003 Aid ship the Sir Galahad finally docks at the port of Umm Qasr, carrying over 200 tonnes of food, medicine and blankets. The British military claims a group of around 200 civilians fleeing Basra are fired upon by Iraqi mortars. Shelling continues over Baghdad.
- 3/28/2003 The sister of one of the two soldiers whose corpses were shown on Iraqi television accuses the government of lying about how they died. The prime minister's spokesman says it looks as though they were executed but she insists they died in combat because that is what the British army told her.
- 3/29/2003 Four US servicemen are killed by a suicide bomber at a checkpoint near Najaf - the first such attack but a tactic that Iraqi vice president Taha Yassin Ramadan says will become 'routine military policy'. He also vows to launch suicide attacks in Britain and America and says the bomber was a non commissioned officer in the Iraqi army.
- 3/29/2003 The bodies of the first British servicemen to die in the war arrive at RAF Brize Norton, Oxfordshire. All 10 died in accidents - eight in a helicopter crash and two RAF pilots shot down by a US patriot missile.
- 3/29/2003 A spokesman for the prime minister says the commander of Iraqi air defence forces in Baghdad has been replaced after Iraqi missiles went astray and hit the capital.
- 3/30/2003 General Richard Myers apologises for the deaths of five British soldiers under 'friendly fire' and says it will be his quest to ensure it does not happen again.
- 3/30/2003 Around 600 commandos launch the largest single British assault of the war to secure a suburb to the south-east of Basra. Iraqi tanks are destroyed and 300 prisoners taken. But a Royal Marine on patrol in the Basra canal is killed in an attack on his landing craft.
- 3/30/2003 Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, accuses Syria of being engaged in 'hostile acts' by delivering military equipment to Iraq. Damascus accuses Mr Rumsfeld of trying to divert attention from 'the acts committed by US troops against civilians'. Claims of splits in the US between the defence secretary and army chiefs over tactics intensify. General Tommy Franks, head of US Central Command, denies any pause in the drive towards Baghdad.
- 3/31/2003 The US military launches an investigation after troops kill seven women and children at a checkpoint in southern Iraq.
- 3/31/2003 US marines launch a dawn raid on the southern Iraqi town of Shatra, north of Nassiriya, after a tip-off that General Ali Hassan al-Majid, the Iraqi general known as 'Chemical Ali', may be using it as a base to orchestrate guerrilla attacks.
- 3/31/2003 A wave of bombardments begins on positions south of Baghdad, where Saddam Hussein's elite troops are believed to be guarding the route to the city, and at

least one US marine is reported killed in fighting around 70 miles south of Baghdad in clashes in and around the town of Imam Aiyub.

- 4/1/2003 In the second civilian shooting in 24 hours by US marines, one man is killed and another injured after troops fire on their car as it approaches a roadblock.
- 4/1/2003 Saudi Arabia urges Saddam to make a war-ending 'sacrifice' and quit, while Saddam Hussein's aides deny US reports that some of the president's family have fled abroad.
- 4/1/2003 A presidential palace, Iraq's Olympic headquarters and an airforce officers' club are targeted in the latest round of air raids on Baghdad.
- 4/2/2003 US officials announce they have rescued American prisoner of war Private Jessica Lynch, 19, of Palestine, West Virginia.
- 4/2/2003 US forces 'surround and secure' the southern holy city of Kerbala. The US claims Iraqis are firing on its troops from inside the Ali mosque in Najaf, an important Shia Muslim shrine, but American soldiers are not returning fire.
- 4/2/2003 Further north, US troops continue their advance on Baghdad. CentComm claims they are now 19 miles from the capital and inside the 'red line' within which it is feared Saddam's regime may use chemical weapons on troops. A Republican Guard division to the south-east of the city has been 'destroyed' and a key bridge over the Tigris river has been secured, the US military says.
- 4/3/2003 US troops from the 3rd Infantry Division reach Saddam international airport, 10 miles from Baghdad's city centre, after heavy overnight bombardment.
- 4/3/2003 About 320 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the advance by some 1,000 US troops, US military sources say. As many as 80 Iraqis, some of them civilians, are reported to have been killed at the village of Furat near the airport in what witnesses described as a rocket attack.
- 4/3/2003 The attack on the airport comes hours after a power cut in Baghdad, the first since the war began, prompting speculation that a 'blackout bomb' had been dropped to allow special forces to infiltrate the city.
- 4/3/2003 In the south, British troops make their deepest incursion yet into Basra, "poking a toe" within four miles of the centre. The Ministry of Defence admits to having used Israeli-made manufactured cluster shells around Basra as well as cluster bombs dropped from RAF Harrier jets.
- 4/3/2003 The Arabic satellite television service al-Jazeera says it would no longer cover the war inside government-controlled Iraq in protest at the ban imposed on two of its reporters.
- 4/4/2003 A figure purported to be the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, going on a walkabout in Baghdad is shown by Iraqi TV. There is debate about whether it is really him.
- 4/4/2003 Two Iraqis are held over the "execution" of two British soldiers. Ministry of Defence confirms they are being questioned "in accordance with the Geneva convention".
- 4/4/2003 It emerges the US president, George Bush, and the prime minister, Tony Blair, will meet in Belfast on Monday April 7 for talks.
- 4/4/2003 Bombing of Baghdad continues with Saddam Hussein's palaces targeted. British forces continue making offensives in and around Basra. Hundreds of US soldiers are flown in to reinforce Baghdad airport.
- 4/5/2003 US armour makes a brief foray into a Baghdad suburb in an attempt at displaying military might with tanks crossing into the city limits for the first time.
- 4/5/2003 British forces in the south say they have struck the home of Ali Hassan al-Majid, the Iraqi general who ordered the poison gas attack that killed thousands of Kurds in 1988.
- 4/6/2003 Forces loyal to Saddam Hussein appear to lose control of much of Basra after columns of British troops pour into Iraq's second city, destroying its Ba'ath party headquarters. Three British soldiers were killed in action.
- 4/6/2003 US forces isolate Baghdad and claim to have closed off the major roads into the city, which is hit by air strikes and artillery shells. The city is braced for a looming battle.

- 4/6/2003 The BBC reporter John Simpson witnesses a "friendly fire" attack in Northern Iraq in which his translator, and up to 17 Americans and Kurds are killed.
- 4/6/2003 US troops battle alongside more than 1,000 Kurdish peshmerga fighters to flush Iraqi soldiers out of the northern Iraqi town of Ain Sifni.
- 4/7/2003 US forces make their most far-reaching move into Baghdad, capturing two palaces, including Saddam Hussein's new presidential palace, which is on the west of the city by the Tigris river. Marines are pictured relaxing in its opulence. Resistance is moderate and US commanders later confirm that the forces will not pull back.
- 4/7/2003 In the south, British forces say that while they still expect some resistance they now have control of Basra. British troops walked into the city centre and did not fire a single shot; there was no sign of militia loyal to President Saddam. There was no euphoria from locals but some people welcomed the troops, although others were concerned about rampant looting by Iraqis.
- 4/7/2003 Reports claim US forces have found suspected chemical weapons outside Baghdad but officials are cautious about commenting before they are conclusively identified after previous claims of finding such weapons proved inaccurate.
- 4/7/2003 Three houses in Baghdad's up-market al-Mansour area are destroyed in what neighbours said was an allied missile attack. US officials say early on April 8 that they had intelligence President Saddam and his sons were meeting there. Two bodies have been recovered, but the toll may be as high as 14, rescue workers said.
- 4/8/2003 US forces, operating from a presidential palace in Baghdad, continue their show of strength in the city centre, targeting government buildings.
- 4/8/2003 Three journalists are killed by coalition fire. Two die after a shell hits the main hotel in which the media are staying in the city.
- 4/8/2003 Pentagon officials say they cannot confirm whether the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, was killed in the bombing of a Baghdad suburb. However, Iraqi command orders are still being issued to key elements of the regime's military.
- 4/8/2003 US marines seize the Rashid military airfield, 5km from the centre of Baghdad. The US president, George Bush, says that he sees a "vital" role for the UN in establishing an interim authority made up of Iraqis.
- 4/9/2003 US marines help crowds to topple a giant statue of Saddam Hussein in the heart of Baghdad. Widespread looting breaks out unhindered in the Iraqi capital.
- 4/9/2003 Fighting is continuing in some areas of the city, but many Iraqis welcome the advancing US marines with waving and cheering.
- 4/9/2003 The US vice-president, Dick Cheney, says the Iraqi regime is collapsing, and that military progress shows criticism of the war was misguided. But he warns that there is "still a lot to do" and says he cannot predict when the conflict will end.
- 4/9/2003 US central command says that Iraq has reached the "tipping point" as citizens realise that Saddam's reign has ended.
- 4/10/2003 Kirkuk falls to Kurdish fighters. Turkey, fearing the Kurds will seize the city's oil wealth and make a bid for independence, sends in military observers at the invitation of the US. Looting and lawlessness continue in Baghdad. Aid agencies warn of a humanitarian disaster if US and British forces do not stabilise the situation.
- 4/11/2003 The entire Iraqi army's 5th Corps surrenders as US special forces and Kurdish fighters enter Mosul. US paratroopers arrive in Kirkuk so Kurdish forces can withdraw. The US publishes a pack of 55 playing cards identifying its most wanted suspects in Iraq.
- 4/12/2003 General Amer Hammoudi al-Saadi, Iraq's chief scientist, gives himself up to US forces in Baghdad. Looting and lawlessness continue in Baghdad and Iraq's major cities.
- 4/13/2003 US marines enter the outskirts of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's home town, encountering some resistance. Television crews report heavy damage to Iraqi army positions.

- 4/13/2003 Seven US troops listed as missing are found alive on the road to the city from Baghdad and the US confirms that Saddam's half-brother, Watban al-Tikriti, is captured apparently trying to reach Syria.
- 4/14/2003 US marines enter the centre of Tikrit. There is a firefight in Baghdad but otherwise some order appears to be returning to the city - there are US foot patrols, police volunteer to return to work and some shops open.
- 4/15/2003 The first political talks involving different Iraqi groups take place at an airbase outside Nassiriyah despite a boycott from the main Shia Muslim group.
- 4/15/2003 At least seven Iraqis are killed when US troops try to restore order at a demonstration in Mosul.
- 4/16/2003 US officials trumpet the capture in Iraq of Palestinian guerrilla Abu Abbas, who masterminded the 1985 hijacking of an Italian cruise ship, as evidence of a link between Saddam and terrorism.
- 4/16/2003 American marines raid the Baghdad home of a scientist wanted for work on Saddam's banned weapons programme and, elsewhere, claim to have found a terrorist training camp.
- 4/16/2003 The Pentagon's top budget officer says that the Iraq war has cost the US at least £12bn and will probably consume that much or more in the next five months.
- 4/16/2003 George Bush urges the UN to lift the economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iraq for 13 years, saying that the country had been liberated.
- 4/17/2003 Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, a half-brother of Saddam Hussein who is believed to have extensive knowledge of the toppled Iraqi regime's inner workings, is captured, says US Brigadier General Vincent Brooks.
- 4/17/2003 The UK-based aid agency Oxfam flies out vital water supplies and sanitation to Iraq, as Sir Richard Branson's airline, Virgin Atlantic, announces that it is to begin flying relief supplies to Iraq, and plans to reintroduce scheduled services to Baghdad.
- 4/18/2003 Tens of thousands of Iraqis demonstrate against the US occupation of Iraq in central Baghdad.
- 4/18/2003 Tony Blair reveals that he was ready to quit his job as prime minister if he had lost a crucial Commons vote over the war with Iraq.
- 4/18/2003 The head of the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmad Chalabi, who some in Washington want as a new Iraqi leader, makes his first public appearance in Baghdad.
- 4/18/2003 Iraqi Kurds near Mosul hand over to the US Samir Abul Aziz al-Najim, a senior Ba'ath party figure and number 24 on America's list of 55 most wanted Iraqis, according to US officials.
- 4/19/2003 US central command says that Iraqi police in Baghdad yesterday arrested the former finance minister, Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim al-Azzawi, who also served as a deputy prime minister.
- 4/20/2003 Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Jamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan al-Tikriti, has surrendered to the Iraqi National Congress in Baghdad after leaving Syria, a London-based spokesman claims.
- 4/21/2003 Jay Garner, the retired former US general, arrives in Baghdad to take up the post of Iraq's postwar civil administrator.
- 4/21/2003 US central command announces that Iraq's scientific research minister, Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafar, was captured on Saturday (April 19).
- 4/22/2003 The UN chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, condemns British and American handling of the hunt for any possible weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
- 4/24/2003 The UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, calls on the US-led coalition to respect international law as the "occupying power" in Iraq, drawing immediate ire from US officials who resist the label "occupier".
- 4/25/2003 Tariq Aziz, the former Iraqi deputy prime minister, surrenders to US forces in Baghdad.
- 4/26/2003 US forces say they have captured former Iraqi spy chief Farouk Hijazi near the Syrian border. Mr Hijazi, who most recently served as Iraq's ambassador to Tunisia, was once a senior official in the Mukhabarat, Saddam's feared intelligence service. US officials claimed he met Osama bin Laden in 1998.

- 4/28/2003 US troops fire on a group of Iraqi demonstrators near Baghdad, killing at least 13 people and wounding 75 others.
- 4/30/2003 US troops open fire on Iraqi civilians for the second time as an angry crowd in Falluja protested over an earlier shooting
- 5/1/2003 Seven US soldiers are wounded when grenades are lobbed into their base in the Iraqi city of Falluja, in an apparent revenge attack after troops killed at least 15 civilians during protests.
- 5/2/2003 US troops yesterday took custody of Saddam Hussein's minister of military industrialisation, Abdul Tawab Mullah Hwaish, who is suspected of playing a central role in developing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. One of Saddam's vice-presidents, Taha Mohieddin Ma'rouf, is also arrested bringing the total number of regime members under arrest to 17, out of 55 being sought.
- 5/3/2003 The Bush administration moves to heal a damaging rift with London, following claims from a senior Washington official that Saddam Hussein may have got rid of most of his weapons of mass destruction before the war. Such claims are highly awkward for Tony Blair, who remains adamant that banned weapons will be found and prove the coalition was justified in going to war.
- 5/4/2003 The army investigates the reported fatal shooting of a 14-year-old Iraqi boy in Basra. A British army spokesman says initial inquiries pointed to an "unfortunate accident".
- 5/5/2003 The Pentagon announces that Huda Ammash, the woman dubbed "Mrs Anthrax" for her alleged role in clandestine Iraqi biological weapons programmes, is in US custody.
- 5/6/2003 Qusay Hussein, one of Saddam's sons fled Iraq with \$1bn (£620m) in cash hours before the US-led war on the country began, it is claimed.
- 5/7/2003 The US military says it has found a vehicle which appears to be a mobile bio-arms lab. The US president, George Bush, names Paul Bremer, a former ambassador and head of America's counter-terrorism office as Iraq's new civil administrator.
- 5/8/2003 Behind the scenes horse-trading at the United Nations increases as the US/UK and Spain prepare to present a draft resolution on May 9 calling for the lifting of sanctions on Iraq and the phasing out of the oil-for-food programme.
- 5/9/2003 America and Britain lay out their blueprint for postwar Iraq in a draft resolution to the United Nations security council, naming themselves as "occupying powers" and giving them control of the country's oil revenues.
- 5/11/2003 Iraqi agriculture is on the brink of collapse, with fears that many of its 24.5 million people will go hungry this summer, according to a confidential report being studied by the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation.
- 5/12/2003 The new head of the US-led interim administration arrives in Baghdad as the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, concedes that progress towards restoring order in the Iraqi capital was "not satisfactory".
- 5/13/2003 A mass grave is found near Baghdad. It could hold the remains of up to 15,000 people, missing since a Shiite uprising in 1991. British-trained microbiologist Dr Rihab Taha, known as "Dr Germ" for her role in Iraq's biological weapons programme, surrenders to coalition forces.
- 5/14/2003 Human rights workers accuse the US military of failing to protect and properly excavate the largest mass grave discovered in Iraq. More than 3,000 bodies were dug up in a field near the ancient Babylonian city of Hilla, south of Baghdad.
- 5/15/2003 Foreign secretary, Jack Straw, concedes that hard evidence of weapons of mass destruction might never be found in Iraq. He says it is "not crucially important" to find them because the evidence of wrongdoing was overwhelming.
- 5/22/2003 The UN security council votes 14-0 to lift sanctions on Iraq and hand temporary control of the country to the US and Britain. Syria boycotts the vote.
- 5/27/2003 Two US soldiers are killed and nine injured in an attack on an army checkpoint in the Iraqi town of Falluja.
- 5/29/2003 Tony Blair's Iraq crisis deepens as ministers accused of distorting the findings of the chief UN weaponsinspector to support Britain's claims about Saddam weapons programme.

- 5/30/2003 Military police question a British soldier about photographs of alleged "torture" of Iraqi prisoners of war, including one gagged and bound, and dangling in netting from a fork-lift truck.
- 6/2/2003 Tony Blair faces mounting pressure from across the House of Commons to hold an independent inquiry into the Iraq war after Clare Short levelled the incendiary allegation at the prime minister that he had lied to the cabinet.
- 6/4/2003 Tony Blair rejects calls for an independent judicial inquiry into the case for the Iraq war.
- 6/6/2003 Hans Blix hits out at the quality of intelligence given to him by the United States and Britain on Iraq's alleged chemical and biological weapons programmes. "Only in three of those cases did we find anything at all, and in none of these cases was there any weapons of mass destruction, and that shook me a bit, I must say," he says.
- 6/8/2003 David Blunkett becomes the most senior minister to admit publicly that Downing Street was wrong to publish the "dodgy dossier" on the military threat posed by Saddam Hussein.
- 6/10/2003 The all-party parliamentary intelligence and security committee serves notice that it expects ministers to cooperate fully with its inquiry into Iraq's banned weapons programme.
- 6/10/2003 Hans Blix, the UN chief weapons inspector, meanwhile lashes out at the "bastards" in who he says tried to undermine him throughout the three years he has held his high-profile post.
- 6/12/2003 US troops questioning about 400 suspects after the biggest military operation in Iraq since the regime collapsed two months ago.
- 6/13/2003 Almost 100 Iraqis are killed in two of the bloodiest attacks since the fall of Baghdad. A independent research group meanwhile says that as many as 10,000 civilian may have died in the war.
- 6/15/2003 Hundreds of American soldiers sweep through Falluja in a further, apparently more precise, operation against guerrilla resistance.
- 6/17/2003 Scores of American troops mount new searches through Baghdad after a sniper shot dead a US soldier on patrol.
- 6/19/2003 One American soldier is killed and two are injured when the military ambulance they are travelling in is struck by a rocket-propelled grenade.
- 6/22/2003 George Bush addresses increasing national disquiet over the number of US servicemen killed in Iraq. More than a quarter of US casualties have occurred since the president declared an end to major military combat on May 1.
- 6/24/2003 Six British soldiers are killed and eight injured in two attacks in the south eastern town of Majar al-Kabir.
- 6/26/2003 One US soldier is killed and another injured when their vehicle is ambushed on a road leading to Baghdad airport. An Iraqi passer-by also dies in the attack.
- 6/28/2003 Andrew Gilligan, the reporter at the centre of claims that Number 10 deliberately 'sexed up' evidence against Saddam Hussein, announces he is ready to sue a serving Minister.
- 7/1/2003 A huge explosion destroys a mosque in central Iraq, killing at least five Iraqis and injuring four others, according to witnesses and officials.
- 7/2/2003 Jack Straw claims that the political and security situation in Iraq is improving, in spite of attacks on US soldiers and sabotage of electricity and oil supplies.
- 7/4/2003 A tape recording purportedly of Saddam Hussein is broadcast urging guerrilla fighters in Iraq to continue their resistance to the US-led occupation of the country.
- 7/5/2003 A British freelance TV cameraman is shot and killed by an Iraqi gunman in the centre of Baghdad.
- 7/6/2003 The BBC's governors issue a pugilistic statement demanding that Downing Street retract its claims of bias against the corporation's journalism.
- 7/6/2003 Former US diplomat Joseph Wilson says it was "highly doubtful" that Niger sold uranium to Iraq.
- 7/7/2003 Downing Street's communications director, Alastair Campbell, is cleared by MPs of exerting "improper influence" on the drafting of the government's

intelligence-led dossier on Iraq but the Commons foreign affairs committee attacks the government over its handling of the affair.

- 7/8/2003 Tony Blair tells a committee of MPs that his evidence for Iraq's attempts to secure uranium from Niger did not come from forged documents but "separate intelligence".
- 7/8/2003 White House spokesman Ari Fleischer says the report on the uranium "did not turn out to be accurate".
- 7/11/2003 The CIA director, George Tenet, apologises for not preventing George Bush from making use of the British-sourced uranium claims in his state of the union address.
- 7/13/2003 Iraq's governing council, which is to prepare the way to free elections, has its first meeting.
- 7/14/2003 The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, says the CIA believed British intelligence reports that Iraq was attempting to obtain uranium from Africa.
- 7/14/2003 One US soldier is killed and six injured in an attack on a convoy of military vehicles in Baghdad.
- 7/16/2003 Guerrilla attacks in western Iraq claim the lives of a pro-US mayor and his son, as well as a US soldier.
- 7/17/2003 An audio tape purported to be of Saddam Hussein, and apparently timed to coincide with the anniversary of the 1968 Ba'athist revolution, is played on Arab television station al-Arabiya.
- 7/21/2003 The United Nations secretary-general gives his stamp of approval to Iraq's governing council, selected by the US-led occupation forces in Iraq.
- 7/22/2003 Uday and Qusay, Saddam Hussein's sons and his most feared lieutenants, are killed in a gun battle at their hideout in the northern Iraqi town of Mosul.
- 7/23/2003 Photographs of Saddam Hussein's sons laid out in plastic body bags are released by the US in a bid to convince sceptical Iraqis that neither will follow their father into power.
- 7/24/2003 Three US soldiers are killed when their convoy is ambushed near the northern Iraqi town of Mosul.
- 7/25/2003 Tokyo approves its biggest deployment of troops since 1945 as Washington casts around for help shouldering the post-Saddam burden.
- 7/27/2003 Iraqi guerrillas kill a US soldier in a grenade attack south of Baghdad, bringing the American death toll in 24 hours to five.
- 7/28/2003 Tony Blair and other British ministers are accused of crimes against humanity in prosecuting the war against Iraq in a case lodged with the international criminal court by Greek lawyers.
- 7/29/2003 A tape recording purported to be by Saddam Hussein declares that his two sons, Uday and Qusay, died as martyrs for Iraq, and pledges that the US will be defeated.
- 7/31/2003 Around 10,000 young men have come forward to join an "Islamic army" in the holy city of Najaf, according to Muqtada al-Sadr, the fiery cleric who is trying to become the unchallengeable leader of Shia opposition.
- 8/2/2003 With their coffins wrapped in the Iraqi flag, but guarded by the troops of their mortal enemy, the bodies of Uday and Qusay Hussein are laid to rest in a dusty cemetery in the village where their father was born.
- 8/7/2003 At least 11 people are killed in a car bomb explosion outside the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, sparking fears that guerrilla fighters may be turning their attention towards so-called soft targets.
- 8/8/2003 US snipers shoot dead two Iraqis and injure at least two others they claim were selling weapons at a street market in Saddam Hussein's home town, Tikrit.
- 8/8/2003 Six Iraqis, including a father and three of his children, are killed in Baghdad by US troops who open fire on them as they hurry home to beat the curfew.
- 8/9/2003 British troops in riot gear fight to restore calm in the southern Iraqi city of Basra as dire shortages of fuel and power spark disturbances.
- 8/10/2003 US officials say they are braced for further large-scale terrorist attacks in Iraq after reports from intelligence sources that hundreds of Islamic militants, who

escaped across the border to Iran during the war, may have got back into the country.

- 8/14/2003 A British soldier is killed, and two others injured, in an attack on an army ambulance travelling through the outskirts of Basra.
- 8/15/2003 Saboteurs blow up a crude oil export pipeline in northern Iraq, starting a huge oil fire, halting all oil exports to Turkey and starving an economy in chaos of much-needed income to rebuild.
- 8/17/2003 US attempts to restore Iraq's shaky infrastructure suffer a serious setback when guerrillas blow up a vital oil pipeline in the north for the second time. A hole is also blown in a water main in Baghdad.
- 8/17/2003 A Reuters TV cameraman is shot dead by US troops after they mistake his camera for a grenade launcher.
- 8/19/2003 A truck bomb strikes at the heart of the international humanitarian effort in Iraq, destroying part of the UN headquarters in Baghdad and killing at least 20 people, including the head of the UN mission.
- 8/20/2003 The official message from the UN breathed defiance - the terrorist attack that had killed more than 20 of its staff would not stop the rebuilding of Iraq.
- 8/21/2003 The former high-ranking Iraqi official known as 'Chemical Ali' is captured and taken into custody, according to US central command.
- 8/22/2003 America and Britain will face a challenge to persuade the international community to send troops to Iraq unless they agree to share power, says the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan.
- 8/22/2003 A previously unknown group claims responsibility for the bomb attack on the UN compound in Baghdad that killed at least 23 people, and threatened further attacks.
- 8/23/2003 The British and American-led mission in Iraq suffers a new blow when three British soldiers are killed and one seriously wounded by unidentified attackers in the southern city of Basra.
- 8/24/2003 Three Iraqi security guards are killed when a bomb explodes at the office of a senior cleric in Najaf in central Iraq.
- 8/26/2003 Humanitarian aid agencies say they are evacuating their workers from Iraq in the latest sign that the security situation is slipping out of the US-British coalition's control.
- 8/29/2003 A leading Shia cleric is among the many people killed in a car bomb attack outside a mosque in the Iraqi town of Najaf.
- 9/1/2003 Two Arabic television channels broadcast what they say is a recorded message from Saddam Hussein, denying responsibility for last week's devastating car bomb in Najaf.
- 9/2/2003 Tens of thousands of mourners turn the funeral service for the murdered Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim into a show of defiance against the US-led occupation.
- 9/3/2003 Resolution is defeat for hawks in White House.
- 9/5/2003 A Briton and an American working in Iraq are shot and killed in separate incidents, fuelling concerns that guerrillas launching attacks on the military occupiers may be widening their targets.
- 9/7/2003 President George Bush seeks to reassure jittery Americans about their country's involvement in Iraq, dismissing doubts by arguing that it remains a central front in the war on terror.
- 9/8/2003 Britain will send 1,000 more troops to bolster its security operation in Iraq, says defence secretary Geoff Hoon.
- 9/10/2003 A suicide car bomber attacks the US intelligence base in the northern Iraqi city of Irbil, killing three people and injuring 41.
- 9/12/2003 The US military reignites tension in one of Iraq's most troubled towns when its troops mistakenly shoot dead eight policemen who were chasing a car full of suspected bandits.
- 9/13/2003 President George Bush's approval ratings have slumped to a lower point than they were in the week of the terrorist attacks two years ago, according to the latest Gallup poll.

- 9/14/2003 Colin Powell, US secretary of state, meets Iraqi politicians in Baghdad as an American soldier is killed and three wounded in an attack near Falluja, where Iraqi police died in a "friendly fire" incident.
- 9/17/2003 An audio tape message purported to have been recorded by the deposed Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, is aired by Arabic television channel al-Arabiya.
- 9/18/2003 The former UN chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, says he believes Iraq destroyed most of its weapons of mass destruction 10 years ago.
- 9/19/2003 Saddam Hussein's former defence minister surrenders to US troops in northern Iraq following weeks of negotiations, says a Kurdish mediator.
- 9/21/2003 Officials on Iraq's governing council warn that they are increasingly at risk from attack, a day after one of their number was shot and badly wounded in an assassination attempt.
- 9/25/2003 Aqila al-Hashmi, the most prominent of three women on Iraq's governing council, dies of wounds sustained in an ambush. A planted bomb damages a hotel housing the offices of NBC News, killing a Somali guard.
- 10/2/2003 The man in charge of a hunt for Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction admits that no weapon stocks had been found, and that all a three-month search, costing some £180m (\$300m), had uncovered was a single vial containing a possible strain of biological agent.
- 10/9/2003 A suicide bomber drives his Oldsmobile into a police station in Baghdad's Sadr City district, killing himself and nine other people.
- 10/12/2003 A suicide car bombing near the Baghdad Hotel leaves eight people dead and at least 32 wounded.
- 10/14/2003 A suicide car bomber exploded his vehicle outside the Turkish embassy, killing the driver and a bystander, and wounding at least 13.
- 10/17/2003 Three American soldiers and at least seven Iraqis are killed in a gun battle outside the office of a Shia cleric in the holy Iraqi city of Kerbala.
- 10/19/2003 Two American soldiers are killed and one wounded in an ambush outside the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk.
- 10/23/2003 Major security failures at the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad were partially responsible for the large number of deaths and casualties caused by the truck bomb there in August, according to a report on the incident.
- 10/24/2003 Last-minute pledges from Arab states and Japan gave a major boost to Iraq's reconstruction funds as governments opposed to the US-led invasion began to soften their positions.
- 10/26/2003 Iraqi resistance fighters fire a rocket salvo at the Rashid hotel in Baghdad, narrowly missing Paul Wolfowitz, the US deputy defence secretary. An American colonel is killed and 18 people wounded.
- 10/27/2003 Thirty-five people are killed in attacks in Baghdad on its bloodiest day since the fall of Saddam. A suicide bomber rams an explosive-laden ambulance into barriers outside the Red Cross headquarters and three police stations are attacked.
- 11/2/2003 Sixteen US soldiers are killed after their Chinook helicopter is struck six miles south of Falluja in the deadliest attack against the occupying powers since the US declared major combat to be over.
- 11/4/2003 The US president, George Bush, wins Senate approval for \$87.5bn (£52bn) in funds to continue the US-led occupation of Iraq.
- 11/6/2003 Several US papers report that, in the weeks before its fall, Iraq's Ba'athist regime made a series of increasingly desperate peace offers to Washington, promising to hold elections and even allow US troops to search for banned weapons.
- 11/7/2003 Six US soldiers are killed when their Black Hawk helicopter crashes in central Iraq, apparently after being hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. It is the third time in two weeks that Iraqi fighters have brought down a US military helicopter.
- 11/11/2003 Head of the US coalition, Paul Bremer, is summoned to Washington for high level talks amid growing unease at the lack of progress in Iraq and the mounting human and financial cost. The visit prompts speculation that the US is trying to speed up the transfer of power.

- 11/12/2003 A suspected car bomb on an Italian military police base in the southern town of Nassiriya kills at least 14 Italian officers and eight Iraqis. Until now, no Italian military personnel had been killed in combat in Iraq.
- 11/27/2003 George Bush makes a surprise visit to US troops in Baghdad to serve them a Thanksgiving Day dinner.
- 11/29/2003 US troops return fire on insurgents in the central Iraqi city of Samarra after an ambush on a convoy. Seven Spanish intelligence agents, two Japanese diplomats, two US soldiers and a Colombian oil worker are also killed.
- 11/30/2003 American soldiers kill 46 Iraqis and capture eight in three repelled ambushes on US convoys in the central Iraqi city of Samarra, according to a military spokesman.
- 12/1/2003 Iraqi officials in Samarra challenge US military accounts of a bloody battle, accusing American soldiers of spraying fire at random on the city streets, killing several civilians.
- 12/2/2003 An American soldier is expecting to be dismissed from the army for taking a break from patrol in Baghdad to marry his Iraqi girlfriend, says his lawyer.
- 12/3/2003 The US is planning to set up a paramilitary battalion in Iraq drawn from the five main political parties to help American troops fighting a fast-spreading insurgency.
- 12/4/2003 US secretary of state says alliance is united on need to play bigger role.
- 12/7/2003 An Iraqi officer claims he warned British intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programme.
- 12/8/2003 Key contract decisions postponed again as Tony Blair is drawn into row over lack of 'level playing fields'
- 12/9/2003 Forty-one US troops and six Iraqi civilians are wounded in a suicide car bombing outside a barracks near the northern Iraqi city of Mosul.
- 12/10/2003 Pentagon excludes countries that opposed the Iraq invasion from bidding for reconstruction contracts.
- 12/12/2003 A Pentagon audit finds that Halliburton overcharged the government by \$61m (about £35m) for delivering petrol to Iraq; Tony Blair insists at the EU summit that it is "for the Americans to decide how to spend their own money" over Iraq reconstruction.
- 12/13/2003 Saddam Hussein, Iraq's deposed leader, is found by US forces at the bottom of a hole near his home town of Tikrit.
- 12/16/2003 Germany and France agree to a US request to write off part of Iraq's \$120bn (£68bn) debt; two divisions of Halliburton - the oil services firm formerly run by the US vice president, Dick Cheney - file for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as part of a \$4.2bn (£2.5bn) plan to settle hundreds of thousands of asbestos claims.
- 12/23/2003 British security officials circulate stories that the former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein may have been hoodwinked into believing he possessed weapons of mass destruction; a distinguished Kurdish judge, Youssef Khoshi, is shot dead while driving in the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul.

APPENDIX B
List of UN Suggestions
on how Iraq
could demonstrate that
it had in fact complied
with UN agreements and resolutions
-source: Dr. Hans Blix,
Chairman of UMOVIC
(UN Weapons Inspectors)
3/6/03
Unresolved Disarmament Issues Report

(Author's note: 2 Weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom, this report listed the hundreds of ways that Iraq could have proven that it had disarmed per UN resolution requirements and per the 1991 Cease-Fire Agreement signed by Iraq.)

- Fully declare the names of individuals who have been associated with Iraq's proscribed programmes.
- Provide the employment records, from 1998 to present, of the above individuals.
- Facilitate the granting of interviews in private to UNMOVIC by individuals identified by UNMOVIC as being relevant to the resolution of disarmament issues in Iraq.
- Provide complete supplier information for items Iraq has declared purchased from the "local market". Most such items have been clearly identified through inspections as foreign made and have not been processed through the UN export/import mechanism. The information to be provided should include the full name and address of the foreign supplier(s) and all intermediary persons, banks, companies, government institutions, etc., both Iraqi and foreign, involved.
- Provide full cooperation in the establishment by UNMOVIC of a system of road/rail traffic monitoring in Iraq and facilitate its implementation.
- Explain, with credible evidence, the purposes for which the various RPV/UAV platforms were created and provide the full names, Iraqi and foreign, of all organizations, institutions etc., and the associated persons involved.
- Provide details on imports for the RPV/UAV programme, such as the supply of engines, GPS guidance systems, airframes, etc. and include the full name and address of the foreign supplier(s) and all intermediary persons, banks, companies, government institutions, etc., both Iraqi and foreign, involved.

- Analysis and verification of this information and examination of it for consistency, both internally and with other information, may assist UNMOVIC to determine patterns of activity and whether Iraq is intending to develop RPV/UAVs that would be capable of carrying chemical or biological agent. While this may not result in full certainty that proscribed activities did not take place, in combination with extensive inspections and monitoring, it will help raise the level of confidence that there are no significant gaps in the information Iraq has provided UNMOVIC.
- To clear up the uncertainty as to whether Iraq has engines and key engine components that could be used for the production of proscribed missiles, Iraq should submit the remnants of the seven engines, which it claimed were “training” engines, to UNMOVIC to allow for their analysis and verification
- Present any retained proscribed missiles and associated equipment, including the 50-tonne trailer declared to have been stolen and the parts from a disassembled imported Scud TEL.
- Present the remnants of the seven engines, which it claimed were “training” engines, for analysis and verification. As proposed by Iraq on 8 February 2003, the fragments found by Iraq on 4 August 1997 should also be presented for analysis.
- Present the melted remnants of the destroyed key components, including the turbo-pumps for analysis.
- Present documentation or other evidence to support the information it had submitted during the TEM in 1998 on the number of indigenously produced warheads.
- Present other specific documentation, such as the two reports written by the missile force commander on 30 January 1991 and in May 1991; technical documentation, such as videotapes and tracking data, concerning the interception missile project; and the two diaries that relate to the unilateral destruction of the proscribed missile propellants.
- Present any remaining Scud-B guidance and control drawings, documentation and hardware.
- Explain and present credible evidence on why it had conducted proscribed missile activities and procurement after the adoption and acceptance by Iraq of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991).
- Present any remaining Fahad missiles.
- Present Al Samoud 2 missiles and related major parts, including those that were imported.
- Present all Al Samoud 2 drawings, research and production documentation.
- Present a more adequate and coherent description with credible evidence of the various SA-2 related projects, including their organizational structures.
- Present a more adequate and coherent description with credible evidence of the work carried out at Al Sadiq in the period 1991–1993, including production documentation and quality assurance records.

- Present verifiable information on inventory and consumption of SA-2 missiles, including on imported missiles and on missiles that have been fired against aircraft and those that have been dismantled.
- Explain how the parts it dismantled from SA-2 missiles were used in its Al Samoud 2 programme.
- Present all materials related to its work on the SA-2 based SLVs.
- Explain with credible evidence the precise nature of its activities concerning clustering, staging and separation mechanisms, particularly after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991).
- Present documents or other evidence substantiating its declared destruction of the UDMH fuel.
- Present all of the input/output data generated during the computer simulations of the Scud-based SLVs.
- Present all drawings of the 7-tonne thrust engine and the turbo-pump developed to simultaneously feed four clustered SA-2 engines.
- Present verifiable evidence that it abandoned R&D on the turbo-pump and the engine.
- Explain with credible evidence why it had resumed R&D on UDMH.
- Explain with credible evidence why it has developed a horizontal test stand at the Al Rafah site.
- Present credible evidence to support its assertion that it had abandoned its work on producing a non-conventional warhead for the FROG and explain the documents, which contradict this assertion.
- Declare all the sources of its import of equipment, raw materials and technology that were acquired for the solid propulsion missile programme, since 1998.
- Declare the design drawings of Al Ubour missile, including launcher and the associated radar system in order for UNMOVIC to verify that this missile is actually surface-to-air missile.
- Explain with credible evidence the reason for upgrading a test stand in Al Mu'tasim.
- Present the delivery schedule that was attached to the contract signed in 1987, and declare all the equipment, material and technology it had acquired for the Badr-2000.
- Present any remaining Scud-type special warheads to UNMOVIC.
- Present further evidence to support its declarations concerning the number of special warheads that it had produced, such as a complete production-planning chart and supporting documents.
- Provide a credible explanation for why no biological warheads were found until after 1995 and present documentary evidence in support.
- Verify its declaration of the locations of the biological warheads immediately prior to their transport to Nibai P3, where it said they had been destroyed.
- Present further explanation supplemented with verifiable evidence is required of Iraq concerning its declaration that it had unilaterally destroyed, at the same time and location, 15 biological warheads at Nibai, P3.

- Present any remaining R-400 bombs and relevant moulds.
- Provide more supporting documentation on production, inventory, delivery, etc. relating to the R-400 and R-400A bombs it manufactured.
- Provide further documentation explaining the coding system it had used with the R-400 type bombs, including the coding assigned to specific CBW agents.
- Provide credible evidence that the R-400 bomb production line stopped after September 1990.
- Provide any remaining quantities of aerial bombs configured for CW or BW purposes or provide verifiable evidence of their destruction.
- Provide credible evidence, documentary or other concerning import, production and consumption of aerial bombs configured for CW and BW purposes.
- Explain in greater detail and with supporting credible evidence the rationale, outcome and major decisions taken regarding the testing and use of aerial bombs in the BW programme.
- Provide the name and present location of the officer who produced the “Air Force document”.
- Present any existing quantities of 155 mm Mustard filled artillery shells and 122-mm rocket warheads.
- Present more detailed information and supporting documentation on the import, indigenous manufacture, delivery and inventory of the special rocket warheads, and components thereof, which were produced or acquired for the CBW programmes.
- Present more detailed information and supporting documentation on the various special warhead and canister field-tests, including tests relating to the development of binary systems.
- Present complete documentation from all military organizations, detailing their consumption of special munitions.
- Present all documents or letters referenced in the document from the Commission of Inquiry.
- Present any CBW cluster munitions that it may find.
- Provide additional information regarding CBW related cluster munitions, especially concerning the work done by “project 101” and the project’s relationship to the Al Noaman cluster bomb factory and the BW programme.
- Provide a credible explanation and documentation for the cluster bomb sub-munition component, its intended use and agent fill.
- Present any outstanding quantities of NaCN, or provide credible evidence to support that all quantities delivered have either been consumed or destroyed.
- Explain with credible evidence the process used for production of Tabun and clarify whether any volume of solvent is included as part of the quantity of Tabun declared produced (1996 FFCDD and 2002CAFCDD).
- Provide credible evidence that all quantities of DMA.HCl delivered and produced have either been consumed or destroyed.

- Provide any additional documentation to support the quantities of chemicals declared destroyed through aerial bombardment. Such documentation may include bills of lading, inventory records, Iraqi reports or memos from the early 1990s that mention the quantities and identity of the chemicals.
- Present any outstanding quantities of PCI3, or provide credible evidence that all quantities imported have been consumed, destroyed or spoiled.
- Identify all facilities, in addition to MSE and TRC, involved in production/modification of munitions (artillery shells, rockets, etc.) into true binary weapons.
- Explain with credible evidence, all details regarding the design for binary weapons munitions.
- Provide credible evidence to support the declared quantities of thionylchloride imported, produced and destroyed through armed action, explaining how more was destroyed by UNSCOM than declared available.
- Provide any additional documentation to support the quantities of chemicals declared destroyed through aerial bombardment. Such documentation may include bills of lading, inventory records, Iraqi reports or memos from the early 1990s that mention the quantities and identity of the chemicals.
- Present any existing spray (drop) tanks or other spray devices modified for CBW purposes.
- Provide documents or other evidence that explain what type(s) of spray-devices it had developed or had planned to develop, and for which agents, for the MiG-21 RPV and any other RPV.
- Account for all of the L-29 aircraft, provide all records of unmanned flight tests and explain the presence of an L-29 at Tallil Air Force base in 1997.
- Account for all of the smaller RPV and UAV aircraft and provide all of the flight-testing records up to the present (March 2003).
- Provide all of the procurement details relating to RPV components including records from 1998 to 2003.
- Provide details on the control mechanisms for the smaller RPVs, the location of the transmitters and the frequencies used.
- Provide documents that explain the letter of 10 December 1990 from the Director General of the MSE to the Deputy Director of MIC. The letter indicates that, contrary to Iraq's declarations to UNSCOM by December 1990 it had successfully developed a CW spray-tank.
- Provide further explanation and documentation on their work on spray (drop) tanks for CW purpose.
- Explain the letter dated 25 August 1991, which appears to contradict Iraq's declaration to UNSCOM that, due to a shortage of valves, it could not produce more spray tanks.
- Present any quantities of Mustard filled 155 mm artillery shells and aerial bombs or provide credible evidence of their destruction.

- Present any remaining quantities of phosphorous trichloride, or provide credible evidence that all quantities imported have been consumed, destroyed or spoiled.
- Present any remaining quantities of thiodiglycol, or provide credible evidence that all quantities imported have been consumed, destroyed or spoiled.
- Present any remaining quantities of chloroethanol, or provide credible evidence that all quantities imported have been consumed or destroyed.
- Present complete documentation from all military organizations, detailing their consumption of CW special munitions.
- Provide credible evidence to support the declared quantities of thionylchloride imported, produced and destroyed through armed action, explaining how more was destroyed by UNSCOM than declared available.
- Provide the name and present location of the officer who produced the Air Force document.
- Present any outstanding quantities of phosphorous trichloride and phosphorous pentasulphide, or provide credible evidence that all quantities imported have been consumed, destroyed or spoiled.
- Present any quantity of the immediate precursors for “Iraqi choline”, diisopropylamine (DIPA) and chloroethanol, or provide credible evidence that all quantities imported and produced have been consumed, destroyed or spoiled.
- Present all documents and other evidence relating to work on VX development (including concepts of use, production, R&D, scaling up, stabilization, destruction orders and decision to abandon the VX program).
- In connection with Iraq’s assertion that it had been unable to weaponize VX, explain with credible evidence 1) why the VX it declared produced in 1990 and unilaterally destroyed in 1991, was not indicated in the 1990 MSE storage inventory, 2) why a nerve agent degradation product was found on a swipe sample from a warhead by one laboratory.
- Present credible evidence for the finding of a VX stabilizer spread over a large area and depth indicative of quantities far in excess of the few grammes of VX stabilizer Iraq declared it had used.
- Present credible evidence that there were no more than 2 batches of VX produced from the second half of 1988 up to the beginning of the Gulf war.
- Present documentary information on munitions designed to be filled with VX, including binary-types.
- Provide credible evidence to support the declared quantities of thionylchloride imported, produced and destroyed through armed action, explaining how more was destroyed by UNSCOM than declared available.
- Provide credible evidence of the outcome of the 738,145 Dinar credit balance with foreign suppliers in 1988.

- Provide an inventory, with credible evidence, for all buried equipment at the Samarra site of MSE.
- Present any outstanding quantities of phosphorous trichloride, or provide credible evidence that all quantities imported have been consumed, destroyed or spoiled.
- Present documentation or, other credible evidence, on work to indigenously produce pinacolylalcohol at the pre-industrial level.
- Provide credible evidence to support the declared quantities of thionylchloride imported, produced and destroyed through armed action, explaining how more was destroyed by UNSCOM than declared available.
- Provide any additional documentation to support the quantities of chemicals declared destroyed through aerial bombardment. Such documentation may include bills of lading, inventory records, Iraqi reports or memos from the early 1990s that mention the quantities and identity of the chemicals.
- Present any remaining stocks of anthrax or provide evidence for its destruction.
- Explain, with credible supporting evidence: the finding of anthrax in the equipment at FMDV, its statement that anthrax had not been produced in 1991, the unaccounted for for bacterial growth media, its statement that bulk agent was not deployed.
- Provide documentation or other evidence, to support its account of unilateral destruction of BW agent in 1991.
- Present any remaining stocks of botulinum toxin to UNMOVIC.
- Provide complete records of its entire production of botulinum toxin in particular for the period since 1989.
- Provide a detailed declaration supported by credible evidence of the types and total numbers of weapons it had filled with botulinum toxin.
- Provide complete fermenter production records for all of the bacterial agents it had produced, including the periods during which each agent had been produced, in particular for the years 1989 and 1991.
- Explain the occurrence of botulinum toxin type B on the fermenter found at Al Hakam.
- Provide a credible explanation for why it had chosen to pursue the development of aflatoxin.
- Provide documentation relating to its work on mycotoxins, such as laboratory notes, etc.
- Provide credible evidence of the types and total numbers of a munition it had filled with aflatoxin.
- Provide evidence supporting its declarations on the quantities of wheat cover smut declared produced, consumed and destroyed.
- Provide a detailed explanation and supporting documentation on the organization(s) and sources of funding for the work on this agent.
- Present any remaining stocks of Clostridium perfringens. - Present documents and other evidence that explain the

- concept of use, including the types of weapons to be used, it had developed for the agent.
- Provide information with supporting documents – production records – for the quantities of the agent it produced, in particular, for the years 1989 and 1991.
- Present any remaining stocks of ricin it had produced.
- Provide a detailed explanation and supporting documentation on the organization(s) and sources of funding for the work on this agent.
- Provide credible evidence which shows when it started to produce the agent as well as the total quantities it had produced to date.
- Present any remaining stocks of undeclared agents it had produced.
- Provide a comprehensive account, with credible supporting documentation, of the peptone and TSB it had declared imported.
- Provide Annual Reports relating to its BW programme for the years 1989 and 1991. Such reports should exist, as Iraq had provided an Annual Report for 1990 to UNSCOM.
- Provide more information and supporting documentation on its efforts to dry BW agents, in particular concerning its attempts to acquire specialized dryers from abroad and indigenous modification and production of dryers.
- Provide more information and supporting documentation on the drying of bacterial insecticide at Al Hakam from 1992 to 1995.
- Provide detailed information with supporting evidence, such as documentation, on fermenter production schedules for the bacterial BW agents produced.
- Provide a credible account with supporting evidence, for the unaccounted for peptone and TSB growth media.
- Provide information on any work done on smallpox whether for military or civilian purposes after 1972 including vaccinations of civilians and military troops.
- Provide records of destruction of smallpox isolates obtained in 1972.
- Provide documentation, such logbooks, laboratory notes, etc. relating to the research on camelpox as well as documents from other levels of the management hierarchy concerning virus research in connection with the BW programme.
- Provide more documentation that details its production and use of simulants, including the locations, quantities and specific timing of production.
- Provide information on the use of all simulants.

(Author's note: Iraq had been instructed to do all of these items listed above for over 10 years. At the time of the report, it was clear that Iraq was going to face military action if it did not comply with the above requests from UN inspectors, yet Iraq did none of the above-listed verbatim from the UNMOVIC report to the UN and Iraq.)

APPENDIX C
Highlights
of Dr. David Kay's
Interim Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) Report
10/02/03

It is far too early to reach any definitive conclusions and, in some areas, we may never reach that goal.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

It is important to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are searching for, in the quantities we would expect to find, can be concealed in spaces not much larger than a two car garage;

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We have discovered...

...Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles --probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

With regard to biological warfare activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the UN and was previously unknown.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

In a similar vein, two key former BW scientists, confirmed that Iraq under the guise of legitimate activity developed refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The scientists discussed the development of improved, simplified fermentation and spray drying capabilities for the simulant Bt that would have been directly applicable to anthrax, and one scientist confirmed that the production line for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

A very large body of information has been developed through debriefings, site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi documents

that confirms that Iraq concealed equipment and materials from UN inspectors when they returned in 2002. One noteworthy example is a collection of reference strains that ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a vial of live *C. botulinum* Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced. This discovery - hidden in the home of a BW scientist - illustrates the point I made earlier about the difficulty of locating small stocks of material that can be used to covertly surge production of deadly weapons.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

In searching for retained stocks of chemical munitions, ISG has had to contend with the almost unbelievable scale of Iraq's conventional weapons armory, which dwarfs by orders of magnitude the physical size of any conceivable stock of chemical weapons. For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50 square miles in size and hold an estimated 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs and other ordinance. Of these 130 ASPs, approximately 120 still remain unexamined. As Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their chemical ordinance and to store it at the same ASPs that held conventional rounds, the size of the required search effort is enormous.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

While searching for retained weapons, ISG teams have developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored the possibility of CW production in recent years, possibly as late as 2003. When Saddam had asked a senior military official in either 2001 or 2002 how long it would take to produce new chemical agent and weapons, he told ISG that after he consulted with CW experts in OMI he responded it would take six months for mustard. Another senior Iraqi chemical weapons expert in responding to a request in mid-2002 from Uday Husayn for CW for the Fedayeen Saddam estimated that it would take two months to produce mustard and two years for Sarin.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

With regard to Iraq's nuclear program, the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain

nuclear weapons. They have told ISG that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. These officials assert that Saddam would have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future point.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Some indicated a resumption after Iraq was free of sanctions. At least one senior Iraqi official believed that by 2000 Saddam had run out of patience with waiting for sanctions to end and wanted to restart the nuclear program. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) beginning around 1999 expanded its laboratories and research activities and increased its overall funding levels. This expansion may have been in initial preparation for renewed nuclear weapons research, although documentary evidence of this has not been found, and this is the subject of continuing investigation by ISG.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began several small and relatively unsophisticated research initiatives that could be applied to nuclear weapons development.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Despite evidence of Saddam's continued ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material. However, Iraq did take steps to preserve some technological capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.

According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, some of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program remained largely intact, performing work on nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies within the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). Some scientists from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program have told ISG that they believed that these working groups were preserved in order to allow a reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program, but none of the scientists could produce official orders or plans to support their belief.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

In some cases, these groups performed work which could help preserve the science base and core skills that would be needed for any future fissile material production or nuclear weapons development.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Several scientists - at the direction of senior Iraqi government officials - preserved documents and equipment from their pre-1991 nuclear weapon-related research and did not reveal this to the UN/IAEA. One Iraqi scientist recently stated in an interview with ISG that it was a "common understanding" among the scientists that material was being preserved for reconstitution of nuclear weapons-related work.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

The ISG nuclear team has found indications that there was interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment program. Most of this activity centered on activities of Dr. Sa'id that caused some of his former colleagues in the pre-1991 nuclear program to suspect that Dr. Sa'id, at least, was considering a restart of the centrifuge program. We do not yet fully understand Iraqi intentions, and the evidence does not tie any activity directly to centrifuge research or development.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Exploitation of additional documents may shed light on the projects and program plans of Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id. There may be more projects to be discovered in research placed at universities and private companies. Iraqi interest in reconstitution of a uranium enrichment program needs to be better understood through the analysis of procurement records and additional interviews.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Detainees and co-operative sources indicate that beginning in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1000km and that measures to conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were initiated in late-2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors. Work was also underway for a clustered engine liquid propellant missile, and it appears the work had progressed to a point to support initial prototype production of some parts and assemblies. According to a cooperating senior detainee, Saddam concluded that the proposals from both the liquid-propellant and solid-propellant missile design centers would take too long. For instance, the liquid-propellant missile project team forecast first delivery in six years. Saddam countered in 2000 that he wanted the missile designed and built inside of six months. On the other hand several sources contend that Saddam's range requirements for the missiles grew from 400-500km in 2000 to 600-1000km in 2002.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

ISG has gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly underway in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC. This program was not declared to the UN.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

ISG is presently seeking additional confirmation and details on this project. A second cooperative source has stated that the program actually began in 2001, but that it received added impetus in the run-up to OIF, and that missiles from this project were transferred to a facility north of Baghdad. This source also provided documentary evidence of instructions to convert SA-2s into surface-to-surface missiles.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

The range goals cited for this system vary from over 400km up to 1000km, depending on the source and the payload mass.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

A cooperative source, involved in the 2001-2002 deliberations on the long-range solid propellant project, provided ISG with a set of concept designs for a launcher designed to accommodate a 1m diameter by 9m length missile. The limited detail in the drawings suggest there was some way to go before launcher fabrication. The source believes that these drawings would not have been requested until the missile progress was relatively advanced, normally beyond the design state. The drawing are in CAD format, with files dated 09/01/02.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

While we have obtained enough information to make us confident that this design effort was underway, we are not yet confident which accounts of the timeline and project progress are accurate and are now seeking to better understand this program and its actual progress at the time of OIF.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

While I have spoken so far of planned missile systems, one high-level detainee has recently claimed that Iraq retained a small quantity of Scud-variant missiles until at least 2001, although he subsequently recanted these claims, work continues to determine the truth. Two other sources contend that Iraq continued to produce until 2001 liquid fuel and oxidizer specific to Scud-type systems. The cooperating source claims that the al Tariq Factory was used to manufacture Scud oxidizer (IRFNA) from 1996 to 2001, and that nitrogen tetroxide, a chief ingredient of IRFNA was collected from a bleed port on the production equipment, was reserved, and then mixed with highly concentrated nitric acid plus an inhibitor to produce Scud oxidizer. Iraq never declared its pre-Gulf War capability to manufacture Scud IRFNA out of fear, multiple sources have stated, that the al Tariq Factory would be destroyed, leaving Baghdad without the ability to produce highly concentrated nitric acid, explosives and munitions. To date we have not discovered documentary or material evidence to corroborate these claims, but continued efforts are underway to clarify and confirm this information with additional Iraqi sources and to locate corroborating physical evidence. If we can confirm that the fuel was produced as late as 2001, and given that Scud fuel can only be used in Scud-variant missiles, we will have strong evidence that the missiles must

have been retained until that date. This would, of course, be yet another example of a failure to declare prohibited activities to the UN.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms and maintained two UAV programs that were working in parallel, one at Ibn Farnas and one at al-Rashid Air Force Base. Ibn Farnas worked on the development of smaller, more traditional types of UAVs in addition to the conversion of manned aircraft into UAVs. This program was not declared to the UN until the 2002 CAFCD in which Iraq declared the RPV-20, RPV-30 and Pigeon RPV systems to the UN. All these systems had declared ranges of less than 150km. Several Iraqi officials stated that the RPV-20 flew over 500km on autopilot in 2002, contradicting Iraq's declaration on the system's range. The al-Rashid group was developing a competing line of UAVs. This program was never fully declared to the UN and is the subject of on-going work by ISG. Additional work is also focusing on the payloads and intended use for these UAVs.

Surveillance and use as decoys are uses mentioned by some of those interviewed. Given Iraq's interest before the Gulf War in attempting to convert a MIG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents, attention is being paid to whether any of the newer generation of UAVs were intended to have a similar purpose.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

In addition to the activities detailed here on Iraq's attempts to develop delivery systems beyond the permitted UN 150km, ISG has also developed information on Iraqi attempts to purchase proscribed missiles and missile technology. Documents found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included an October 2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate Iraqi interest in the transfer of technology for surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1300km (probably No Dong) and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300km. The document quotes the North Koreans as understanding the limitations imposed by the UN, but being prepared "to cooperate with Iraq on the items it specified". At the time of OIF, these discussions had not led to any missiles being transferred to Iraq. A high level

cooperating source has reported that in late 2002 at Saddam's behest a delegation of Iraqi officials was sent to meet with foreign export companies, including one that dealt with missiles. Iraq was interested in buying an advanced ballistic missile with 270km and 500km ranges.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

The ISG has also identified a large volume of material and testimony by cooperating Iraq officials on Iraq's effort to illicitly procure parts and foreign assistance for its missile program.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

However, there is little doubt from the evidence already gathered that there was substantial illegal procurement for all aspects of the missile programs.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay

Although we are resisting drawing conclusions in this first interim report, a number of things have become clearer already as a result of our investigation, among them:

Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.

In the delivery systems area there were already well advanced, but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF had not intervened, would have resulted in the production of missiles with ranges at least up to 1000 km, well in excess of the UN permitted range of 150 km. These missile activities were supported by a serious clandestine procurement program about which we have much still to learn.

In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going research and

development activities that were embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn about the exact work programs and capabilities of these activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.

-10/2/03 Iraqi Survey Group Interim Report (unclassified)-David Kay